John Wilkins has written a blog post on definitions of atheism and agnosticism, in which he suggests that the definition of atheism has been shifting of late (and encroaching upon agnosticism’s territory). His discussion and that which follows in the comments is well worth reading. Anonymous (2009-06-26): Jim, Why don't you weigh in? You, Wilkins, and Moran… just like the old days of USENET. ...
John Wilkins sets out “a code of conduct for effective rational discussion," a list of principles for debate and discussion that aims at approaching truth rather than winning a rhetorical battle, at the new location of his Evolving Thoughts blog. The list of proposed principles is: The Fallibility PrincipleThe Truth-Seeking PrincipleThe Clarity PrincipleThe Burden of Proof PrincipleThe Principle of CharityThe Relevance PrincipleThe Acceptability PrincipleThe Sufficiency PrincipleThe Rebuttal PrincipleThe Resolution PrincipleThe Suspension of Judgement PrincipleThe Reconsideration PrincipleFleck’s AddendumCheck out Evolving Thoughts for discussion of each of these principles. ...
Last night, Daniel Dennett gave the 2009 Beyond Center lecture with a talk appropriate for the bicentennial of Charles Darwin’s birthday, titled “Darwin’s ‘Strange Inversion of Reasoning.’” While not quite drawing the crowd that last year’s lecture by Richard Dawkins did (3000 people at Gammage Auditorium), Dennett filled the 485-seat Galvin Playhouse and an overflow room was set up with a video link. The Phoenix Atheists Meetup group alone had about 57 members who attended. The talk was videotaped by the Beyond Center, and what may be an unauthorized video has been made available on YouTube. Skyhooks and Cranes The content of Dennett’s talk was largely drawn from his book, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, and centered on the idea that Darwin brought about a change from thinking of the world as the product of top-down design to a recognition of apparent design as the result of bottom-up processes. Dennett referred to the former as the “trickle-down theory of creation” and the latter as the “bubble-up theory of creation,” and used his “intuition pump” of skyhooks vs. cranes to make the point. “Skyhooks” are explanations of design in terms of miraculous intervention by an entity which itself has no explanation, a deus ex machina. Dennett illustrated that with the drawing above, a Guy Billout illustration titled “Deus ex Machina,” from the May 1999 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. By contrast, “cranes” are built up from the ground to provide scaffolding for constructing new things. The dome of the Florence Cathedral (Santa Maria del Fiore), depicted in Billout’s illustration, was a marvel of engineering by Filippo Brunelleschi, which used some innovative construction techniques to build something that many thought was not possible. Darwin’s “Strange Inversion of Reasoning” The title of Dennett’s talk came from a critique of Darwin’s theory of natural selection by Robert Beverley MacKenzie in 1868, who wrote (as quoted by Dennett in DDA, p. 65): In the theory with which we have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer; so that we may enunciate as the fundamental principle of the whole system that, IN ORDER TO MAKE A PERFECT AND BEAUTIFUL MACHINE, IT IS NOT REQUISITE TO KNOW HOW TO MAKE IT. This proposition will be found, on careful examination, to express, in condensed form, the essential purport of the Theory, and to express in a few words all Mr. Darwin’s meaning; who, by a strange inversion of reasoning, seems to think Absolute Ignorance fully qualified to take the place of Absolute Wisdom in all the achievements of creative skill.To which Dennett’s response was: “Exactly!” He illustrated the point with an example that is now somewhat commonplace, the computer. Dennett observed that prior to Alan Turing, “computers” referred to people who were hired to perform tasks that today are performed by mechanical devices with the same name. In order to perform these functions, people had to understand arithmetic. Dennett cited Turing’s 1936 paper, “On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem" (PDF), a demonstration that arithmetic computation is a specific case where, in fact, understanding is not required to perform the action–another example of the same kind of “strange inversion of reasoning.” Dennett quotes Turing: “The behaviour of the computer [meaning a person] at any moment is determined by the symbols which he is observing and his ‘state of mind’ at that moment,” noting that “state of mind” is in quotes because Turing’s showing a method by which no mental activity or understanding is actually required. Substituting into MacKenzie’s argument, we get “IN ORDER TO BE A PERFECT AND BEAUTIFUL COMPUTING MACHINE, IT IS NOT REQUISITE TO KNOW WHAT ARITHMETIC IS." Creationists and Mind-Creationists Dennett observed that many people cannot abide Darwin, and we call them creationists. There are also people who can’t abide Turing, and he suggests we call them mind-creationists. (Steve Novella’s presentation at last year’s The Amazing Meeting, on “Dualism and Creationism," drew this same analogy.) Dennett said that there are some people who can’t abide either–including both Jerry Fodor and Thomas Nagel, referring to his paper “Public Education and Intelligent Design” in Philosophy and Public Affairs vol. 36, no. 2. I think Dennett mischaracterizes Nagel’s position here–Nagel is an atheist who thinks that we don’t have the full account of evolutionary theory, and who also thinks that if a god exists, there’s no reason to think science couldn’t study such a being and its effects. I agree with Nagel about that–methodological naturalism could potentially find its own limits and suggest the existence of entities that operate independently of the laws of physics we’ve discovered. I think we’d end up just modifying our understanding of those laws and continuing to call the result “natural.” Jake Young, at the Pure Pedantry ScienceBlog, argues otherwise, defending Stephen J. Gould’s “Nonoverlapping Magisteria” (NOMA), the view that science and religion are completely distinct subjects with no intersection, a view I find implausible unless religion is restricted to matters that are completely unobservable and have no causal consequences in the empirical world–which is not the case for any actual religion that I’m aware of. A few of the “mind-creationists” Dennett pointed out were Jerry Fodor and John Searle. Another is Victor Reppert, author of C.S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, the main argument of which I criticized in a short paper (“Historical But Indistinguishable Differences: Some Notes on Victor Reppert’s Paper,” Philo vol. 2, no. 1, 1999, pp. 45-47). Reppert’s position is that Turing machines don’t actually do arithmetic, because they have no semantics, only syntax, and that you only get meaning through original intentionality of the sort that John Searle argues is an irreducible feature of the world. Computers only have semantics when we impute it to them. My argument was that if you have two possible worlds that are exactly alike, except that one was created by a top-down designer and one evolved, there’s no reason to say that one has semantics and the other one doesn’t–how they got to the point at which they have creatures with internal representations that stand in the right causal relationships to the external world doesn’t make a difference to whether or not those representations actually refer and have meaning. [UPDATE (March 3, 2009): Victor Reppert says I’ve misdescribed his position and elaborates a bit at his own blog.] Hunting for Skyhooks Dennett observed that people’s issues with bubble-up theories of creation and design center around the fact that some designs seem to be too remarkable to have evolved. Michael Behe’s notion of “irreducible complexity” is the idea that some structures require all of their parts in place to function at all, and cannot evolve step-by-step from a previous structure that doesn’t also have all of those parts. (The mistake there is that the previous