CIA

An article in The Progressive by Matthew Rothschild worries that the FBI’s InfraGard program is deputizing businesses, training them for martial law, and giving them a free pass to “shoot to kill.” Rothschild writes: The members of this rapidly growing group, called InfraGard, receive secret warnings of terrorist threats before the public does—and, at least on one occasion, before elected officials. In return, they provide information to the government, which alarms the ACLU. But there may be more to it than that. One business executive, who showed me his InfraGard card, told me they have permission to “shoot to kill” in the event of martial law.Nonsense. I’ve been a member of the Phoenix InfraGard Members Alliance for years. It’s a 501(c)(3) organization sponsored by the FBI whose members have been subjected to some rudimentary screening (comparable to what a non-cleared employee of the federal government would get). Most InfraGard meetings are open to the general public (contrary to Rothschild’s statement that “InfraGard is not readily accessible to the general public”), but the organization facilitates communications between members about sensitive subjects like vulnerabilities in privately owned infrastructure and the changing landscape of threats. The FBI provides some reports of threat information to InfraGard members through a secure website, which is unclassified but potentially sensitive information. InfraGard members get no special “shoot to kill” or law enforcement powers of any kind–and membership in the organization is open to anyone who can pass the screening. As Rothschild notes in the first sentence of his article, there are over 23,000 members–that is a pretty large size for a conspiracy plot. At one point in the article, Rothschild quotes InfraGard National Members Alliance chairman Phyllis Schneck referring to a “special telecommunications card that will enable your call to go through when others will not.” This is referring to a GETS card, for the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service, which provides priority service for call completion in times of emergency or disaster to personnel who are working to support critical infrastructure. There is a similar service for wireless priority (Wireless Priority Service), and yet another for critical businesses and organizations (like hospitals) which need to have their telecommunications service re-established first after a loss of service due to disaster (Telecommunications Service Priority). These programs are government programs that are independent of InfraGard, though InfraGard has helped members who represent pieces of critical infrastructure obtain GETS cards. The ACLU’s concern about InfraGard being used as a tip line to turn businesses into spies is a more plausible but still, in my opinion, unfounded concern. Businesses are not under any pressure to provide information to InfraGard, other than normal reporting of criminal events to law enforcement. The only time I’ve been specifically asked to give information to InfraGard is when I’ve been asked to speak at a regular meeting, which I’ve done a few times in talks that have been open to the public about malware threats and botnets. Check out the comments in The Progressive for some outright hysteria about fascism and martial law. I saw similar absurdity regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s TOPOFF 4 exercise, which was a sensible emergency planning exercise. Some people apparently are unable to distinguish common-sense information sharing and planning in order to defend against genuine threats from the institution of a fascist dictatorship and martial law. Now, I think there are plausible criticisms to be made of the federal government’s use of non-governmental organizations–when they’re used to sidestep laws and regulations like the Freedom of Information Act, to give lots of government grant money to organizations run by former government employees, to legally mandate funding of and reporting to private organizations and so forth. The FBI has created quite a few such organizations to do things like collect information about missing and exploited children, online crime, and so forth, typically staffed by former agents. But personally, I’ve not witnessed anything in InfraGard that has led me to have any concerns that it’s being used to enlist private businesses into questionable activities–rather, it’s been entirely devoted to sharing information that private businesses can use to shore up their own security and for law enforcement to prosecute criminals. UPDATE (February 9, 2008): The irony is that Matthew Rothschild previously wrote, regarding 9/11 truthers: We have enough proof that the Bush administration is a bunch of lying evildoers. We don’t need to make it up.He’s right about that, but he’s now helped spread nonsense about InfraGard and seriously damaged his own credibility. I find it interesting that people are so willing to conclude that InfraGard is a paramilitary organization, when it’s actually an educational and information sharing organization that has no enforcement or even emergency, disaster, or incident response function (though certainly some of its members have emergency, disaster, and incident response functions for the organizations they work for). UPDATE (February 10, 2008): I suspect tomorrow Christine Moerke of Alliant Energy will be getting calls from reporters asking what specifically she confirmed. I hope they ask for details about the conference in question, whether it was run by InfraGard or DHS, what the subject matter was, and who said what. If there’s actually an InfraGard chapter endorsing the idea that InfraGard members form armed citizen patrols authorized to use deadly force in time of martial law, that’s a chapter that needs to have its leadership removed. My suspicion, though, is that some statements about protection of infrastructure by their own security forces in times of disaster or emergency have been misconstrued. Alliant Energy operates nuclear plants, nuclear plants do have armed guards, and in Arizona, ARS 13-4903 describes the circumstances under which nuclear plant security officers are authorized to use deadly force. Those people, however, are thoroughly trained and regularly tested regarding the use of force and the use of deadly force in particular, which is not the case for InfraGard members. UPDATE (February 11, 2008): Somehow, above, I neglected to make the most obvious point–that the FBI doesn’t have the authority to grant immunity to prosecution for killing. If anyone from the FBI made that statement to InfraGard members, they were saying something that they have no authority to deliver on. UPDATE (February 12, 2008): I’ve struck out part of the above about the ACLU’s concern about spying being unfounded, as I think that’s too strong of a denial. There is a potential slippery slope here. The 9/11 Commission Report pointed to various communication problems that led to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. These problems included failure to share information (mainly from the CIA to the FBI and INS), failure to communicate information within the FBI (like Phoenix Special Agent Ken Williams’ memo about suspicious Middle Easterners in flight schools), and failure to have enough resources to translate NSA intercepts (some