Vocab Malone on abortion and personhood, part 3

Vocab Malone has posted the third part of his argument against abortion at his blog, focusing on what he calls “the argument from size.” As I don’t think there’s any plausibility to this argument, I won’t spend any time with it, but there are still a few things in his post that I think demand response. The first is the assertion Vocab quotes from “prolific pro-life trainer and speaker Scott Klusendorf” that he always encounters this argument when he speaks at Christian schools. I find this assertion very difficult to believe–I don’t think I’ve ever encountered this argument anywhere, and I suspect that Klusendorf is either intentionally or unintentionally misconstruing some other argument as this argument. (Would he consider Randy Newman’s song, “Short People,” to be an instance of the argument, given its lyric, “short people got no reason to live”?) The instance of the argument Vocab suggests is nothing of the sort, though at least he admits that it is an argument about another subject. Here’s the quote as Vocab presents it: From the other end of things, a recent New York Times article featured a similar argument (although his piece was on a broader topic than abortion): Look at your loved ones. Do you see a hunk of cells or do you see something else? … We do not see cells, simple or complex – we see people, human life. That thing in a petri dish is something else. [2]The quote is from a New York Times editorial by neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga about the difference between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. Here’s the quotation in context; it’s the ending of the piece: ...

December 16, 2009 · 16 min

Vocab Malone on abortion and personhood, part 1

Vocab Malone has put up his first post arguing for the position that “the unborn human embryo is a full person at the moment of conception and should be afforded the full rights due human beings by their very essence." Criteria of Personhood or Humanity He starts by looking at the question of what it is to be human or to be a person, citing a few historical references of individual characteristics–being rational, being “in relationship,” and “the capacity for self-objectification.” He expresses doubt that any single characteristic is appropriate, on the grounds that human beings undergo changes of state such as being asleep or being drugged, or not thinking. I agree with him that the characteristics he has listed won’t do the trick, and I also agree with him that features that go away when we sleep are inadequate. But it doesn’t follow that there is no single feature that can do the trick–if the feature is a capacity that we have, for example, that capacity doesn’t cease to exist when it’s not being used. He goes on to note that lack of personhood doesn’t entail that any treatment is morally permissible, pointing out animals as examples of nonpersons that deserve humane treatment. Again, I agree with him–and observe the converse, that possession of personhood doesn’t mean that there are no cases where it can be moral to kill a person–cases of self-defense, euthanasia, capital punishment, or war come to mind as possibilities. But what makes animals deserve humane treatment is that they have certain capacities and interests, such as an inner mental life that includes at the very least the ability to feel sensations–and note that humane treatment doesn’t necessarily entail a right to life on the part of an animal, or a duty on our part not to kill them. Vocab appears to want to lay the groundwork for rejecting the use of a criterion of personhood in favor of a criterion of humanity as his standard for arguing against abortion, but here he only offers a promissory note and doesn’t provide an argument to that effect. I think this is a mistake, however, because ethical distinctions should be based on morally relevant features, and I don’t believe species membership is any more relevant in and of itself to being the holder of rights or of being the object of duties than is race or gender. If a member of an intelligent alien species capable of language were to make contact with us, my intuition is that we would attribute personhood to that entity and give it the same consideration as a human being. Likewise if we manage to build artificially intelligent, self-directed machines with beliefs, desires, and intentions, though the intuition is not as strong there unless I imagine them to have mental lives similar to our own. Conception: Fertilization Even though Vocab hasn’t yet given a reason to reject a personhood criterion in favor of a human being criterion, the rest of his case is solely about human life rather than personhood, which I think is the wrong issue for the reasons I just gave. He argues that human life begins at conception, and clarifies that he means fertilization rather than implantation. This choice means that 30-50% of human lives are spontaneously aborted due to the failure of the fertilized ova to implant in the uterine wall. If Vocab thinks that this loss of human life is the loss of beings with rights and interests to whom we owe a duty to enable them to live out normal lives, then he has some explaining to do. First of all, why would a loving God create a human reproductive system that resulted in such a Holocaust of lives lost before they get a chance to