structure may have some other function.) So those arguing for intelligent design have gone “hunting for skyhooks,” to try to find examples of design in nature that require a top-down designer’s intervening hand to bring into existence. Dennett observed that all of the hunting for skyhooks has failed to come up with any actual examples, but instead has resulted in multiple new discoveries of cranes. This is certainly true for the main examples of “irreducible complexity,” blood clotting systems and bacterial flagella. This has led to the quip, “evolution is cleverer than you are,” which Dennett discussed in the Q&A as “Orgel’s Second Rule." Another example Dennett gave was the discovery of motor proteins, which he showed using a clip from the film “The Inner Life of the Cell," produced by XVIVO for Harvard University. Dennett didn’t mention that this film was the subject of a controversy regarding the film “Expelled," pre-release versions of which used XVIVO footage without permission. Earlier still, intelligent design advocate William Dembski used an overdubbed version of their film in his lectures. The Bubble-up Path “We are made of trillions of mindless little robots,” Dennett said, “but not a one of them knows who you are or cares.” But we do know, and we do care. How is that possible? The bubble-up view has to provide an explanation. Dennett provided some examples of how certain evolutionary changes in the past have created entirely new ways for evolution to proceed. His first example was one that was championed for years by Lynn Margulis to much resistance, but which has now become mainstream, which is the idea of a symbiotic origin for eukaryotes. For the first 2.5 billion years of life, everything was prokaryotic–single-celled organisms without a nucleus. But then, one form of single-celled organisms invaded another without destroying each other, and came to evolve together, forming eukaryotic life. Each of our cells has not only its own genome in the cell nucleus, but a separate genome in its mitochondria, which is inherited only from our mothers. This development allowed cells to become more complex and versatile, as well as allowed a division of labor that made multicellular life possible. The Need-to-Know Principle Dennett showed a video clip about the cuckoo (the link is to a different but similar one). The mother bird lays her egg in the nest of another bird, and removes one of the other bird’s eggs. The other bird is then surprised to find that one of its eggs–the cuckoo’s egg–hatches first, and the hatchling pushes the other eggs out of the nest. It seems evil, Dennett said, but “don’t worry, the cuckoo chick doesn’t know what it does. It doesn’t need to know." A principle something like the CIA’s need-to-know principle applies in evolution as a matter of thrift, but matters are often confused because biologists tend to attribute more understanding when explaining a feature of living things than actually exists. This, Dennett says, is partly a linguistic matter, because we don’t have a word for a “semi-understood quasi-representation” or a “hemi-semi-demi-understood quasi-representation.” But Turing does give us models of competence without comprehension. He then showed a video of a New Caledonian crow trying to use a bit of metal wire to get a worm out of a glass beaker. The crow bends the wire around the glass to make it into a hook, then uses it to fish the worm out of the beaker. This was an example of a creature that goes a step beyond the cuckoo chick. Dennett cited the work of Ruth Millikan, noting that the crow is an example of an animal that represents its goals in the same system in which it represents its facts–but not its reasons for those goals, which are produced by evolution and not represented within the organism. The MacCready Explosion and Memes Dennett observed that there has been about 3.5 billion years since the start of the whole tree of life, and only about 6 million years since the divergence of humans from chimps and bonobos, our closest hominid relatives. But a mere 10,000 years ago, as Paul MacCready pointed out, the total human population plus livestock and pets composed about a tenth of one percent of the terrestrial vertebrate biomass. Today, however, we consume 98% of it (most of which is cattle). The Cambrian “explosion” in which multicellular life became dramatically more diversified took place over millions of years, while the “MacCready explosion” took place over a mere 500 generations, and the explanation is science and technology, communicated from parents to children not by biological evolution but through culture. Here Dennett gave an introduction to memes by analogy–the cultural highway of transmission of ideas, once it exists, can be invaded by “rogue cultural variants,” or “memes,” as Richard Dawkins originally called them They are vehicles of information, like viruses, that invade our brains. He then paused for a “skeptical interlude” to address the question of what’s the evidence that memes even exist. He asked, “do you believe that words exist?” If so, then those are examples of a subset of memes, those that can be pronounced. (I’m not sure of the practical benefit of talk of memes as opposed to ideas, concepts, and language, but I’ll save commentary on that until I read the meme chapters in DDI.) So, said Dennett, we are apes with “infected” brains, or, on analogy to prokaryotes/eukaryotes, we are “euprimates.” We carry with us virtual machines that give us new powers and versatility to bring organization of the world up another level. Mind Tools Dennett quoted one of his own students, Bo Dahlborn, who wrote, “Just as you cannot do very much carpentry with your bare hands, there is not much thinking you can do with your bare brain.” We have conceptual tools and methods. At the very simplest level, there are words as tools, such as passwords or labels. Douglas Hofstadter’s I Am A Strange Loop identifies a bunch of phrases that are frequently used as tools for analogies, such as “wild goose chases,” “tackiness,” “loose cannons,” “feet of clay,” “feedback,” “slamdunks,” “lip service,” and “elbow grease.” Dennett compared these to Java applets for the mind–collections of information transmitted from one person to another that allow them to do something more. Long division is a more complex example. With a sufficiently well developed English (or other language) “virtual machine,” you can “download” the procedure in the form of mathematical instruction or from a book, to be able to perform the process. Cost-benefit analysis is a bigger, more complex set of tools learned in the same way. While some such tools have distinct authors, others have evolved. Language itself, money, and tonal music are examples of such mental tools that were not created at once by individual authors, but have evolved over time. What this implies for who we are is that we are not Cartesian egos with original intentionality, but “an alliance of hemi-semi-demi-understood virtual machines." Darwin’s Trio Darwin proposed three types of selection. First, two types of selection where the selective force is human beings. 1. Methodical selection, or intentional artificial selection, where humans intentionally breed creatures for particular characteristics. 