specific chatter about the attacks was translated after the attacks had already occurred). As a result, the CIA has been working closely with the FBI on counterterrorism and counterintelligence at least since 2001. (Also see Dana Priest, “CIA Is Expanding Domestic Operations,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2002, p. A02, which is no longer available on the Post’s site but can be found elsewhere on the web, on sites whose other content is so nutty I refuse to link, as well as this January 2006 statement from FBI Director Robert Mueller on the InfraGard website, which includes the statement that “Today, the FBI and CIA are not only sharing information on a regular basis, we are exchanging employees and working together on cases every day.”) The slippery slope is this–the CIA is an organization which recruits and develops in its officers a sense of flexible ethics which has frequently resulted in incredible abuses, and which arguably has done more harm than good to U.S. interests. (My opinion on the CIA may be found in my posts on this blog labeled “CIA”; I highly recommend Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.) Some of that ethical flexibility may well rub off on FBI agents who work closely with CIA case officers. (The FBI itself has also had a history of serious abuses, an objective account of which may be found in Ronald Kessler’s book The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI.) And then, that same ethical flexibility may rub off on InfraGard members as a result of their relationships with the FBI (and potentially relationships with the CIA, as well). The intelligence community seems to have a hunger for more and more information from more and more sources, but it is already awash in a sea of information that it has trouble processing today. (It doesn’t help that the Army fires direly needed Arabic translators because they are gay.) The need is to accurately assess the information that it has, and ensure that bits and pieces aren’t cherry-picked to produce desired conclusions, as well as ensure that information isn’t sought or assembled to serve personal and political ends of particular interests rather than combatting genuine threats to the country and its citizens. My recommendation is that all InfraGard members read Kessler’s The Bureau, Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes, and view the film that won the 2007 Academy Award for best foreign film, “The Lives of Others,” to help innoculate them against such a slippery slope. UPDATE: Amy Goodman interviewed Matt Rothschild for “Democracy Now!” on Wisconsin Public Television, in which it is pretty clear to me that Rothschild is exaggerating something he doesn’t understand–what he cites as evidence doesn’t support what he claims. Here’s a key excerpt, see the link for the full transcript: MR: […] And one other member of InfraGard [Christine Moerke of Alliant Energy] confirmed to me that she had actually been at meetings and participated in meetings where the discussion of lethal force came up, as far as what businesspeople are entitled to do in times of an emergency to protect their little aspect of the infrastructure. AG: But just to clarify, Matt Rothschild, who exactly is empowered to shoot to kill if martial law were declared? The business leaders themselves? MR: The business leaders themselves were told, at least in this one meeting, that if there is martial law declared or if there’s a time of an emergency, that members of InfraGard would have permission to protect—you know, whether it’s the local utility or, you know, their computers or the financial sector, whatever aspect. Whatever aspect of the infrastructure they’re involved with, they’d have permission to shoot to kill, to use lethal force to protect their aspect of the infrastructure, and they wouldn’t be able to be prosecuted, they were told. […] You know, this is a secretive organization. They’re not supposed to talk to the press. You need to get vetted by the FBI before you can join it. They get almost daily information that the public doesn’t get. And then they have these extraordinary, really astonishing powers being vested in them by FBI and Homeland Security, shoot-to-kill powers. I mean, this is scary stuff. MR: The business leaders themselves were told, at least in this one meeting, that if there is martial law declared or if there’s a time of an emergency, that members of InfraGard would have permission to protect—you know, whether it’s the local utility or, you know, their computers or the financial sector, whatever aspect. Whatever aspect of the infrastructure they’re involved with, they’d have permission to shoot to kill, to use lethal force to protect their aspect of the infrastructure, and they wouldn’t be able to be prosecuted, they were told.It looks to me like the following transformation has occurred: 1. At a DHS conference on emergency response, somebody asks if owners of critical pieces of infrastructure should be expected to use deadly force if necessary to protect it (e.g., a nuclear power plant). 2. Somebody at DHS answers yes. They may even add that in some cases the law provides specific justification for use of deadly force (as in the Arizona statute I cite above). 3. Matt turns that into a general right to “shoot-to-kill” in times of martial law by any InfraGard member. 4. The blogosphere turns that into roving citizen patrols unleashed on the nation as the Bush hit squad after declaration of martial law. I don’t see his key source–Christine Moerke–confirming anything beyond #1 and #2. Note other exaggerations and contradictions–Rothschild claims that InfraGard is highly secretive and selective, yet has quickly grown to over 23,000 members and has multiple public websites. He fails to note that most InfraGard meetings are open to the general public, or that it has been discussed in many articles in the national press over the last decade. Rothschild speaks of “business leaders,” which the blogosphere has turned into “CEOs,” yet I suspect the most common “business leader” represented in InfraGard is an IT or physical security manager. UPDATE (February 15, 2008): The FBI has issued an official response to Rothschild’s Progressive article (PDF), which says, in part: In short, the article’s claims are patently false. For the record, the FBI has not deputized InfraGard, its members, businesses, or anything else in the program. The title, however catchy, is a complete fabrication. Moreover, InfraGard members have no extraordinary powers and have no greater right to “shoot to kill” than other civilians. The FBI encourages InfraGard members – and all Americans – to report crime and suspected terrorist activity to the appropriate authorities.The FBI response also states that Rothschild has “refused even to identify when or where the claimed ‘small meeting’ occurred in which issues of martial law were discussed,” and promises to follow up with further clarifying details if they get that information. UPDATE (February 25, 2008): Here’s another blogger with a rational response to The Progressive article. UPDATE (March 2, 2008): Matthew Rothschild has responded to the FBI’s response on Alex Jones’ Info Wars blog, and he stands behind every word of his original article. He doesn’t display any knowledge of or response to any of the criticisms I’ve offered. ...