start? Second, why has no one considered this to be a serious ethical problem that we need to urgently devote medical resources to address? We can call this the problem of natural abortion, which has both a natural evil and human evil component that requires justification. Complete at Fertilization? Vocab says that at conception (by which he means fertilization), “every human is complete and alive.” I agree that a fertilized human ovum is alive–as life is a continuous process, arising from living components, at least until synthetic biology gets to the point of creating life from entirely nonliving components. Sperm and ova are also alive. But it is certainly not complete–zygotes have no brains, no central nervous systems, no organs, no body parts other than undifferentiated, identical cells. An Individual at Fertilization? Vocab also says that at fertilization and pre-implantation, “it is not merely a collection of cells lumped together but an actual individual.” This also need not be the case. At fertilization, a zygote is an undifferentiated cell that undergoes a process of division without changing size for several days, to become a blastocyst by about the fifth day. During this period each of its cells is totipotent, meaning that each individual cell has the potential to become a full human being. Sometimes more than one of the cells does become a separate human being, as in the case of identical twins. In the case of identical twins, if they don’t split completely, they may become conjoined twins or parasitic twins, or one twin may be completely absorbed into the other or otherwise fail to develop and become a vanishing twin. Where a vanishing twin occurs with fraternal twins, the resulting individual can be a chimera, with two sets of DNA. Should we also grieve for those twins who fail to develop, either due to failure to split off or failure to develop? The science fiction scenarios of teleportation that create interesting philosophical puzzles for the notion of personal identity are real puzzles for a view that attributes personhood to zygotes, though without the additional problem of memories and experiences, since zygotes are undifferentiated cells. Blastocysts Once the zygote becomes a blastocyst, it forms into an outer layer of cells, which later becomes the placenta, and an inner cell mass of pluripotent embryonic stem cells, each of which is capable of differentiating into any kind of human cell. Only after this stage does the blastocyst implant in the wall of the uterus, about a week after fertilization, and begin taking nutrients directly from the blood of the mother–a dependency that can itself be of moral significance, as Judith Jarvis Thomson’s violinist argument shows. As already mentioned above, a great many fertilized ova do not reach this stage. Further, the percentages of implant failure are higher for in vitro fertilization (IVF), a procedure which Vocab’s criteria would have to declare unethical, even though it is the only way that many couples can have their own biological offspring. It should also be noted that the process of therapeutic cloning involves taking a female ovum (which Vocab doesn’t seem to indicate he considers to be a bearer of rights on its own), removing its haploid DNA, inserting the nucleus from a (diploid) human somatic cell (this is called somatic cell nuclear transfer), and giving it a shock to cause it to start dividing just like a fertilized egg. This occurs without fertilization by a human sperm. Once it reaches the blastocyst stage, its inner cell mass is harvested for embryonic stem cells, which destroys the blastocyst in the process. The natural process of fertilization never takes place, but there’s little doubt that reproductive human cloning is possible via this process. Vocab’s choice of fertilization as key suggests that there is no moral issue with this process, even though it also has some potential to become a human being. Further, if fertilization is a necessary, not just a sufficient, condition for rights, Vocab’s view suggests that human clones would have no rights. Fully Programmed? Vocab goes on to say that “the embryo is already ‘fully programmed’ (to use computer language). This means the pre-implanted embryo needs no more information input at any further point in its development.” While this was formerly believed to be the case about the individual embryo’s biology, we now know that the environment of development can play a role in the characteristics that will come to be exhibited, such as from mRNA supplied from the mother to a developing embryo after fertilization and prior to zygote formation. But in any case, I would maintain that it’s not our cellular biology that gives us moral value, as opposed to our capacities to have interests, desires, intentions, plans, sensations, and so forth–all capacities that zygotes lack. Vocab ends this piece with some anthropomorphizing of zygotes, which appears to me to be a highly misleading form of argument–his analogies cannot be taken literally, since zygotes have no mental processes. Human and Living = Human Being? I agree with Vocab that a fertilized human ovum is living, that it’s human, and that, if all goes well, it will become one (or more) individual human beings. I don’t agree that it’s yet a person or a “human being,” since it lacks the requisite parts and capacities. To sum up: ...

