The Two Faces of Diebold

SAIC was commissioned to perform a study on security issues in Diebold voting machines by the State of Maryland. One of the conditions Diebold set on the report in return for allowing access to their machines for the study was the right to redact whatever they wanted from the public version of the report. The public version of the report (PDF) was 38 pages. The unredacted version was 152 pages plus 41 pages of appendices. The private version of the report has now been leaked, and Rebecca Abrahams writes about the differences.

November 5, 2006 · 1 min

TSA Fails Screening Tests, Looks for Who Leaked the Results

The TSA badly failed a recent set of tests at Newark’s Liberty Airport. TSA screeners missed 90% of the guns and explosives that testers put through the system. TSA’s response? Immediate action to try to find out who leaked the results. (Via Bruce Schneier’s blog.)

October 31, 2006 · 1 min

Point out the obvious, get raided by the FBI

Security researcher Chris Soghoian, a graduate student at Indiana University’s School for Informatics and an intern at Google, set up a website that functions as a boarding pass generator for Northwest Airlines. The site contained a form that allowed you to fill in name, flight number, destination, and all of the other information on a boarding pass, and would display a boarding pass that would be indistinguishable from the real thing at the TSA security checkpoints. He pointed out that the identity check at the TSA checkpoint amounts to nothing more than a comparison between the name on a picture ID and the name on a boarding pass, and that this provides no security whatsoever. I’m not sure what threat this check is even supposed to be trying to mitigate. At best, it is an attempt to piggy-back on the check against the no-fly list (which is itself a complete joke) that is performed by the airlines when you purchase a ticket, but clearly that fails as his boarding pass generator is one of several ways to create a boarding pass in a name other than your own–including modifying the displayed text generated by any airline’s online site or even purchasing a ticket in any name you choose. The latter was displayed vividly by a couple of guys who purchased tickets in the names of “Al Kyder” and “Terry Wrist” (link includes video). In my opinion, the only actual purpose served by checking for a valid boarding pass at the TSA checkpoint is to reduce the number of people passing through the checkpoint in order to most efficiently make use of security resources. It does not otherwise have any effect on security; it provides no deterrent to an attacker. It is not effective in screening out those with malicious intent, and it is not even effective in verifying identity. Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) has called for Chris Soghoian to be arrested. He was visited and interrogated by the FBI, then went to stay at his parents’ house. Friday night, the FBI broke their way into his apartment, seized his computers, and generally trashed his place. Lesson: Point out U.S. security weaknesses, and you will be punished. Those responsible for the weaknesses and idiocy of U.S. “security theater,” however, will not be held accountable. This is one of the rare times when Michelle Malkin actually says something correct. Other coverage: Jim Harper, author of the excellent book Identity Crisis, at the Technology Liberation Front and at Cato@Liberty (this post does a good job of pointing out the problems with the TSA identity check). Bruce Schneier, at his blog. And there’s some rather good coverage in multiple posts at BoingBoing. The problem that Soghoian pointed out was previously described in February 2005 on Slate.com by Andy Bowers, and in 2003 by Bruce Schneier in his Crypt-o-Gram newsletter. So yes, Kip Hawley is still an idiot. UPDATE (November 2, 2006): Bruce Schneier has written a detailed description of the flaw in the security design of the TSA identity check, and makes the same point that even if the flaw is corrected it doesn’t add any real security because it’s just a check of the no-fly list.

October 29, 2006 · 3 min

Innocent torture victim still on no-fly list

Maher Arar, a Canadian (born in Syria) who was arrested by the U.S. and sent to Syria where he was tortured as a result of the RCMP’s erroneous labeling of him as someone associated with al Qaeda, was unable to receive a human rights award in Washington, D.C. because his name is still on the TSA no-fly list. Arar currently has a lawsuit pending in Canada against the RCMP. (Also see the Wikipedia entry on Arar.) This is further evidence of the TSA’s failure to competently maintain the no-fly list. UPDATE (October 20, 2006): Ed Brayton has discussed this story today. UPDATE (January 23, 2007): The U.S. Attorney General and head of Homeland Security are both insisting that Arar remain on the no-fly list for reasons which they have disclosed only to officials in Canada. The Canadians don’t think those reasons make any sense. My guess is that they think somebody they sent off to be tortured might have a beef with the people who did it to him.

October 19, 2006 · 1 min

The U.S. no-fly list is a joke

Steve Kroft of 60 Minutes has obtained a copy of the no-fly list being used for airline passenger screening. The list includes people who are not a threat (like Evo Morales, president of Bolivia, Saddam Hussein, and 14 of the 19 dead 9/11 hijackers). It includes numerous common names that are useless for screening purposes–Gary Smith, John Williams, and Robert Johnson are on the list. Kroft spoke with 12 Robert Johnsons, and all of them said they are detained almost every time they try to fly. Worse yet, it doesn’t include the names of some of the most dangerous living terrorists: The 11 British suspects recently charged with plotting to blow up airliners with liquid explosives were not on it, despite the fact they were under surveillance for more than a year. The name of David Belfor who now goes by Dahud Sala Hudine, is not on the list, even though he assassinated someone in Washington, D.C., for former Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini. This is because the accuracy of the list meant to uphold security takes a back seat to overarching security needs: it could get into the wrong hands. “The government doesn’t want that information outside the government,” says Cathy Berrick, director of Homeland Security investigations for the General Accounting Office.I’d say that particular name is well known outside of the government now, Ms. Berrick. The TSA has allegedly been trying to fix the list for three years, spending $144 million to do so, but there is “nothing tangible yet." This is staggering incompetence. Kip Hawley is still an idiot. UPDATE (October 5, 2006): I second Tim Lee’s recommendation of Jim Harper’s commentary on what’s wrong with watch lists.