December 12, 2007 The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV, Chairman The United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC 20510 The Honorable Silvestre Reyes, Chairman The United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Washington, DC 20515 Dear Chairman Reyes and Chairman Rockefeller: As retired military leaders of the U.S. Armed Forces, we write to express our strong support for Section 327 of the Conference Report on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082. Section 327 would require intelligence agents of the U.S. government to adhere to the standards of prisoner treatment and interrogation contained in the U.S. Army Field Manual on Human Collector Operations (the Army Field Manual). We believe it is vital to the safety of our men and women in uniform that the United States not sanction the use of interrogation methods it would find unacceptable if inflicted by the enemy against captured Americans. That principle, embedded in the Army Field Manual, has guided generations of American military personnel in combat. The current situation, in which the military operates under one set of interrogation rules that are public and the CIA operates under a separate, secret set of rules, is unwise and impractical. In order to ensure adherence across the government to the requirements of the Geneva Conventions and to maintain the integrity of the humane treatment standards on which our own troops rely, we believe that all U.S. personnel - military and civilian - should be held to a single standard of humane treatment reflected in the Army Field Manual. The Field Manual is the product of decades of practical experience and was updated last year to reflect lessons learned from the current conflict. Interrogation methods authorized by the Field Manual have proven effective in eliciting vital intelligence from dangerous enemy prisoners. Some have argued that the Field Manual rules are too simplistic for civilian interrogators. We reject that argument. Interrogation methods authorized in the Field Manual are sophisticated and flexible. And the principles reflected in the Field Manual are values that no U.S. agency should violate. General David Petraeus underscored this point in an open letter to the troops in May in which he cautioned against the use of interrogation techniques not authorized by the Field Manual: What sets us apart from our enemies in this fight. . . . is how we behave. In everything we do, we must observe the standards and values that dictate that we treat noncombatants and detainees with dignity and respect…. Some may argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy. They would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history shows that they also are frequently neither useful nor necessary. Certainly, extreme physical action can make someone “talk;” however, what the individual says may be of questionable value. In fact, our experience in applying the interrogation standards laid out in the Army Field Manual (2-22.3) on Human Intelligence Collector Operations that was published last year shows that the techniques in the manual work effectively and humanely in eliciting information from detainees. Employing interrogation methods that violate the Field Manual is not only unnecessary, but poses enormous risks. These methods generate information of dubious value, reliance upon which can lead to disastrous consequences. Moreover, revelation of the use of such techniques does immense damage to the reputation and moral authority of the United States essential to our efforts to combat terrorism. This is a defining issue for America. We urge you to support the adoption of Section 327 of the Conference Report and thereby send a clear message - to U.S. personnel and to the world - that the United States will not engage in or condone the abuse of prisoners and will honor its commitments to uphold the Geneva Conventions. Sincerely, General Joseph Hoar, USMC (Ret.) General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.) General Charles Krulak, USMC (Ret.) General David M. Maddox, USA (Ret.) General Merrill A. McPeak, USAF (Ret.) Admiral Stansfield Turner, USN (Ret.) Vice Admiral Lee F. Gunn, USN (Ret.) Lieutenant General Claudia J. Kennedy, USA (Ret.) Lieutenant General Donald L. Kerrick, USA (Ret.) Vice Admiral Albert H. Konetzni Jr., USN (Ret.) Lieutenant General Charles Otstott, USA (Ret.) Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, USA (Ret.) Major General Paul Eaton, USA (Ret.) Major General Eugene Fox, USA (Ret.) Major General John L. Fugh, USA (Ret.) Rear Admiral Don Guter, USN (Ret.) Major General Fred E. Haynes, USMC (Ret.) Rear Admiral John D. Hutson, USN (Ret.) Major General Melvyn Montano, ANG (Ret.) Major General Gerald T. Sajer, USA (Ret.) Major General Antonio ‘Tony’ M. Taguba, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General David M. Brahms, USMC (Ret.) Brigadier General James P. Cullen, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General David R. Irvine, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General John H. Johns, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General Richard O’Meara, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General Murray G. Sagsveen, USA (Ret.) Brigadier General Anthony Verrengia, USAF (Ret.) Brigadier General Stephen N. Xenakis, USA (Ret.) The bill in question has passed in the House. It still needs to pass in the Senate. Bush has threatened to veto the measure. UPDATE (December 20, 2007): Notes on a few of the above–Taguba did the investigation of Abu Ghraib. Guter and Hutson were Judge Advocates General (i.e., the top Navy-Marine Corps lawyer). Turner was former Director of Central Intelligence (i.e., head of the CIA).