December 12, 2009 · 11 min

Discussion on abortion and personhood w/Vocab Malone

Local Christian hip-hop artist and slam poet Vocab Malone, who I’ve interacted with online and met when Daniel Dennett spoke at ASU early this year, asked me in January for my thoughts on abortion and personhood. He’s now written a paper on the subject which he’s asked me to critique, and we thought it would be interesting to see how it would work out to do it in a public manner via our respective blogs. The plan is that he will post successive sections of his paper on his blog, and I’ll respond here, with cross-links to share some traffic and discussion. Both of us allow blog comments; it probably makes the most sense to post your comments at the blog for the person you’d like to see a response from. Vocab has posted an introduction and the comments that I originally sent to him on the subject at his blog, Backpack Apologetics. He’s taking a position that I think is very difficult to justify, that full personhood and human rights are acquired at the moment of conception–we’ll have to see which definition of conception he chooses, fertilization or implantation. Just to throw out a little issue I raised this semester in one of my classes–some have argued that climate change raises the ethical issue of a duty to future generations. If we can have moral duties now to people who don’t exist at all yet, what does that imply about duties to embryos? ...

December 10, 2009 · 8 min

Daniel Dennett, The Evolution of Confusion

Daniel Dennett’s talk from the 2009 Atheist Alliance International convention (link is to my summary) is now online:

November 16, 2009 · 1 min

Philosophy Bites podcast

I’ve been listening to past episodes of the Philosophy Bites podcast, and I highly recommend it–they are short (about 15 minute) discussions with prominent philosophers about specific philosophical topics and questions. I’ve found them to be consistently of high quality and interesting, even in the one case where I think the philosophical argument was complete nonsense (Robert Rowland Smith on Derrida on forgiveness). Even there, the interviewers asked the right questions. I particularly have enjoyed listening to topics that are outside the areas of philosophy I’ve studied, like Alain de Botton on the aesthetics of architecture. Other particularly good ones have been Hugh Mellor on time, David Papineau on physicalism, A.C. Grayling on Descartes’ Meditations, and Peter Millican on the significance of Hume. I’ve still got a bunch more past episodes to listen to; I’m going to be somewhat disappointed when I catch up. ...

November 8, 2009 · 1 min

Where is the academic literature on skepticism as a social movement?

Here’s all I’ve been able to find so far, independent of self-descriptions from within the movement (and excluding history and philosophy of Pyrrhonism, Academic Skepticism, the Carvaka, the Enlightenment, British Empiricism, and lots of work on the development of the enterprise of science): George Hansen, "CSICOP and the Skeptics: An Overview," The Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research vol. 86, no. 1, January 1992, pp. 19-63. I've not seen a more detailed history of contemporary skepticism elsewhere. Stephanie A. Hall, "Folklore and the Rise of Moderation Among Organized Skeptics," New Directions in Folklore vol. 4, no. 1, March 2000. David J. Hess, Science in the New Age: The Paranormal, Its Defenders and Debunkers, and American Culture, 1993, The University of Wisconsin Press. I note that Paul Kurtz's The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge (1992, Prometheus Books) puts contemporary skepticism in the lineage of several of the other forms of philosophical skepticism I mentioned above, identifying his form of skepticism as a descendant of pragmatism in the C.S. Peirce/John Dewey/Sidney Hook tradition (and not the Richard Rorty style of pragmatism). But I think that says more about Kurtz than about the skeptical movement, which also draws upon other epistemological traditions and probably doesn't really have a sophisticated epistemological framework to call its own. There's a lot of literature on parallel social movements of various sorts, including much about advocates of some of the subject matter that skeptics criticize, and some of that touches upon skeptics. For example: Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, "The Construction of the Paranormal: Nothing Unscientific is Happening," in Roy Wallis, editor, On the Margins of Science: The Social Construction of Rejected Knowledge, 1979, University of Keele Press, pp. 237-270. Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science, 1982, Taylor & Francis. Ronald L. Numbers, The Creationists: From Scientific Creationism to Intelligent Design, 2nd edition, 2006, Harvard University Press. Christopher P. Toumey, God's Own Scientists: Creationists in a Secular World, 1994, Rutgers University Press. The Toumey book doesn't really have anything about skeptics, but is an anthropological study of creationists in the United States which describes the connection between "creationism as a national movement" and "creationism as a local experience" that seems intriguingly similar to the skeptical movement, especially in light of the fact (as I mentioned in my previous post) that national skeptical organizations are independent of established institutions of science that provide the key literature of the movement and at least implicitly assume that the average layman can develop the ability to discern truth from falsehood, at least within a particular domain, from that literature. In some ways, the skeptical movement also resembles a sort of layman's version of the activist element in the field of science and technology studies, based on positivist views of science that are the "vulgar skepticism" dismissed in this article: Michael Lynch, "Expertise, Skepticism and Cynicism: Lessons from Science & Technology Studies," Spontaneous Generations vol. 1, no. 1, 2007, pp. 17-24. I think if contemporary skepticism wants to achieve academic respectability, it will need to develop a more sophisticated view of science that comes to terms with post-Popper philosophy of science and post-Merton sociology of science; my recommendation for skeptics who are interested in that subject is to read, as a start: Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions, 1995, Oxford University Press. There's an enormous relevant literature on those topics, an interesting broad overview is: R.C. Olby, G.N. Cantor, J.R.R. Christie, and M.J.S. Hodge, Companion to the History of Modern Science, 1990, Routledge. I welcome any new revelations about sources of relevance that I've missed, particularly if there is other academic work specifically addressing the history, philosophy, sociology, and anthropology of the contemporary skeptical movement--three sources ain't much. UPDATE (September 27, 2014): Some additional works I recommend for skeptics: Harry Collins, Are We All Scientific Experts Now?, 2014, Polity Press.  A very brief and quick overview of science studies with respect to expertise. Massimo Pigliucci, Nonsense On Stilts: How to Tell Science from Bunk, 2010, University of Chicago Press. A good corrective to the overuse of Popper, easy read. Massimo Pigliucci and Maarten Boudry, Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, 2013, University of Chicago Press. Good collection of essays reopening the debate many thought closed by Larry Laudan on whether there can be philosophical criteria for distinguishing the boundary between science and pseudoscience. Reed (2009-11-04): Though not an academic work, I collected data on the skeptics groups on Meetup and reported the numbers in the appendix of my 2008 "Raising Our Game" piece. ...