2. Unconscious selection, where humans simply preferred certain organisms to others, and helped those to reproduce–such as in farming, and raising domestic animals. To those, Darwin added 3. Natural selection. Now we’ve also added 4. Genetic engineering. And the same categories can be applied to memes. There are original, synanthropic memes, those which live with us but are not domesticated, such as superstitions; these are analogous to memes created by natural selection. There are memes replicated by unconscious selection, such as differential replication of tunes based on how catchy they are. Dennett noted that the Germans call tunes that get stuck in your head “earworms.” And then there is methodical selection of domesticated memes, which would include science, literature, and calculus. Dennett compared calculus to laying hens, for which broodiness has been selected out–you have to work hard to get it to reproduce. And to these categories we can add memetic engineering–spin-doctoring, marketing, propaganda, etc. Bootstrapping Dennett asked, how do you draw a straight line? We use a straight edge. And how do we make straight edges? By drawing a line along a piece of metal with a straight edge, and cutting it. How do we get the first straight edge? He pointed to a book on the history of straight edges, and observed that over time we have gradually improved our technology for making straight edges, and can now measure far more precisely how we fall short in reaching the unattainable goal of a perfectly straight line. We can represent our goal, our reasons for achieving the goal, and the imperfections and errors in reaching that goal. He suggested that the Platonic “form of the true” has a similar history, and that in science “memes have been selected for veridicality." At this point, we really do have the capacity for genuine top-down design. Dennett concluded his talk (apart from the next section, which seemed more like an afterword) by stating that “What makes us human is not our genetic children, but our brainchildren. We’ve finally reached genuine intelligent design." Darwin Fish Dennett concluded his prepared lecture by pointing out that he was wearing a Darwin fish lapel pin. The physicist Murray Gell-Mann observed to Dennett that this was patterned after the Jesus fish, a fish symbol which contains the Greek word for fish, which was apparently the first acronym. The Greek letters ΙΧΘΥΣ stand for the Greek words for Jesus Christ, God’s Son, the Savior, said Gell-Mann. But what does “DARWIN” stand for? Dennett took that as a challenge, and came up with a Latin expansion for “DARUUIN” (since there is no letter “W” in Latin): Delere Auctorem Rerum Ut Universum Infinitum Noscas This translates into English as Destroy the author of things in order to understand the infinite universe I’m not too fond of this–it confirms anti-evolutionists’ worst fears of evolution, and refers to an “author of things” to be destroyed, as though there is one that exists, rather than a myth not to be believed. It’s clever, though. UPDATE (February 20, 2009): Dennett then answered a few brief questions, and then signed a bunch of books. The first question (and the only one I’ll note) was what it was like to work with W.V. Quine, his mentor. Dennett said that he transferred to Harvard University as an undergraduate specifically to work with Quine, and that two of the most significant influences from Quine were the view that science and philosophy are significantly overlapping and parts of the same larger project, and that the quality of Quine’s writing (in contrast to his lecture style) was something to aspire to. He’s well-spoken, entertaining, and thought-provoking, and I encourage you to hear him speak if you have the opportunity. I think that his views, like those of Richard Dawkins, argue that science and evolution in particular either imply or at least cohere better with or provide evidence for atheism. I don’t think there is a logical implication, and I’m not sure Dennett and Dawkins do, either–that’s something that anti-evolutionist lawyer Phillip Johnson has argued, which I’ve critiqued at the talkorigins.org website, and which the views of Christian evolutionists like Kenneth Miller, Glenn Morton, and Mike Beidler contradict by their very existence. On the other hand, I’m not sure Miller’s position is coherent (I really should get around to writing a summary of last year’s Skeptics Society conference), and I reject the NOMA view that there is no overlap between the domains of religion and science and agree with Dennett’s and Quine’s views that there is significant overlap between science and philosophy (and history, for that matter). The National Center for Science Education and many scientists argue for a sharp divide between science and philosophy, and between science and religion, and find cases like those made by Dawkins and Dennett (and P.Z. Myers) to be problematic, especially when it comes to the legal arena and the goal of keeping intelligent design and creationism out of the public schools (though public universities have more freedom). I think that this is ultimately due to a tension between the principles of separation of church and state, public education, and academic freedom, given that there is no sharp divide between the domains of science and religion (or science and philosophy). In my view, in any case where a religion makes an empirical claim, if there’s scientific evidence against that claim, it should be legitimate to discuss that scientific evidence in a public school classroom even if that has the primary effect of inhibiting (or promoting) religion (violating the second prong of the Lemon Test for measuring whether a government action is a violation of the Constitution’s establishment clause). I consider it a flaw in the Lemon Test that people can always create new religions which attempt to turn secular ideas into religious content with the specific intent of turning government actions into church-state violations (e.g., creating a doctrine that paying taxes is a sin), as well as the fact that it provides an unwarranted immunity to criticism in the classroom for religious claims, even if they are empirically falsified or conceptually incoherent. (See the comments of this Ed Brayton post at Dispatches from the Culture Wars on the Summum monument case for some legal puzzles. BTW, Justice O’Connor argued for a either a different test in Lynch v. Donnelly, the “endorsement test,” which asks whether a reasonable person would conclude government is endorsing or disapproving religion from the action. This has sometimes been interpreted as a complement to the Lemon Test, and sometimes as a substitute for it. Judge Jones in the Dover case applied both the endorsement test and the Lemon Test, and argued that the Dover school district violated both, including all three prongs of Lemon.) Another resolution is to finesse the issue by getting government out of the business of being a direct provider of education, and instead meet the goal of free public education by providing government funding and standards that include mandatory curriculum requirements that any school can exceed with content that expresses particular religious viewpoints. By providing a fixed amount of per-pupil funding and a mandatory minimum curriculum that doesn’t include religious content, those two items are tied together and anything beyond it would be considered provided at the school’s own expense, and thus not a church-state violation. In my view, more discussion and debate of religious claims at a younger age will yield better-educated adults (and probably more atheists). Ironically, it is western democracies without a strong history of separation of church and state where religion is weakest and acceptance of evolution is strongest. Without finessing the problem like that or modifying the Lemon Test, views like those of Dennett and Dawkins must be excluded from public school classrooms along with creationism for the same reasons (to the extent that they express a religious viewpoint), and I think that ultimately the “exploring evolution” or “academic freedom” strategies of the creationists for getting critiques of evolution into the public school classrooms will succeed in passing constitutional muster. Ultimately, the reason their arguments should be excluded from science classrooms is not that they are religious, but that they are bad arguments, and there’s no constitutional provision prohibiting the establishment of bad arguments. ...
The latest ApostAZ podcast is now available: Episode 014 Atheism and Sucker-Free Thought in Phoenix! Go to meetup.com/phoenix-atheists for group events! Intro from Vocab Malone ‘Lean Back- But think’, Guest Shawn from the Tough Questions Podcast and http://www.youtube.com/user/azsuperman01 and Josh, Religion and the Workplace, Outro Music from Greydon Square- CPT TheoremComments: I wish people would stop saying that you can’t prove a negative. You can. (Also see this.)