Ed Brayton at Dispatches from the Culture Wars observes that “the US has not only always considered waterboarding to be torture, but has aggressively prosecuted other nation’s for war crimes for using that technique on American POWs,” quoting Judge Evan Wallach: After World War II, we convicted several Japanese soldiers for waterboarding American and Allied prisoners of war. At the trial of his captors, then-Lt. Chase J. Nielsen, one of the 1942 Army Air Forces officers who flew in the Doolittle Raid and was captured by the Japanese, testified: “I was given several types of torture. . . . I was given what they call the water cure.” He was asked what he felt when the Japanese soldiers poured the water. “Well, I felt more or less like I was drowning,” he replied, “just gasping between life and death." ...

…read this description of it from Malcolm Nance, former chief of training at the U.S. Navy Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) school in San Diego: I have personally led, witnessed and supervised waterboarding of hundreds of people. It has been reported that both the Army and Navy SERE school’s interrogation manuals were used to form the interrogation techniques employed by the Army and the CIA for its terror suspects. What is less frequently reported is that our training was designed to show how an evil totalitarian enemy would use torture at the slightest whim. Having been subjected to this technique, I can say: It is risky but not entirely dangerous when applied in training for a very short period. However, when performed on an unsuspecting prisoner, waterboarding is a torture technique - without a doubt. There is no way to sugarcoat it. ...

CIA Director (and former head of the NSA) Gen. Michael Hayden is unhappy with CIA Inspector General John Helgerson’s work uncovering abuses at the CIA, so he’s ordered his own investigation of the IG, including an examination of the office’s confidential files. That’s sure to put a chill on employee cooperation with or reporting of abuses to the IG’s office.

In today’s New York Times: When the Justice Department publicly declared torture “abhorrent” in a legal opinion in December 2004, the Bush administration appeared to have abandoned its assertion of nearly unlimited presidential authority to order brutal interrogations.But soon after Alberto R. Gonzales’s arrival as attorney general in February 2005, the Justice Department issued another opinion, this one in secret. It was a very different document, according to officials briefed on it, an expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence Agency. ...

Source and page references are to Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 2007, Doubleday, pp. 71-167. 1953-1961 President: Dwight D. Eisenhower February 18, 1953: The CIA’s “Operation Ajax” (in conjunction with the British, who call it “Operation Boot”) begins, with Kim “Kermit” Roosevelt, Jr. (Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson) in charge–a plan to oust Iran’s prime minister, Mohammed Mossadeq, because of his nationalization of the Iranian oil industry (p. 83). March 5, 1953: Joseph Stalin dies. “We have no reliable inside intelligence on thinking inside the Kremlin. Our estimates of Soviet long-range plans and intentions are speculations drawn from inadequate evidence.” (p. 73) March 1953: The CIA and British back Fazlollah Zahedi to overthrow Mossadeq in Iran. April 1953: Zahedi goes into hiding after his supporters are suspected of kidnapping and murdering Iran’s national police chief. (p. 85). May 1953: CIA propaganda portrays Mossadeq as an enemy of Islam being supported by the Soviet Union. (p. 86) June 5, 1953: Allen Dulles tells the National Security Council that the CIA cannot give “any prior warning through intelligence channels of a Soviet sneak attack” (p. 75). 1953: The CIA guesses that the Soviets will not be able to launch an intercontinental ballistic missile at the United States until 1969 (p. 75). June 16-17, 1953: “Nearly 370,000 East Germans took to the streets” to protest against the Soviet Union and East German Communist Party. The CIA does nothing, “the uprising was crushed.” (p. 76) July 7, 1953: Iran’s Tudeh Party radio “warned Iranians that the American government, along with various ‘spies and traitors,’ including General Zahedi, were working ’to liquidate the Mossadeq government.’” (p. 87). In other words, the CIA and British intelligence plot was blown and made known to the Iranian public even before it began. July 11: President Eisenhower gives approval to the plot. August 1953: Soviet Union tests its first atomic bomb. The CIA “had no clue and gave no warning.” (p. 75) 1953: Joint Chiefs of Staff tells Eisenhower, regarding defense against Soviet aggression, that (as reported by Eisenhower) “we should do what was necessary even if the result was to change the American way of life. We could lick the whole world … if we were willing to adopt the system of Adolph Hitler.” (p. 75) 1953: Allen Dulles builds CIA propaganda machinery by building ties with heads of magazines and newspapers including The New York Times, Time (including Henry Luce), Newsweek, CBS News, and Axel Springer in West Germany (p. 77). August 1953: General Norman Schwarzkopf is brought in by the CIA to try to get the Shah of Iran to support the coup against Mossadeq and appoint Zahedi as prime minister (p. 88). August 16: “Hundreds of paid agitators flooded the streets of Tehran, looting, burning, and smashing the symbols of government.” (p. 89) August 19: Continued protesting occurs, and at least 100 people are killed on the streets of Tehran and 200 killed when the shah’s Imperial Guard attacks Mossadeq’s home. August 20: Mossadeq surrenders, spends 3 years in jail and a decade under house arrest before dying. Zahedia becomes prime minister, is paid $1 million by the CIA, and jails thousands of political prisoners. The shah sets up a secret police force, SAVAK, “trained and equipped by the CIA,” imposes martial law, and exercises dictatorial control over Iran (p. 92). This is considered a great success of the CIA–at least until 1979. The CIA’s internal history of the Iranian operation has been published online, authored by Donald Wilber, who was the main planner of the operation. End of 1953: An internal poll of the CIA yields a report that describes “‘a rapidly deteriorating situation’: widespread frustration, confusion, and purposelessness. … ’too many people in responsible positions apparently don’t know what they’re doing.’ … ‘a shocking amount of money’ going to waste on failed missions overseas.” (p. 78) Allen Dulles suppresses the report (p. 79). 1953: The CIA provides millions of dollars to Japanese gangster Yoshio Kodama, a man who led a group that attempted to assassinate the prime minister in the 1930s, in order to smuggle tungsten from the Japanese military into U.S. hands. December 1953: Colonel Al Haney sets up shop at an air base in Opa-Locka, Florida for “Operation Success," a plan to overthrow the government of Guatemala that has been discussed by the CIA for the previous three years. (p. 93) The plan is to put Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas of the Guatemala military in command, removing President Jacobo Arbenz. Haney draws out timelines and plans on a 40-foot roll of butcher paper pinned to the wall (p. 96). 1954: Frank Wisner has doubts about Haney, so sends Tracy Barnes and Richard Bissell to investigate his operation (p. 96). Henry Hecksher is sent to Guatemala City to spend up to $10,000/month on bribes of military officers, including Colonel Elfego Monzon, and CIA HQ sends Haney a list of 58 Guatemalans to be assassinated as part of the coup. The event that prompts the initiation of the coup is the discovery that a freighter named Alfhelm was transporting $4.86 million in Czech arms to Guatemala. The CIA lost the trail, and the arms–many of which were old WWII weapons with swastikas stamped on them–were successfully delivered (p. 98). May 1, 1954: Voice of Liberation radio, run by David Atlee Phillips, begins broadcasting propaganda to Guatemala. May 26, 1954: A CIA plane drops leaflets promoting rebellion over the presidential guard’s headquarters. June 6, 1954: The propaganda prompts Arbenz to become the dictator he was described to be, as he suspends civil liberties and engages in mass arrests to try to find anyone plotting against him (p. 99). June 18, 1954: Armas launches his assault at Puerto Barrios, but most of his men are killed or captured (p. 100). June 19, 1954: The U.S. ambassador to Guatemala calls for the U.S. to drop bombs. June 22, 1954: A CIA plane drops a bomb that starts an oil tank fire that is put out within 20 minutes. Dulles and businessman William Pawley meet with Eisenhower, who asks if the rebellion will be successful without further assistance. Eisenhower gives approval for the CIA to provide three planes to Nicaragua, funded by Pawley with money transferred through Riggs Bank, which are used by CIA pilots to attack Guatemala City. Armas still fails to gain ground. (p. 102). June 25, 1954: The CIA bombs “the parade grounds of the largest military encampment in Guatemala City” (p. 103) which prompts officers to switch allegiance to support the coup. June 27, 1954: Arbenz cedes power to Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, who vows to fight Armas. Diaz is called a “Commie agent” by Haney and informed by a CIA officer that he is “not convenient for American foreign policy” (p. 103). There are quickly four successive military juntas, “each one increasingly pro-American,” and two months later Castillo Armas becomes president and is welcomed at the White House. Weiner writes: “Guatemala was at the beginning of forty years of military rulers, death squads, and armed repression.” (p. 103) May 1954: WWII war criminal Nobusuke Kishi makes his political debut with CIA support. Kishi befriended former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew by letting him out of detention in Tokyo in 1942 to play a round of golf (p. 117). Grew became the first chairman of the CIA’s National Committee for a Free Europe and was a powerful ally of Kishi. 1954: Joseph McCarthy begins accumulating claims of Communist agents working for the CIA, feeding it disinformation. The claim is true, but the CIA responds not by addressing its own problems but by bugging McCarthy’s office and feeding him disinformation in order to discredit him (pp. 105-106). May 1954: Eisenhower receives a six-page letter from Jim Kellis, blowing the whistle on serious problems in the CIA–the CIA unwittingly funding Communists, being duped in various operations, and Dulles lying to Congress (pp. 107-108). July 1954: Eisenhower asks General Jimmy Doolittle and William Pawley to report on the state of the CIA in response to Kellis’ letter. October 19, 1954: Doolittle reports back to Eisenhower about serious problems within the CIA, with a written report titled “Report on the Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency." November 1954: The U2 spy plane project begins, under a bureaucracy run by Richard Bissell. 1955: Eisenhower creates the “Special Group” to oversee covert operations, consisting of representatives of the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense. Dulles, however, frequently did not bother reporting covert operations to the group or to the president (pp. 114-115). February 1955: A joint U.S.