November 4, 2009 · 5 min

Skepticism, belief revision, and science

In the comments of Massimo Pigliucci’s blog post about the scope of skepticism (which I’ve already discussed here), Skepdude pointed to a couple of blog posts he had written on similar topics some time ago, about what atheists have in common and skepticism and atheism. He argues that skeptics must be atheists and cannot be agnostics or theists, a position I disagree with. In an attempt to get to the bottom of our disagreement after a few exchanges in comments on his blog, I wrote the following set of questions which I first answered myself, so we can see how his answers differ. Do we have voluntary control over what we believe? In general, no. The credence we place in various propositions–our belief or rejection of them–is largely out of our voluntary control and dependent upon our perceptual experiences, memories, other beliefs, and established habits and methods of belief formation and revision. We can indirectly cause our beliefs to change by engaging in actions which change our habits–seeking out contrary information, learning new methods like forms of mathematics and logic, scientific methods, reading books, listening to others, etc. How does someone become a skeptic? People aren’t born as skeptics–they learn about skepticism and how it has been applied in various cases (only after learning a whole lot of other things that are necessary preconditions–like language and reasoning). If skepticism coheres with their other beliefs, established habits and methods of belief formation and revision, and/or they are persuaded by arguments in favor of it, either self-generated or from external sources, they accept it and, to some degree or another, apply it subsequently. When someone becomes a skeptic, what happens to all of the other beliefs they already have? They are initially retained, but may be revised and rejected as they are examined through the application of skeptical methods and other retained habits and methods of belief formation and revision. Levels of trust in some sources will likely be reduced, either within particular domains or in general, if they are discovered to be unreliable. It’s probably not possible to start from a clean slate, as Descartes tried to do in his Meditations. Is everything a skeptic believes something which is a conclusion reached by scientific methods? No. Much of what we believe, we believe on the basis of testimony from other people who we trust, including our knowledge of our own names and date and place of birth, parts of our childhood history, the history of our communities and culture, and knowledge of places we haven’t visited. We also have various beliefs that are not scientifically testable, such as that there is an external world that persists independently of our experience of it, that there are other minds having experiences, that certain experiences and outcomes are intrinsically or instrumentally valuable, that the future will continue to resemble the past in various predictable ways, etc. If you did believe that skeptics should only believe conclusions which are reached by scientific methods, that would be a belief that is not reached by scientific methods. ...