In a recent paper, Jamie Napier and John Jost argue that the reason conservatives are happier than liberals is that they are, for ideological reasons, not pained by observing high levels of income inequality. They draw this conclusion on the basis of responses to a survey item about attitudes about meritocracy that ranges from a scale of “hard work generally doesn’t bring success–it’s more a matter of luck” to “hard work pays,” which Will Wilkinson shows cannot do the job of supporting their explanation: I strongly agree that success, understood as a significant upward move on a valued status dimension, is largely a matter of luck. But I also strongly agree that hard work (in a society with decent institutions) usually brings a better life. It’s possible to work hard and achieve a better life without ever winning anything you’d count as success. So I haven’t a clue how I’d answer this question. Do I believe in meritocracy or not?He observes that there’s also a much better explanation for the answers to that question than assuming a blindness or lack of care about inequality: If one wants to see a meritocratic bent as a common cause of conservative leanings and higher happiness, here’s a less tendentious explanation. (1) Those with a greater sense of the efficacy of their behavior — with a greater sense of being in control — will tend to (a) think hard work brings a better life, (b) be happier, (c) see policies that seem to penalize hard work as unjust. (2) People likely to see high taxes as an unjust penalty on hard work tend to identify as “conservative.”And a further problem about attributing a blindness to inequality to conservatives is that conservatives give more to charity than liberals, as Wilkinson’s commenter John Thacker points out (and I’ve previously observed at this blog). Thacker attributes the difference to religiosity; again, I’ve previously pointed out that he is apparently correct on this point (also see this post and the previous reference on conservatives vs. liberals), that the religious give far more to charity than the secular, even if you don’t count donations to churches. (But apparently Christians are well-known in the service industry as lousy tippers.) The same Napier and Jost paper is discussed at Marginal Revolution, where commenter DocMerlin points out that: ...
Last night at a party, a few of us were discussing some recent self-published books by crackpots that we’ve seen or had pushed on us. We noted that these books seem to have in common a few features. They seem to often have long rambling introductions that are missing key elements like thesis statements or an indication of what the book is about. They use words in non-standard ways, yet don’t bother to explain how they are being redefined. They claim that the author has some special knowledge, yet don’t provide any reason to believe it is the case. I had a dim recollection of having come across a “crackpot index” before somewhere, and a little bit of searching yielded Fred J. Gruenberger’s December 1962 publication from the RAND Corporation titled “A Measure for Crackpots” (PDF), which offers the following scoring mechanism for distinguishing the scientist from the crackpot: 1. Public verifiability (12 points) Scientists promote public verifiability; crackpots rely on revealed truth. 2. Predictability (12 points) Scientists promote predictability and track their record of failure as well as success; crackpots promote wild predictions and count only successes, not failures. 3. Controlled experiments (13 points) Scientists promote controlled experiments; crackpots avoid them. 4. Occam’s razor (5 points) Scientists prefer the simplest explanation that covers all the facts; crackpots enjoy wildly complex theories. 5. Fruitfulness (10 points) Scientists prefer theories that generate new ideas and new experiments; crackpots prefer theories that produce nothing of value for further research. 6. Authority (10 points) Scientists seek the endorsement and validation of known authorities and tend to obtain it if their work is valid; crackpots usually fail to obtain it. 7. Ability to communicate (8 points) Scientists tend to promote clear (if sometimes dull) communications through approved channels; crackpots tend to be incomprehensible and self-published. 8. Humility (5 points) Humility is a desirable (if sometimes lacking) trait in scientists; it is rare in the crackpot. 9. Open mindedness (5 points) Scientists tend to qualify and carefully couch their statements as tentative based on the current evidence; crackpots tend to make absolutely certain statements that may not be challenged. 10. The Fulton non sequitur (5 points) I’m more familiar with this as the “Galileo Gambit,” or the common crackpot claim that “They laughed at Galileo; they’re laughing at me; therefore I’m right just as Galileo was.” Gruenberger uses steamboat inventor Robert Fulton in place of Galileo. This logically invalid argument is refuted by the Bozo rejoinder, which is that “they also laughed at Bozo the clown.” This is a negative test, lack of the characteristic is 5 points, presence is 0. 11. Paranoia (5 points) Another negative test–crackpots tend to be paranoid about their ideas being actively suppressed by conspiracy. 12. The dollar complex (5 points) Another negative test. The crackpot claims immeasurable value for his discoveries as revolutionary, worthy of the Nobel prize, and world-changing. 13. Statistics compulsion (5 points) The crackpot tends to use and continuously explain statistics allegedly supporting his claim, while the scientist tends to use standard methods and assume the reader is familiar with them. Gruenberger’s index is focused on science crackpots rather than philosophy crackpots, but a number of the above features do apply to the books we were talking about. A more recent “Crackpot Index," also focused on physics, was created by John Baez, a mathematical physicist at the University of California, Riverside: ...
A Christian rural psychologist has posted on his blog about “some psychological aspects of atheism," where he claims that: [Atheists] tend to not be able to understand that their position means “anything goes,” with respect to morality. If there is no God, then there is no objective thing as morality. It’s all subjective… They always find some way to justify the fact that they practice at least some moral principles. Whether they think it’s biologically ingrained through millions of years of evolution or morality is simply “adaptive in allowing the species to survive.” Most often; however, they have never even considered the logical consequences of atheism and morality. He also engages in some armchair theorizing about atheism being caused by absent fathers, being intolerant, etc., all without any reference to empirical evidence. (And given the recent Pew Forum survey results where one in five self-reported "atheists" say that they believe in God or a higher power, I think any study of atheists needs to make sure that it's dealing with people who actually know what the word means.) But the quoted passage is completely off-base. Atheism is a denial of the existence of gods. That entails the falsity of divine command theory as a basis for morality, but not much else. Most philosophers have rejected divine command theory as an adequate basis for morality since Plato wrote the "Euthyphro" and asked the critical question, "is the pious [or right] loved by the gods because it is pious [right], or is it pious [right] because it is loved by the gods"? Either fork of the dilemma leads to bad consequences--if the former, then there must be some other ground for moral rightness than because the gods will it to be so, and so the gods themselves are unnecessary. If the latter, then the gods could make acts that we consider to be clearly immoral into right actions according to whim. The latter seems more consistent with the morality of the Bible, since God is depicted therein as commanding murderous acts including the killing of women and children, but it is simply a "might makes right" philosophy of morality. But I think the former is clearly the right