-British project to dig a tunnel from West Berlin to East Berlin to tap Soviet cables is completed, with the taps put in place in March, and information flow beginning in May, hampered by a lack of sufficient Russian and even German linguists (p. 111). April 1956: The Soviets uncover the tunnel and the information flow stops as the Soviets loudly complain. It subsequently turned out that the Soviets knew about the plan in December 1953, when planning first began, having been informed by George Blake, a British intelligence officer who was a Soviet spy. Much of the intercepted information was likely deliberate misinformation, though the CIA did learn about Soviet and East German security systems (p. 112). Spring 1955: The CIA considers assassinating President Sukarno of Indonesia because of fears of communist influence, and because he had declared himself “a noncombatant in the cold war” (p. 143). Sukarno holds a conference of 29 Asian, African, and Arab chiefs of state in Bandung, Indonesia, to propose “a global movement of nations free to chart their own paths, aligned with neither Moscow nor Washington” (p. 143). The White House authorizes “all feasible covert means” to keep Indonesia from going communist. The CIA contributes $1 million to Sukarno’s opponents, the Masjumi Party, but Sukarno wins the 1955 parliamentary elections. November 1955: Nobusuke Kishi sets up the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan with the help of CIA funding; LDP candidates and officials are recruited and approved by (and bribed by) the CIA (p. 119). 1956: Sukarno visits Moscow and Beijing as well as D.C. February 1956: Nikita Krushchev gives a speech denouncing Stalin. March 1956: The CIA hears rumors of the speech and attempts to obtain a copy. April 1956: Israeli spies deliver a copy of the speech to James Angleton. (p. 123) Early 1956: CIA analysts conclude that no Eastern European nations are likely to rebel against the Soviets during the 1950s. June 28, 1956: Polish workers riot against wage reductions and destroy the equipment jamming Radio Free Europe. 53 Poles are killed and hundreds imprisoned (p. 125). July 1956: Gamal Abdel Nasser, head of Egypt, nationalizes the Suez Canal Company, a British-French joint venture, to the surprise of the CIA. The CIA had supported Nasser with millions of dollars, but as the U.S. did not fulfill promises of military aid, Nasser traded cotton to the Soviet Union for weapons. The British proposed Nasser’s assassination, but the U.S. opposed it. The British, French, and Israel plotted Nasser’s overthrow and kept the U.S. in the dark; Dulles assured Eisenhower that rumors of such a plot were untrue, relying upon James Angleton who had contacts with Israeli intelligence (which were feeding him disinformation) (pp. 127-128). October 28, 1956: Israel invades the Sinai Peninsula as a pretext for the British and French to demand a cease-fire and move in to protect the Suez canal. The Soviet Union demands British and French withdrawal. The U.S., caught completely by surprise, applies pressure to force the British and French to leave. Israel was also forced to withdraw, though it destroyed infrastructure on the way. A UN Emergency Force occupied the peninsula until 1967. (More information on the 1956 war may be found here.) October 1956: A CIA-British intelligence plot for a coup in Syria is put on hold due to the Suez fiasco, which pushes Syria closer to the Soviets (p. 138). October 1956: A popular revolution begins in Hungary. The CIA had a single agent in Budapest, a low-level State Department clerk. The uprising was crushed within two weeks. A CIA history of the uprising says “At no time did we have anything that could or should have been mistaken for an intelligence operation.” (p. 129) During the brief revolution, former Hungarian prime minister Imre Nagy, who had been expelled from the Communist Party, went on state radio “to denounce the ’terrible mistakes and crimes of these past ten years.’” He stated that the Russians would leave and a new democratic government would be set up. Nagy formed a coalition government, abolished one-party rule, broke with Moscow, declared Hungary neutral, and appealed to the U.S. and UN for assistance. The CIA attacked Nagy on radio broadcasts as a traitor, liar, and murderer, and claimed that he had invited Russian troops into Budapest–all because he had once been a communist. November 4, 1956: The Soviets sent 200,000 troops and 2,500 tanks and armored vehicles into Hungary to crush the rebellion, killing tens of thousands and sending thousands to Siberian prison camps (pp. 130-131). February 1957: Nobusuke Kishi becomes prime minister of Japan. The CIA-influenced Liberal Democratic Party runs the Japanese government to this day (pp. 119ff); Japanese refer to the CIA-supported political system as kozo oshoku or “structural corruption” (p. 121). (Current Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe is Kishi’s grandson.) April 1957: Plans for a Syrian coup are revisited; the plan is for the CIA and British SIS to “manufacture ’national conspiracies and various strong-arm activities’ in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and blame them on Syria” (p. 138). The Syrians uncover the plot with a sting operation and arrest CIA operative Rocky Stone, publicly identify him as an American spy, and expel him from the country. In return, the U.S. expelled the Syrian ambassador from D.C. Stone’s Syrian co-conspirators are sentenced to death, and “a purge of every military officer who had ever been associated with the American embassy followed” (p. 139). These events permanently poisoned U.S.-Syrian relations. September 25, 1957: Eisenhower, convinced by the CIA that Sukarno was going communist, orders the CIA to overthrow his government (p. 147). September 28, 1957: The Indian newsweekly Blitz (controlled by Soviet intelligence) reports “AMERICAN PLOT TO OVERTHROW SUKARNO” (p. 147). January 8, 1958: The CIA provides weapons to Indonesian army rebels on Sumatra, without any attempt at secrecy. February 10, 1958: A CIA-financed radio station broadcasts demands for “a new government and the outlawing of communism within five days” (p. 148). February 21, 1958: The Indonesian air force bombs the CIA radio stations. The Indonesian army, led by anticommunists trained in the U.S. who referred to themselves as “the sons of Eisenhower,” were at war with the CIA (p. 148). April 19, 1958: CIA pilots began bombing and strafing Indonesia’s outer islands, killing hundreds of civilians, as well as sinking a British and