October 22, 2009 · 22 min

Mirror neurons and the study of science

Tony Barnhart was kind enough to invite me to a psychology seminar yesterday afternoon that was a discussion of mirror neurons, at least partly inspired by (or inflamed by) Marco Iacoboni’s August 27 talk which I attended and summarized. I found the discussion particularly interesting in light of my current studies, as it touched repeatedly on issues of what’s appropriate in science–what does and does not conform to the norms of good science. The discussion leaders began with quotes from V.S. Ramachandran and Marco Iacoboni: ...

September 22, 2009 · 13 min

Investigating Atheism

The faculty of Divinity at the University of Cambridge and University of Oxford have put together a website on “Investigating Atheism." Although it’s ironic that a bunch of theologians have done this, in my brief perusal of the site I haven’t found anything objectionable–it does a good job of putting current atheist arguments and personalities in historical context. (Via the Secular Outpost.) UPDATE: Well, they do have an article from well-known net kook John A. Davison. That’s a bit of an odd choice.

August 7, 2009 · 1 min

The Amazing Meeting 7: SGU, Shermer, Savage

This is part four of my summary of TAM7, now up to Saturday, July 10. Part 1 is here, part 2 is here, part 3 is here, and my coverage of the Science-based Medicine conference begins here. Skeptics Guide to the Universe Both Friday and Saturday morning began with live recording sessions for the Skeptics Guide to the Universe podcast, for which I didn’t bother to take notes, since it was being recorded (it’s Skeptics Guide podcast episode #208 and may be found on the website archive or via the iTunes store). The Saturday morning event began with a satirical ghost hunter video by Jay Novella, “The G Hunters” (part one, part two). But the real surprise came during the listener Q&A session, when Sid Rodrigues asked a question “maybe for Rebecca,” which turned out to be “Will you marry me?” A seemingly impromptu, but carefully planned wedding followed immediately, though there wasn’t enough cake for everyone, nor a champagne toast. All present did receive after-the-fact invitations as a nice memento, and there was a first dance for those who wanted to participate. Michael Shermer Michael Shermer prefaced his talk with an overview of the Skeptics Society and Skeptic magazine that bore some resemblance to the introduction of his TED Talk of 2006. His talk, titled “Rise Above–Towards a Type I Civilization,” argued that we should work to rise above our tribal instincts, our evolutionary heritage, and the left-right political spectrum. He began by noting that most of our decisions are judgments made on uncertainties (a reference to the classic book Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky), made emotionally with intuitive leaps which are then followed by rationalization to provide reasons to justify what we’ve already decided to do. He observed that when the amygdala is damaged, this leads not only to loss of emotional capacity, but an inability to make decisions. We don’t fall into categories of good and evil, but good and evil run through each person, he said, referencing Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago. An individual’s expanding circles of concern are based on genetic relationships and kin selection, he said, and reciprocal altruism operates within kin/kind/community. We’re good to members of our in-group, but skeptical and cautious about other groups. He spoke briefly about the left-right political spectrum, arguing instead for a three-dimensional Nolan chart that is used by libertarians with a misleading questionnaire as a recruiting tool. While I agree with Shermer that the left-right spectrum has serious weaknesses, I don’t think the Nolan chart is much of an improvement, especially when the coordinates on the chart are determined by a limited set of questions that are worded in a way that glosses over details. Better, I think, is to recognize that the space of political positions really encompasses far more dimensions. Shermer asked the audience how many considered themselves to be left of center, right, or libertarians, and the answers were about 1-2 people right of center, 15-20% libertarian, and the rest self-described liberal. He put up a couple of slides containing exaggerated stereotypical descriptions of how conservatives view liberals and vice versa, which produced cheers to both. He put up the political map of red and blue states based on the last presidential election results, and pointed out that the map is misleading, because if you look at it on a more granular level the country is really a mass of purple. (Though he didn’t mention or address the thesis of Bill Bishop’s The Big Sort.) He noted that his speaking out about his libertarianism has raised more ire than his views on religion (theism), and stated that it’s fine to disagree, but that political topics should be open to discussion. This was probably the most controversial talk of the conference, and it, along with Shermer’s recent interview on the Point of Inquiry podcast, have led to some to argue that skepticism