horn of the dilemma to grasp--morality is not something which requires gods. Now, there are certainly atheist philosophers who have argued that atheism precludes more than the divine command theory. The atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie, in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, argues against morality being objective properties of the world on the basis of their "queerness." And I think he is probably right at least to the extent that moral properties are not human-independent properties. My view is that there are certain basic values, held by most human beings and evolutionary in origin, essential to social organization and beneficial to our survival and thriving, which objectively entail moral consequences for us, composed as we are and in the environment (physical and social) we find ourselves in. But my view is not important for confronting the claim of the quoted passage. All atheism means is the denial of the existence of gods. It is not a complete worldview, it is simply a single component in an infinite number of possible consistent worldviews. An atheist can, like J. M. E. McTaggart, believe in reincarnation and immortality. An atheist can believe in the paranormal, in ghosts, in supernatural beings other than gods. An atheist can be a nihilist, a relativist, a utilitarian, a contractarian, an existentialist. An atheist can be a conservative, a liberal, a socialist, an anarchist, a monarchist, a libertarian, a Marxist, or hold any other possible view of political philosophy that doesn't entail the existence of gods. All of these views are consistent with atheism, meaning simply that no contradiction is produced by the combination of the views. Amorality and nihilism are consistent with atheism--it is certainly possible for an atheist to hold that there are no moral truths, that there is no difference between right and wrong. But mere consistency is not the same as entailment--it does not follow that if you are an atheist, it logically follows or is necessary to hold such views. Yet that's what the quoted author is falsely claiming to be the case. Note that amorality and nihilism are also consistent with theism--and in my opinion, both are possible for theists whichever horn of the Euthyphro dilemma is grasped. If the ground of what is morally right is something independent of the gods that does not exist, even while gods do, then that's an amoral theism. And if all there is to morality is what the gods will it to be, that makes morality dependent upon the values of the gods--if the gods choose to be amoral or nihilists, then again there's amoral theism. The Christian psychologist goes on to write (citing this very blog for the quote): Now, I have only seen or read about one logically consistent atheist…..Jeffrey Dahmer. There have been philosophers, I know, who have come to this logical conclusion. But I’m talking about someone who logically practiced what he believed. “If a person doesn’t think there is a God to be accountable to, then—then what’s the point of trying to modify your behaviour to keep it within acceptable ranges? That’s how I thought anyway. I always believed the theory of evolution as truth, that we all just came from the slime. When we, when we died, you know, that was it, there is nothing…” (1) So said Dahmer. The "what's the point" question is easy to answer--there are clearly consequences for us to our own behavior regardless of any accountability to God. Sane, rational people desire to live good and happy lives, rather than follow the example of Dahmer. Even leaving God out of the picture, where is the slightest appeal in following Dahmer as a model of rational living? I see none. But the position this psychologist takes opens up an obvious question that he doesn't notice--God isn't accountable to anyone. Why should God be good, instead of acting maliciously, callously, and evilly, in the absence of any accountability to anyone? According to this psychologist, the answer should be that God should rationally act as an omnipotent Jeffrey Dahmer. Having no greater God to hold him responsible, he should not be bound to any code of morality, his word should be valueless, and every action based on the whims of the moment without regard to any future consequences. That should be considered a reductio ad absurdum of his position. Either there are rational reasons to not act like Jeffrey Dahmer independently of being held accountable to a higher being, or God behaves irrationally by not acting like Jeffrey Dahmer. (Or perhaps, given the content of the Old Testament, God does act like Jeffrey Dahmer.) UPDATE: I've engaged in further argument with the psychologist in the comments of his blog, as have others. UPDATE: After a few back-and-forth exchanges, I don't think the psychologist means to talk about logical consequences of beliefs. I think probably the best reconstruction of his actual argument is something like this: 1. Human beings find it psychologically necessary to believe in an objective external source of morality. (In order to be happy, function well psychologically, etc.) 2. Atheism doesn't provide such a source by itself. 3. Those whose worldview is composed entirely of atheism, without augmenting it with some objective external source of morality, have no psychological reasons to act in moral ways. This is a much more plausible argument. He says something very much like (3), and goes on to say something to the effect that none of these substitutes are sufficient, and his reason seems to be along the lines that people's choices for these substitutes are arbitrary or that they are not externally imposed. But his reasoning is faulty--the fact that people choose for themselves doesn't mean that their choices are arbitrary (they can have good reasons), and external imposition seems to be irrelevant. Presumably he would agree that someone who converts to Christianity as an adult can have all of the psychological benefits he's claiming for theism. And what of the thousands of other religions, sects, and interpretations that can be acquired from one's parents or others? His argument doesn't have any way of singling out Christianity (or any particular version thereof) as special in this regard. It seems to me that it really comes down to an argument about the social and psychological benefits of adopting the beliefs of one's culture that most people accept--though I'm sure he doesn't want to accept the cultural relativism that seems to me to be implied by his position. UPDATE: The "Country Shrink" has resorted to "let's agree to disagree" without even attempting to respond to the criticism of his claim that morality requires theism, nor has he responded to my attempted reformulation. Instead, he has asked whether my impressions of atheists differ from him--claiming the moral high ground, intellectual superiority, etc., to which I responded that I see that as most prevalent among atheists who were previously evangelical Christians, and that he's likely attributing causes to the wrong place. I don't think it's caused by atheism as much as by reaction to Christianity. UPDATE (July 6, 2008): The "Country Shrink" has made a followup post in which he takes a stab of sorts at addressing some of the philosophical arguments I made, but mostly by engaging in argument from ignorance and attempting to shift the burden of proof to me, even though he is the one maintaining that it is impossible for there to be any objective meta-ethical framework without gods. He also asserts (rather than argues) that incompatibilism is the correct position in the free will debate and that consciousness cannot be explained naturalistically. I don't discern any actual arguments for either of those positions other than failure of imagination. Hume's Ghost (2008-07-04): Jeffrey Dahmer is an interesting choice, considering he was raised in a fundamentalist home. Him being a sociopath is another reason that he's a particularly poor choice, especially for a psychologist who would presumably have the training to understand why choosing a sociopath would not make the point he seeks to make. ...