October 5, 2006 · 2 min

Kip Hawley is an idiot

Ryan Bird wrote “Kip Hawley is an idiot” on his clear plastic bag of toiletries that he was carrying through a TSA security checkpoint at Milwaukee’s General Mitchell International Airport. Kip Hawley is the head of the Transportation Security Administration. Bird writes: At the MKE “E” checkpoint I placed my laptop in one bin, and my shoes, cell phone and quart bag in a second bin. The TSA guy who was pushing bags and bins into the X-ray machine took a good hard look, and then as the bag when though the X-ray I think he told the X-ray operator to call for a bag check/explosive swab on my roller bag to slow me down. He went strait to the TSA Supervisor on duty and boy did he come marching over to the checkpoint with fire in his eyes! He grabbed the baggie as it came out of the X-ray and asked if it was mine. After responding yes, he pointed at my comment and demanded to know “What is this supposed to mean?” “It could me a lot of things, it happens to be an opinion on mine.” “You can’t write things like this” he said, “You mean my First Amendment right to freedom of speech doesn’t apply here?” “Out there (pointing pass the id checkers) not while in here (pointing down) was his response." At this point I chuckled, just looking at him wondering if he just realized how foolish that comment was, but I think my laugh pushed him over the edge as he got really angry at this point. A Milwaukee County Sheriffs deputy was summoned - I would have left at this point, but he had my quart bag with my toothpaste and hair gel. When the deputy got over the TSA supervisor showed him the bag and told him what had happened to that point. After he had finished I started to remind him he had left out his statement that my First Amendment rights didn’t apply “here” but was cut off by the deputy who demanding my ID. I asked if I was under arrest, and his response was “Right now you are not under arrest, you are being detained.” I produced my passport and he walked off with it and called in my name to see if I had any outstanding warrants, etc. The TSA supervisor picked up the phone about 20 feet away and called someone? At this point two more officers were near by and I struck up a conversation with the female officer who was making sure I kept put. I explained to her who Kip Hawley was, why I though he was an idiot, and my surprise that the TSA Supervisor felt my First Amendment rights didn’t’ apply at the TSA checkpoint. She didn’t say much. After he was assured I didn’t have any warrants out the first office came back and I had my first chance to really speak, I explained that I was just expressing my opinion and my writing should be protected my by First Amendment rights. When he didn’t respond, I then repeated that the TSA Supervisor stated my First Amendment rights didn’t apply at the TSA check point and I asked if he (the deputy) agreed that was the case. He responded by saying “You can’t yell fire in a crowed theater, there are limits to your rights. At this point I chucked again. I asked how this was even remotely like shouting “Fire” in a crowd, and his answer was “Perhaps your comments made them feel threatened." At about this point the TSA Supervisor finished up his phone call, and summoned the officer back over. They talked for about 2 minutes, and then both came back over. The officer pulled out his pad and asked for my address and I asked why he needed it. “For the report I have to file since I was summoned here” I started to give it, when I noticed the TSA Supervisor was writing it down as well, so I stopped and asked why he needed it. He said he needed to file an incident report too, and I took the opportunity to ask what the resolution of the incident was, did I do anything wrong? Are you going to ask the officer to arrest me? He said no, I was free to go, but he was going to confiscate my bag. I asked “If I did nothing wrong, why would you take my bag” He pointed to a posted sign that said something about reusing plastic bags (the MKE TSA was providing quart sized zipper bags to pax today) I let him know that I had brought my bag from home and would not be letting him take it. He then asked for permission of photograph it, which I agreed too. While he walked away to get the camera I finished giving my address to the deputy, and he told my “You’re free to go” Total time, about 25 minutes.Hat tip to Tim Lee at the Technology Liberation Front. CNN’s given coverage to the story. Also see kiphawleyisanidiot.com. ...

September 30, 2006 · 5 min

The ineffectiveness of TRUSTe

The TRUSTe program is supposed to certify that a website has a reasonable privacy policy. But Ben Edelman has cross-referenced TRUSTe certifications with SiteAdvisor ratings, and found that sites with TRUSTe certifications are twice as likely as those without to be listed as “untrustworthy” in SiteAdvisor’s database–meaning that they send out spam, distribute spyware, etc. Edelman calls out four particularly notorious sites that have or have had TRUSTe certification: Direct-Revenue.com, Funwebproducts.com, Maxmoolah.com, and Webhancer.com. All four are heavily involved with spyware. Direct Revenue and Maxmoolah have had their TRUSTe certifications revoked, but should never have been certified in the first place if TRUSTe was doing the validation they should have been doing. TRUSTe has long been criticized by anti-spammers for giving certifications to organizations that don’t deserve them. Ryan Singel has raised similar questions about TRUSTe’s reliability. ...

September 29, 2006 · 2 min

Hotel minibar keys open Diebold voting machines

Ed Felten points out that Diebold voting machines use a standard, commonly used key that is used for things like hotel minibars, office furniture, jukeboxes, and electronic equipment. UPDATE (January 23, 2007): Diebold helpfully displays a photograph of the key on their website–which is sufficient to make a duplicate that works.

September 18, 2006 · 1 min

More on Diebold voting machine insecurity

Ed Felten announces the release of his paper and an accompanying video about major security issues with Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machines.

September 13, 2006 · 1 min

Accidentally drop iPod in airplane toilet, get caught in a Kafkaesque mess

This is complete absurdity. This bureaucratic overreaction (in Canada) should never have happened. Some of the more interesting questions from the interrogations: What do you think about 9/11? What are your views on the Iran issue? Do you think government is too big, too powerful? Do you connect to the Internet on this laptop? Have you downloaded any images? Do you have any pornography? Via Bruce Schneier’s blog.

August 25, 2006 · 1 min
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