should be apolitical. Shermer said that he’s been told that he should be apolitical, “like Carl Sagan,” to which Shermer (correctly) responded that Sagan was not apolitical, as he argued for a number of liberal causes, including nuclear disarmament (a cause for which he was twice arrested during protests). He then turned to some more interesting research, Jonathan Haidt’s work on how people make moral judgments. Haidt has hypothesized that we make moral judgments based on five scales, which Shermer compared to “a five-channel moral equalizer”: care: Protection from harm.fairness: Justice, equality.loyalty: Family, group, nation.authority: Respect for law, tradition, and traditional institutions.purity: Rules about sexual conduct, recognition of sacredness.Liberals tend to emphasize the first two items, which place a focus on individual rights, while conservatives use those two and the remaining three about equally, and the last three focus on group cohesiveness. These tendencies seem to hold up across cultures. Shermer apparently argued that all five of these scales are important, saying that “since 9/11, things have changed,” and noting that group loyalty is now getting some emphasis from left-atheists like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris. Shermer argued that religious extremists are dangerous, and are assisted by religious moderates. I think this is actually a badly mistaken inference to draw. Sure, there are extremists who are out to harm the U.S., but terrorism is a strategy of the militarily weak against the strong, and the right way to combat it is not by doing things like launching an invasion and occupying a country that had nothing to do with 9/11 (Iraq), engaging in torture and abuse, and causing religious moderates to join with the extremists, but rather by a divide-and-conquer strategy that isolates the extremists from the moderates and maintains the moral high ground. (Skeptic and physicist Taner Edis, from Turkey, has criticized Sam Harris for his misunderstanding of Islam, as has Chris Hedges who, despite his sometimes annoying attitude, made some good points on the subject in his Point of Inquiry interview.) To support his point, Shermer showed a clip from the film “A Few Good Men” in which Jack Nicholson defends his position of ordering a “Code Red” to engage in self-enforcement to punish a slacker in the military ranks as an ugly and unpleasant necessity. Shermer then turned to the Kardashev scale referenced in his title, which classifies civilizations into Type 0 (energy produced from dead plants and animals), Type I (planetary civilizations controlling the energy of an entire planet), Type II (stellar civilizations controlling the energy of an entire sun), and Type III (a civilization controlling all of the energy in an entire galaxy). Shermer gave an ordering from Type 0 to Type II, with tribal communities at 0.3, liberal democracies at 0.8, and then described Type I civilizations as including a global wireless (why wireless?) communication system (the Internet), a global language (English, most likely), a global culture (why not diverse cultures?), and global free trade, which breaks down tribal barriers. He didn’t really provide an argument for the details of the how and why, apart from that short defense of global free trade and a little more he said later, pointing to the work of Fredric Bastiat (Bastiat’s axiom: where goods cross frontiers, armies will not), which he augmented with the “Starbucks theory of war” (two nations with Starbucks won’t fight each other) and the “Google Theory of Peace” (where information and knowledge cross frontiers, armies will not). He then cited the work of Rudy Rummel on democracy and war, stating that between 1860 and 2005 there have been 371 wars, of which 205 were between non-democratic nations, 166 were between democracies and non-democracies, and 0 were between democracies. He said that some have challenged the details of the classifications, but that in general, democracies seem to be less likely to engage in war as a means of resolving disputes. He concluded by saying that rising above tribal instincts is hard, and quoted Katherine Hepburn’s line from “The African Queen”: “Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we must rise above." I didn’t get a chance to ask my question in the Q&A, but I went up to Shermer afterward and suggested that the tribal in-group seems to be a biological/mathematical limitation of our memories and processing capabilities with respect to the number of combinations of relationships we can track. Anthropologist Robin Dunbar’s work on this topic has led to what is called the “Dunbar number” or a “Dunbar circle,” which is the number of people you can keep track of and that make up your in-group, and it’s about 150. Studies of Facebook users show that even those with thousands of friends still engage in most of their interactions with a group of 150 or fewer. So my question was, in light of that limitation, how can we rise above tribal membership? Shermer’s answer was the same one I would have given, which is that although we may still be limited to that number of relationships, today they don’t have to be