This is part three of my summary of The Amazing Meeting 6 (intro, part one, part two, part four, part five). Friday night was my one late night out, as I went with a group of Denver and Boston skeptics (and one local friend) to Gallagher’s Steakhouse at the New York, New York Casino. On the walk down the strip, we passed some 9/11 truthers holding signs promoting a website promoting their views. I told one that he should check out 911myths.com, to which he responded, “That’s funny.” He ended up going off on a rant about how I was sticking my head in the sand, to which Iunproductively responded in an off-color manner about where he was sticking his head. We had a fantastic, though expensive, meal, and I ended up leaving my camera at the restaurant. Fortunately, I was able to retrieve it even though the restaurant had closed. Saturday morning I had breakfast with an attorney from Florida and a regular attendee of hacker’s conferences from Pennsylvania; we talked a bit about criminal hacking on the Internet and copyright law. Michael Shermer on the Skeptologists and why people believe in unseen things Michael Shermer gave the first talk of the day. He began by talking about how he recently accepted some money from the Templeton Foundation in return for editing a booklet of thirteen essays on the question “Does science make belief in God obsolete?", which he agreed to do on the condition that he could pick at least some of the people to write answers to the question. Respondents included Kenneth Miller, Victor Stenger, Christopher Hitchens, Stephen Pinker, and Stuart Kauffman. He then showed a segment from a TV show pilot, “The Skeptologists," that is now being pitched to the TV networks. The show features Yau-Man Chan, Mark Edward, Steven Novella, Phil Plait, Kirsten Sanford, Michael Shermer, and Brian Dunning investigating claims using the tools of skepticism. The segment shown was of Shermer, Sanford, and Novella investigating health claims made for wheat grass, such as that because it contains chlorophyll which is molecularly similar to hemoglobin, it turns into hemoglobin when you consume it. Shermer then went on to give a talk about “why people believe in unseen things,” arguing that we engage in learning by association (something illustrated by Banachek’s memory workshop) and have a tendency to make type II errors (incorrectly accepting a belief in something false) over type I errors (incorrectly rejecting a belief in something true). He gave a brief review of some evidence that when we process a sentence in order to understand it, we go through the same steps as entertaining that it is true, and to exercise skepticism about it requires additional effort; disbelief requires a subsequent process of rejection after the process of comprehension. This kind of acceptance of knowledge presented by others makes sense for a child growing up, especially in a hostile environment where survival is at stake. Humans also tend not to be persuaded by or even remember being told that something is false–the negation can be forgotten while the statement being denied is remembered as true. A flyer put out by the CDC to rebut myths about flu vaccines turned out to have the opposite of the desired effect, at least by certain groups of people–after 30 minutes, they remembered 28% of the false statements as being true, and after three days the percentage jumped to 40%. (Also see Sam Wang and Sandra Amodt’s op-ed in the June 27, 2008 New York Times, “Your Brain Lies to You.") Shermer didn’t mention the study I’ve linked to, but rather later near the end of his talk referred to some fMRI studies by Sam Harris, Sameer Sheth, and Mark Cohen (PDF) about evaluating statements as true, false, or undecideable, comparing reaction times to different types of statements. Agency and the intentional stance Shermer talked about the work of Pascal Boyer and Daniel Dennett on agency and the intentional stance–that we tend to assume by default that everything that happens not only has a cause, but is caused by an agent, and particularly one that means us harm. Such an assumption may make evolutionary sense to enable survival, though it clearly doesn’t work well for accurate explanations of the world. But such appeal of agency lies behind intelligent design theory, and attributing supernatural intentions to natural phenomena. Shermer called this “The God Illusion” rather than “delusion,” because he, like Boyer and Dennett, see it as a normal cognitive illusion rather than something delusional or pathological. He went on to talk about folk intuitions as being the engines of all sorts of beliefs. He gave examples from folk astronomy, folk biology (the elan vital), folk psychology (mind/brain dualism), and folk economics (centrally planned economies). He compared natural selection and Adam Smith’s invisible hand, observing that many people misconstrue one or the other as being something magical or directed. He observed that we have folk intuitions that have evolved for a particular environment, yet do not work well at the huge or tiny scales. Then, more controversially, he referred to folk politics, viewing societies as an extension of the family, and referred to “intelligent government theory,” the “God of the government” theory, and “the government illusion,” drawing an analogy to intelligent design, God of the gaps, and the God illusion, respectively. But where intelligent design says “I can’t imagine how X could have evolved, therefore it must have been designed,” he described “intelligent government theory” as based on the faulty reasoning that “I can’t imagine how X could be done privately, therefore a government must do it.” The difference here, as I’ve already mentioned, is that we know that governments exist and do provide services. The libertarian argument about private provision of services vs. government provision of services is one about whether government is necessary, or moral, or more efficient than private provision of services. To my mind, such arguments are well worth having, but come down to questions of competing values (e.g., liberty vs. justice) and empirical evidence about costs and benefits of competing approaches. It’s not really analogous to the question of the existence or nonexistence of gods, unless perhaps one takes that to partly be an issue about the pragmatic value of belief in an illusion vs. truth. Sharon Begley Newsweek science writer Sharon Begley gave a talk titled “Creationism and Other Weird Beliefs: The Role of the Press,” with a subtitle “hint: don’t get your hopes up.” She was very pessimistic about the press being helpful in promoting critical thinking. She began by telling the story of the Tichbourne Claimant. In 1854, Roger Tichbourne was lost at sea off the coast of Brazil. He had been raised in France to the age of 16, then in England. He was very thin, and had blue eyes and tattoos. His mother refused to accept that he was dead, and placed ads in newspapers seeking him. Some 20 years later, a man from Wagga Wagga, Australia contacted her, claiming that he had not previously contacted her because he wanted to achieve success on his own accord, under the name “Mr. Castro,” but had failed to do so. This man, the Tichbourne Claimant, was obese, spoke no French, had no tattoos, had brown eyes, and was an inch taller than Roger Tichbourne, yet she accepted him as the genuine article. According to Begley, the role of the newspaper is not to educate. In the early years of the AIDS crisis, public health officials asked for the press to run informative stories, and they complied, but this was not helpful because: The scientific ignorance of the American public.The capacity for rational thnking is not identical to the disposition to employ rational thinking.There is a disconnect between factual knowledge and belief, as exhibited in the case of Mrs. Tichbourne.Public attitudes towards the press are negative.The press has a commitment to “balance."Common sense is not common.She gave some statistics on polls of Americans’ agreement or disagreement with the statement that “Human beings as we know them developed from earlier species of animals”: 1985: 45% agreed, 48% disagreed, 7% unsure. 2005: 40% agreed, 39% disagreed, 21% unsure. By comparison the percentage of agreement in Iceland, Denmark, and Sweden was over 80%; of OECD nations only Turkey had a lower percentage of acceptance than the U.S. Evolution, gay marriage, and abortion are all highly politicized in the U.S. in a way that they aren’t in Europe or Japan. But if the question was “Can natural selection explain appearance and change over time of animals,” 78% of Americans agreed. Yet 62% agree that “God created humans as they are today.” This, according to Begley, is because Americans have a view of human exceptionalism. She went through a list of facts that are beyond dispute, which were presented to Americans for acceptance or denial. Two examples: More than half of all genes in humans are identical to those in mice. 33% agree More than half of all genes in humans are identical to those in chimps. 