Panamanian freighter (p. 151). The Indonesians claimed, correctly, that these planes were piloted by Americans, but the president and secretary of state of the United States denied it. May 18, 1958: CIA pilot Al Pope was shot down by the Indonesians. May 19, 1958: The U.S. decides that Sukarno is doing a good job of suppressing communism (p. 153). Sukarno frequently mentioned the U.S.’s failed attempts to overthrow his government in public speeches, and the actual communists in Indonesia gained in power and influence. July 14, 1958: The CIA had been active in Iraq, offering money and weapons for support of anticommunism. On this date a military coup occurred, overthrowing Nuri Said. The General Abdel Karim Qasim regime found proof that the CIA had been paying off the previous government, and an American working for the CIA as a writer for American Friends of the Middle East (a CIA front group) was arrested and disappeared. CIA officials left the country and Qasim began ties with the Soviets. The Ba’ath Party attempted to assassinate Qasim, which led to CIA support. (The Ba’ath Party later gained control with the help of the CIA, which then led to Saddam Hussein coming to power.) (pp. 140-141) January 1, 1959: Richard Bissell becomes chief of the clandestine service. April-May 1959: Fidel Castro visits the U.S. and meets with the CIA, which was supportive. December 11, 1959: Richard Bissell sends a memo to Allen Dulles asking that “thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro.” Dulles replaced “elimination” with “removal from Cuba." 1960: The CIA projected that the Soviet Union would have 500 ICBMs aimed at the U.S. by 1961. In fact, it had four. (p. 158) March 17, 1960: Dulles and Bissell present plans for an overthrow of Castro to Eisenhower and Nixon, which did not involve an invasion (p. 157). April 9, 1960: The first U-2 flight over the Soviet Union occurs; the Soviets detect it and go on high alert (p. 159). May 1, 1960: A U-2 is shot down by the Soviets over central Russia, and the CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers, is captured. The CIA cover story was that it was a weather plane lost in Turkey, which the White House and State Department insisted was the case for a week before coming clean (pp. 159-160). Summer 1960: Richard Bissell arranges with Guatemala’s President Manual Ydigoras Fuentes to set up a training camp for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba (pp. 160-161). August 1960: Richard Bissell hires the Mafia to kill Fidel Castro, in hopes the Cuban invasion will be unnecessary. A second assassination plot is developed in-house by the CIA. August 16, 1960: Dulles and Bissell obtain approval from Eisenhower to spend $10.75 million on paramilitary training for five hundred Cubans in Guatemala, the invasion force. Eisenhower approves on the condition that “So long as the Joint Chiefs, Defense, State and CIA think we have a good chance of being successful” (p. 161). Summer 1960: The Congo declares independence from Belgium; Patrice Lumumba is elected prime minister. Lumumba’s request for U.S. assistance is ignored, so he seeks help from the Soviet Union. The CIA sends Larry Devlin to head the CIA post in the Congo, and CIA chemist Sidney Gottlieb delivers him vials of poison to inject into Lumumba’s food, drink, or toothpaste. Devlin asks who the order came from, Gottlieb told him “the President.” Devlin refused to follow through (pp. 162-163). October-November 1960: The CIA selected Joseph Mobutu to be the new leader of the Congo, and supplied him with $250,000 and weapons. Mobutu successfully captured Lumumba, who was then killed by a Belgian officer. It took five years for Mobutu to gain full control of the Congo, where “he ruled for three decades as one of the world’s most brutal and corrupt dictators, stealing billions of dollars in revenues from the nation’s enormous deposits of diamonds, minerals, and strategic minerals, slaughtering multitudes to preserve his power” (p. 163). January 5, 1961: The President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities issues a report which states that “We are unable to conclude that, on balance, all of the covert action programs undertaken by CIA up to this time have been worth the risk of the great expenditure of manpower, money, and other resources involved.” It urged “complete separation” of the director of central intelligence from the CIA. Dulles claimed that everything was fine and that he had “corrected deficiencies”, and Eisenhower gave up in defeat, stating that he was leaving a “legacy of ashes” for his successor (p. 167). ...

Virgil Griffith has put together a fascinating data-mining tool that compares anonymous Wikipedia edits to WHOIS records for IP addresses, to allow users to examine edits made by people at particular organizations. The tool can be used to examine edits by people at the NSA (Ft. Meade), the CIA, the Church of Scientology, Bob Jones University, the Environmental Protection Agency, Diebold, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Wal-Mart, Pfizer, Raytheon, The New York Times, Al-Jazeera, the WorldNetDaily, Fox News, the Republican and Democratic Party, the Vatican, among many others. The organizations listed here are all listed on the side of the tool’s main search page, but there are many more in the drop-down list of user-submitted organizations, and you can specify organization names and locations. Wired magazine has assembled a list of some of the more interesting edits, such as someone at Diebold deleting references to security flaws in electronic voting machines and someone at the CIA editing song lyrics from an episode of Buffy the Vampire Slayer. Griffith, who built Wikiscanner while working at the Santa Fe Institute, begins graduate work in September at Caltech on theoretical neurobiology and artificial life under Christoph Koch and Chris Adami. It’s wonderful when data mining can be used for good purposes. (Hat tip to Scott Peterson on the SKEPTIC list.)