limited by geography, and so the way to “rise above” is to have lots of these small groups. Shermer suggested that we need to avoid any such groups having a political monopoly, but the real concern is how those small groups build coalitions which obtain and exercise political power, and what they try to do with it. I’m not sure there’s any getting around the problem of having political institutions which govern vastly larger numbers of people. My own opinion on whether “skepticism” should be apolitical and avoid religious topics is that skeptical organizations should avoid taking positions on those topics, except where there are clear empirically testable hypotheses. (For example, it should be perfectly legitimate for a skeptical organization to publish an examination of the social and psychological factors that cause people to give credence to crackpots like Orly Taitz and Philip Berg, and their respective bogus Kenyan and Canadian Obama birth certificates–as well as to examine the facts around topics like the “birther” controversy.) Individual skeptics, however, should feel free to argue for whatever positions they hold, while being cognizant of what is within the realm of the empirical and what is more philosophical. I don’t think Shermer’s talk should have been ruled inappropriate for TAM, though I would have liked to have seen a bit more science and argument in the talk, and I wouldn’t want to see a whole bunch of talks that all touched on politics or religion, especially if they all came from a single viewpoint. (UPDATE: I recently came across something I wrote relevant to this point about ten years ago on Usenet, which I still agree with today: “The skeptic’s position should be, on any issue where there isn’t conclusive evidence one way or another, either agnosticism or tentative acceptance of the view that seems to be best supported–but with tolerance for those who accept other views which are also inconclusively supported by the evidence. In other words, there is no and should be no official skeptic’s position. Further, there shouldn’t be an official skeptic’s position on subjects which are matters of political ideology, religious faith, or metaphysical views on which empirical science is silent.”) Adam Savage Adam Savage of Mythbusters gave a talk not directly related to skepticism, but to which everyone could relate–a talk about personal failure. He said that he is often asked how he attained his success, and he said that he didn’t follow a straight path and that he had a lot of failures along the way. He began by referring to Aaron Sorkin’s “Sports Night,” which he called the best 26 hours of television. In an episode of the second season, a billionaire who’s going to buy the show says, “Dana. I’m what the world considers to be a phenomenally successful man. And I’ve failed much more than I’ve succeeded. And each time I fail, I get my people together, and I say, “Where are we going?” And it starts to get better. And that’s what you should do." Savage said that he wanted to present the details of how spectacular and painful some of his failures have been. He said that he’s been fired from a production assistant job, he’s been divorced, and he’s yelled at his kids. All of our lives are two steps forward, one step back. He got a job at Industrial Light and Magic, working with his heroes, a job he’d wanted since he was 11. In the SFX industry, everybody is freelance, working on jobs for a time, and always looking for the next. But at ILM, there is no selling required. He said your resume is just three words–just four words–Industrial Light and Magic. And he would also take extra outside jobs. His friend Ben called him with a job that he couldn’t take because of the short turn-around time. A department store wanted a window display within five days, that depicted a ballpark fence. What they wanted was baseballs automatically being pitched over the fence on a continuous basis. Savage bid his day rate, $300-$500/day, plus a market-rate rush fee. It was a really fat paycheck for five days work. He got pitching machines and a ballfeeder, built it, and watched it work 70 times in a row, and then fail. He figured this was a solvable problem. He stayed up all night Friday and Saturday morning trying to get it to work–it was originally supposed to be ready by Saturday, and needed on Monday (?)–and brought it to the store to assemble. It turned out that the size of the display area was different from what he was told, and in the new set up it was down to 30-40 balls in a row before failure, so would fail every 3 hours. He observed that there’s a reason the displays in airports with balls moving around on tracks use fixed rails, rather than tubes like he was using–rails lead to balls moving in a predictable amount of time, while the air resistance in a tube makes the timing unpredictable. So he added an air blower to force the balls down the tubes. The next problem was that when one pitching machine pitches, it takes more power, which causes the other two machines to slow down, increasing the failure rate. He had relatives coming into town at 6 p.m. on Saturday and it still wasn’t working. He came to the conclusion that no amount of