38% agree Only 9% of Americans know what a molecule is. Because of this, while sports writers can use abbreviations such as ERA and RBI without explaining them, Begley says she cannot assume her readers know anything at all, and recently learned that she can’t even refer to DNA and expect her readers to know what she’s talking about. She observed that a disposition to critical thinking is associated with being more curious, open-minded, open to new experiences, conscientiousness, being less dogmatic, less close-minded, less authoritarian, and likely to rely more on epirical and rational data than on intution and emotion when weighing information and reaching conclusions. But you have to both have the skills and want to think critically in order to apply them. In addition to Tichbourne as an example of someone who had the skills but didn’t want to apply them, she noted that Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s son was killed two weeks before the end of WWI, and he went to a medium who claimed to contact his son, which he very much wanted to believe. Alfred Russell Wallace, who formulated evolution by natural selection parallel to Darwin, was also a believer in ghosts, levitation, spirit photography, and clairvoyance. And she noted that a statement Penn Jillette made the previous day sounded like he was rejecting climate change on the basis of a dislike for Al Gore. (UPDATE, July 4, 2008: Sharon Begley wrote about this at the Newsweek blog, and Penn Jillette responded in the Los Angeles Times. I think Penn more accurately reports what happened than Sharon Begley did–he really did say that he didn’t know, and that people he knows and considers reliable tell him that anthropogenic climate change is real. One thing Penn gets wrong is that Teller didn’t mention Gore’s name when he said that carbon credits are “bullshit modeled on indulgences.”) She commented on some of the negative letters she has received any time she writes about evolution or critically about claims like alien abductions. When she wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal about the discovery of Tiktaalik, she received several letters which she read excerpts of, three examples of which were the standard argument that “evolution requires more faith” than believing that God did it, a letter asking “where are the billions of ’transition fossils,’” and one asking, “if you are terminal will you call on Darwin or God?" Don’t count on the press The “reality-based community” must contend with contrarian politicians, the masses’ distrust of elites, and new sources of news. With regard to the last point, she pointed out that Googling evolutionary biology terms often brings up Answers in Genesis sites prior to sites with accurate information. The journalistic conceit of objectivity, she said, is imported from political disputes where there are two contrary sides. (I actually think that notion of balance is as often mistaken in politics as it is in science–there may only be one side with any valid support, or there may be more than two sides deserving of representation, though the latter is more common in politics than in science. But dualism is a misrepresentation in both circumstances.) Uncommon common sense Begley made the following points, which had some overlap with Shermer’s talk: Evolution is not intuitive.Common sense can mislead us about the physical world.Our brains are driven to see patterns.We have a habit of imputing consciousness to inanimate objects.Someone is staring at me from behind. (People tend to have and respond to such feelings. I can’t remember if she actually discussed Rupert Sheldrake’s studies of this, or of the skeptical critiques by Robert Baker or Richard Wiseman.) She gave the example of an experiment with a sweater at Bristol University. Students were shown a ratty old sweater and asked who would be willing to put it on in return for a payment of twenty British pounds. Most indicated a willingness to do so. But if they were then told, oh, by the way, this sweater belonged to a murderer, many of the hands would go down–as though evil were a property that contaminated the object. What she didn’t mention is that similarly, the value of something associated with someone of status has the reverse effect–e.g., if the sweater were claimed to belong to Einstein. The effect of status on objects is one that is clearly prevalent even among skeptics, who are as likely as anyone to enjoy collecting autographs and memorabilia, or objects like ping pong balls used on a television show (see Adam Savage’s talk, below). Derek and Swoopy Derek and Swoopy, the hosts of the official Skeptics Society podcast, “Skepticality,” gave a short talk about their show and noted that they now have about 35,000 listeners per program, and that the top two skeptics’ podcasts, “Skepticality” and “The Skeptics Guide to the Universe,” have over 4 million downloads between them. They reported that after some successful skeptical panels at science fiction conventions, Dragon*Con 2008 in Atlanta this Labor Day weekend, a conference so large that it occurs at four hotels, will have four full days of skeptical content, a “Skeptrack” featuring James Randi, Michael Shermer, Phil Plait, Ben Radford, Alison Smith, George Hrab, and others. Steven Novella Dr. Novella gave a talk on “Dualism and Creationism” covering the history of dualism in philosophy of mind, evidence from neuroscience, and a discussion of modern dualism. In his discussion of dualism in philosophy, he attributed to Descartes a notion of computation occurring in the brain and a position he called “consciousness dualism.” I think perhaps that gives Descartes too much credit, though he did think that “animal spirits” flowing in the brain caused signals from perception to be projected on the surface of the pineal gland, which was the seat of the soul and consciousness. He referred to the advocacy of property dualism/epiphenomenalism by David Chalmers, and observed that his views would not be acceptable to most of those who advocate dualism. Chalmers’s position is that most mental activity is physical brain activity, but there’s a remaining hard problem of consciousness posed by the conscious properties of perception and feeling known as qualia, which distinguish unconscious zombies that could behave just like us from real people. He gave Deepak Chopra as an example of an individual who is essentially a denialist about contemporary neuroscience, an anti-materialist who supports “quantum woo,” Eastern mysticism, and what he called “substrate consciousness,” a feature of the universe itself. Evidence from neuroscience Novella gave the following points to summarize the evidence from neuroscience: Brain anatomy and activity correlates with mental activity.There is no mind without the brain.Brain development correlates with mental development.If you damage the brain, you damage the mind.Different states of consciousness correlate with different brain states.Turn off the brain and you turn off the mind.The mind does not survive the death of the brain.MEG (magnetoencephalography) can be used to provoke specific mental effects, including inducing out-of-body experiences at will.My notes on the last point suggest that Novella said that MEG could be used to induce OBEs. There were a couple of recent studies about two different methods for inducing OBEs, but I don’t recall either of them using magnetic induction (e.g., this 2007 Science paper). I’m skeptical of Michael Persinger’s claims of magnetic induction of religious experiences (also see this 2004 Nature article). We’re in the process of reverse-engineering the brain, and the materialist model of consciousness is working pretty well. The elements of consciousness are increasingly identifiable and localizable, and our ability to reconstruct them in artificial intelligence will be the ultimate test. Novella defined consciousness as the moment-to-moment functions of the brain, when it is processing information reflectively, and presenting it to the part of the brain that is paying attention. (Is it really commonly accepted that attention is localized to a particular part of the brain?) We are trying to assess our consciousness with our consciousness. The vitalism analogy Novella stated, referencing Daniel Dennett, that just as life is an emergent property of living things, consciousness is the sum of the easy problems about consciousness, leaving no remaining residue of a hard problem, just as there is no elan vital for biology. Egnorance Novella then talked about neurosurgeon Michael Egnor, who he said makes the mistake of confusing the question of “does” with “how.” That is, because we don’t know the details of how consciousness is physically generated, it must not be the case. He compared this to the “God of the gaps” argument–whatever is currently unexplained must be caused by something supernatural. Defenses of dualism Novella then went through a few rhetorical strategies used to defend dualism. One is that any day now, evolution (or materialism) will collapse. But they’ve been saying this in the evolution case for 100 years. (Glenn Morton has a nice article titled “The Imminent Demise of Evolution: The Longest Running Falsehood in Creationism," which offers 178 years of such quotes.) Another is to generate false