effort is going to make it work, and told his employer that in 30 minutes he would present three alternatives and have whichever one they chose implemented by 8 a.m. the next morning. He came up with a new solution using a monofilament chain connected to the balls, simulating the motion of a pitched ball–no pitching machines. He stayed up all night and visited Home Depot repeatedly, and finally got it working with 10 baseballs. The National Head of Display came to look at the display, and said, “it looks great, but I don’t like the balls–get rid of them." Savage’s second story of failure was from earlier in his career, when he “pretended to attend NYU for a year” and then worked with his film student friends on their films. He worked on a friend’s film that was filmed at the Alexis Theater, and the film ended up winning the NYU Film Festival’s best art direction prize. So he thought about becoming an art director, and put his name out. He was asked to work on a friend Gabby’s film, with an $850 budget. He needed to build a set of a room with a glass door with an ATM in it, which he figured he could do with wood frames and canvas for the walls, a shell for a computer as the ATM, and a plexiglass door. He never asked for help. He worked Wednesday through Saturday morning, without sleep for 60 hours, and wasn’t close. The screen on the ATM cracked–he figured, it’s supposed to be an urban environment, it will be fine. He didn’t pre-prep the canvas, so it all become horribly wrinkled. He put down linoleum on the carpet of the home where the set was being built for the floor. At some point, a member of the crew asked him, “Do you even know what you’re doing?” He responded with what he thought was a clever line from Raiders of the Lost Ark, “I don’t know, I’m making this up as I go along.” The response from the crew member: “Go home.” So he did. The following Monday, he went to the set to pick up his toolbox, and it wasn’t there. There was a note that said “We have your toolbox. Call me. Gabby.” He called her, and she said, “What did you do to me? You screwed me. You pissed away the money. If you could do anything to destroy our friendship, this is it. I want you to account for every penny.” He cried and called his father, who told him, “All you can do is move forward.” He went and met with Gabby, and accounted for every penny that he had spent. She then said, “The crew is next door, and they want to talk to you." He went to the room next door, and found a dark room with a chair in the middle, with a spotlight focused on it. He sat in it, and the director read from a pad of paper all of the things that Adam had said he would do, but didn’t. This litany of offenses was periodically interrupted by a member of the crew adding something, like the fact that the linoleum he put down ruined the carpet in the apartment. There was also one point during the work where Savage was across town having sex instead of working on the set, and somehow the crew knew about that, too, and brought it up. Finally, they asked him what he had to say for himself. He simply agreed–“You’re absolutely right. I screwed up. I’m sorry.” He added four meta-levels of sorry, and said that he knows it doesn’t mean or help anything. At that point, the director said, after a long pause–“look, we’re not trying to bring you down or anything." Savage then quoted, from memory, from Ian McEwan’s Enduring Love, which begins with four people in a public park running towards a balloon accident. In the opening, he writes something like “running towards a catastrophe, a kind of furnace in which are characters would be buckled into new shapes." He said that he doesn’t trust working with people who don’t know or understand failure–failure builds character. And whatever you think now (about anything?), you’re probably wrong. He ended first by reading from Rilke’s Letters to a Young Poet, which went something like this: “We find out moments of sadness terrifying because we are standing in a place we cannot stand. It’s important to be lonely and attentive when one is sad, because that is when you learn.” And then by saying that his favorite fictional character is Raymond Chandler’s Philip Marlowe, because Chandler so clearly describes his flaws and foibles. He said that if the world were full of people like Marlowe, the world would be a safer place, but not boring. There followed a Q&A, most of the questions were about Mythbusters, except for one question which Savage answered about Rilke’s hatred of Rodin (and writing “what is fame but a collection of misunderstandings about a name?”) and another which he answered by describing his “boyhood dream” to win an Ig Nobel Prize for writing a taxonomy of nonsense words for large and small numbers. (Savage gave a similar talk at Defcon 17, available online.) (Click on the link to continue to a summary of the rest of the Saturday sessions at TAM7–a panel on the ethics of deception, the Skeptical Citizen Award, a Jerry Andrus video, Stephen Bauer’s talk on Jerry Andrus and his estate, a panel on skepticism and the media, Phil Plait on Doomsday 2012, and a JREF update.) ...

August 7, 2009 · 18 min
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