controversy, and say that until the argument is resolved, it’s legitimate to accept dualism. Then there’s the claim of impending acceptance, the converse of the imminent demise argument–that Deepak Chopra’s views are about to be accepted by the entire world, for example. The need to change science–Novella said that B. Alan Wallace, a Buddhist, has argued that we need to reintroduce subjective evidence into science. Novella suggested that subjective evidence can’t be scientific evidence, which I think is a slight overstatement–a self report is a valid source of data, we just need to have a way to correlate those self reports with other evidence. In his conclusion, Novella stated that the purpose of modern Cartesian dualism is to provide intellectual cover for a belief system–presumably including various religious views about immortality as well as Deepak Chopra’s views. It’s worth noting that Keith Augustine of the Internet Infidels has done a lot of work presenting the evidence against survival of death and the possibility of immortality, as well as critical of claims that near-death experiences are evidence of survival. He has recently published a four-part series of articles in the Journal of Near-Death Studies on the subject, which have been accompanied by responses from NDE researchers. He is also working on an anthology which will respond to recent arguments for dualism. I urge Novella to contact Augustine, as he might have some contribution to make to that anthology. Jeff Wagg Jeff Wagg of JREF stated that there is a possibility of a future TAM in the UK, and that TAM7 will be in Las Vegas on July 9-12, 2009 at the South Point Casino. There will also be a JREF Mexican Riviera cruise in March, 2009, which still is looking for speakers. Jim Underdown Jim Underdown of the Center for Inquiry, Los Angeles reported that the Independent Investigations Group, a skeptical group that does paranormal investigations, would be giving an award for best TV show or movie that debunks pseudoscience to Penn & Teller’s Bullshit!, and a lifetime achievement award to James Randi. Randi came up and said that some years ago he had terminated his relationship with CSICOP because they had asked him to stop going after Uri Geller, who was suing him repeatedly (and had also sued CSICOP as a result). Randi said that Geller only won once, in the Japan case, where the judgment was lowered from slander to insult, and that while Geller was suing for millions he was only awarded a small amount. The amount was 500,000 yen against Randi, and a larger amount against the Japanese magazine which reported Randi’s erroneous statement that Dr. Wilbur Franklin of Kent State University had killed himself after Randi discredited Geller, who Franklin had endorsed as genuine. Franklin had actually died of natural causes, and Randi attributed the Japanese magazine statement to a mistranslation of the phrase “shot himself in the foot,” though Randi had been quoted in a U.S. publication in English making the same statement about Franklin killing himself out of embarrassment over Geller’s exposure. Geller also won a case in Hungary for a statement by Randi that called Geller a swindler, though Randi was not named in that suit. After Geller sued Victor Stenger in Hawaii, CSICOP and Prometheus in England, and CSICOP and Prometheus in Miami, Prometheus Books added errata slips to Stenger’s Physics and Psychics and to Randi’s The Truth About Uri Geller regarding an incident where Geller was sued in Israel for breach of contract and not, as those two sources stated (Stenger relying upon Randi), “arrested.” The Miami suit was eventually won by Prometheus and CSICOP on the grounds that Geller had knowingly filed after the statute of limitations had expired, and Geller paid them slightly less than half of the fees, costs and sanctions that were originally awarded and dismissed his appeal. Contrary to the impression Randi has sometimes given, the vast majority of Geller’s lawsuits were not about paranormal abilities, but about accusations of other kinds of impropriety, such as fraud, criminal acts, plagiarism, and so forth. Geller gives his version of events on his web page. Now, apparently as a result of this award, Randi said he would like to forgive and forget, and resume his relationship with CSICOP (now CSI). The Skeptologists During lunch was a showing of the full pilot episode of “The Skeptologists,” which also included a segment on the tools used for ghost hunting, testing them aboard the Queen Mary in order to see what they actually measure. I missed all but the ending, but it was shown again on Sunday, about which more later. There were several more speakers on Saturday–Phil Plait, Adam Savage, Matthew Chapman, Richard Wiseman, and a panel discussion ostensibly on “the limits of skepticism,” but I’ll save that for further summary tomorrow. On to TAM6 summary, part four.
Will Wilkinson has an interesting post about how his market liberal views are very like the views of Hayek, Friedman, and Buchanan, and that the libertarian-conservative alliance against a slippery slope to socialism isn’t justified by what’s actually occurring in the world today. In a subsequent post, he writes about how economic regulation and tax/transfer policies are logically separable, but most people think about them as if they aren’t; a comparison of levels of inequality and poverty across the EU shows that the common thought that less regulation and taxation goes hand-in-hand with higher levels of poverty and inequality (of the sort seen in the U.S. and UK) doesn’t hold. Thus you could have a regime with very low levels of regulation yielding more wealth, combined with more redistribution for a better safety net and less poverty and inequality. And in another post, he calls for greater empirical grounding for proposals in political philosophy, of the sort that has started to yield fruitful results in moral philosophy: But shouldn’t it impossible to take seriously an argument to the effect that, say this or that policy is required in order to secure the conditions for the development of some capacity, in the absence of (a) a well-empirically-grounded theory of the nature of that capacity and its development, and (b) some kind of actual evidence that this or that policy in fact has the kind of effect on it that one hypothesizes? I wouldn’t mind so much if political philosophy arguments were more often in the form of “Hey, here’s a conjecture! I suggest somebody competent to do so try to find out if it’s true.” I would be quite happy if I saw more “Hey, here’s a conjecture, and here’s a my attempt to honestly synthesize the relevant literature in a first pass at getting the answer.” That would be terrific. But usually, the argument aims to establish something substantive with an armchair, a Joe Stiglitz op-ed, and something remembered from the Tuesday Science Times.Let’s hear it for empiricism.
In an interview in Christianity Today: I believe God created the heavens and the earth, and it doesn’t scare me when scientists say that can’t be proved. I couldn’t give a [profanity] whether a person calls himself a scientist. Science has covered itself with glory, morally, in my time. Scientists were the people in Germany telling Hitler that it was a good idea to kill all the Jews. Scientists told Stalin it was a good idea to wipe out the middle-class peasants. Scientists told Mao Tse-Tung it was fine to kill 50,000,000 people in order to further the revolution.In an interview on the Trinity Broadcasting Network with Paul Crouch, Jr. (video is available if you follow the link): Stein: When we just saw that man, I think it was Mr. Myers [i.e. biologist P.Z. Myers], talking about how great scientists were, I was thinking to myself the last time any of my relatives saw scientists telling them what to do they were telling them to go to the showers to get gassed … that was horrifying beyond words, and that’s where science — in my opinion, this is just an opinion — that’s where science leads you. Crouch: That’s right. Stein: …Love of God and compassion and empathy leads you to a very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people. Crouch: Good word, good word.Note that he offers no qualifiers. He doesn’t say science must be complemented with ethics. He doesn’t say that science (like any knowledge of truths about the universe) may have negative as well as positive consequences. He simply says that science leads to mass murder. If Stein really believes this, then he must be a genuine opponent of the practice of science, and his promotion of “Expelled” can be seen as an aspect of that anti-scientific attitude, despite the fact that he certainly takes personal advantage of many of the positive contributions of science. If he doesn’t genuinely believe it, then he’s not only engaging in a defamatory slur against scientists, he’s also dishonest. Either way, he’s demonstrated that he is a despicable character. And some people claim not to understand why scientists are angered by this film and its creators. Others on this subject: John Lynch at Stranger Fruit Larry Moran at The Sandwalk P.Z. Myers at Pharyngula Ed Brayton at Dispatches from the Culture Wars ...