A major gap in Tim Weiner’s A Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (2007, Doubleday) is that it contains not a word about the 2002 coup in Venezuela against Hugo Chavez, which lasted 47 hours. The U.S. has denied any involvement, and an Office of the Inspector General investigation started at the request of Sen. Christopher Dodd came to the same conclusion. Press reports published in the U.S. about Hugo Chavez’s recent referral to the coup as “attacks” by the U.S. put the word in quotes and gave it no credence. But the foreign press, on the other hand, documents facts which make it sound just like many other events described in Weiner’s book where the CIA gave support to coup attempts in Central and South America, and the CIA’s own reports in advance of and during the coup are remarkably detailed predictions of what was going to happen. The incidents prior to the coup were growing protests against Chavez’s heavy-handed approach to politics (which he has unfortunately continued since regaining power), which culminated in violence and gunfire between pro-Chavez and anti-Chavez protestors on April 11, 2002. There are conflicting reports about who was responsible (the pro-Chavez protesters say they were shooting back at snipers who were shooting at them, the anti-Chavez protesters say they were fired upon unprovoked), but the result was that military leaders seized Chavez, threw him in jail, and asked for his resignation on the condition that he would be exiled, otherwise he would be tried for the deaths of the protesters. Chavez said that he would resign only under the condition that his vice president would succeed him and the government would continue. The military leaders publicly proclaimed that Chavez had resigned, and put businessman Pedro Carmona, not Chavez’s vice president, in charge. Carmona and other coup leaders had visited the White House on multiple occasions in months and weeks prior to the coup to visit Special Envoy to Latin America Otto Reich, and the U.S. was the only foreign government to immediately recognize the authority of the new leader. But Carmona began his short term of office by abolishing the Venezuelan constitution, dissolving the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, and even changing the name of the country. This did not make the Venezuelan public or the military happy, and Carmona was quickly forced to resign in favor of power being briefly turned over to vice president Diosdado Cabello until Chavez was returned to office a few hours later. The total duration of the alternative government was about 47 hours. Carmona and his team went into exile. It certainly looks like the CIA was involved. Otto Reich founded the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean at the State Department, which engaged in covert propaganda activities before being declared illegal by the U.S. Comptroller General in 1987 for engaging in “prohibited, covert propaganda activities, beyond the range of acceptable agency public information activities.” Reich was also involved with Col. Oliver North during the Iran-contra scandal. Both of these appear to indicate Reich being directly involved with the CIA.

Source and page references are to Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA, 2007, Doubleday, pp. 1-70. 1945-1953 President: Harry S Truman September 20, 1945: Office of Strategic Services ordered to disband; General William J. “Wild Bill” Donovan fired. OSS Intelligence analysts moved to the State Department. January 24, 1946: Truman appoints Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers as chief of the “Cloak and Dagger Group of Snoopers” and “Director of Centralized Snooping,” the Central Intelligence Group. Brigadier General John Magruder interprets this as meaning the group should operate a clandestine service, though Truman has said nothing of this and no legal authority has been given. June 10, 1946: General Hoyt Vandenburg appointed director of central intelligence. He creates an Office of Special Operations and obtains $15 million in Congressional funding. The group uses the money to buy intelligence information in Europe about the Soviets, most of which turns out to be fraudulent. July 17, 1946: Vandenburg obtains an additional $10 million in funding from the Secretary of War and Secretary of State. September-October 1946: The OSO attempts to organize Romania’s National Peasant Party into a resistance force. Soviet intelligence and the Romanian secret police detect the plot and imprison the Peasant Party’s leaders. The OSO gets the former foreign minister of Romania and “five other members of the would-be liberation army into Austria” and out to safety on October 5. “A brutal dictatorship took control of Romania, its rise to power hastened by the failure of American covert action.” (pp. 18-19) May 1, 1947: Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter becomes head of central intelligence. June 27, 1947: A Congressional committee holds secret hearings that lead to formal creation of the CIA on September 18. Dean Acheson writes “I had the gravest forebodings about this organization, and warned the President that as set up neither he, the National Security Council, nor anyone else would be in a position to know what it was doing or to control it.” (p. 25) James Forrestal wrote that “This office will probably be the greatest cemetery for dead cats in history.” (p. 24) The National Security Act says nothing about clandestine operations overseas, only the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information. September 1947: CIA counsel Lawrence Houston warns Hillenkoetter that the agency has no legal authority to conduct covert action without Congressional approval. December 14, 1947: The National Security Council instructs the CIA to engage in “covert psychological operations designed to counter Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities.” (p. 26) The CIA’s first plan of action is to defeat the communists in the April 1948 Italian elections. The CIA gains access to the Exchange Stabilization Fund, which held $200 million for the reconstruction of Europe. $10 million is distributed to wealthy Americans, many of whom are Italian-Americans, who pass it on to CIA political front groups as “charitable donations,” and on to Italian politicians in suitcases filled with cash. Italy’s Christian Democrats win the election, and the CIA repeats this process in Italy and many other nations for the next 25 years (p. 27). March 5, 1945: After Communists seize power in Czechoslovakia, General Lucius D. Clay, head of occupation forces in Berlin, cables the Pentagon that he fears Soviet attack. The CIA’s Berlin office assures the president that there is no sign of a Soviet attack. Truman warns Congress of an imminent Soviet attack, gaining approval of the Marshall Plan. 5% of Marshall Plan funds are allocated to the CIA ($685 million), used to create front organizations throughout Europe and to create underground political groups that would become a fighting force if needed. This operation was carried out under the Office of Policy Coordination inside the CIA, reporting to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. September 1, 1948: Frank Wisner becomes head of covert operations at the CIA; his organization quickly becomes larger than the rest of the CIA. Wisner recruits spies from Ivy League institutions, obtains a quarter of a billion dollars worth of military equipment in Europe and Asia, and builds a huge organization. November 1948: Wisner attempts to break communist influence over trade organizations in France and Italy using U.S. labor leaders Jay Lovestone (former head of the American Communist Party) and Irving Brown to deliver cash to “labor groups backed by Christian Democrats and the Catholic Church” (p. 36). The CIA creates the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Radio Free Europe. Early 1948: James Forrestal asks Allen Dulles to investigate the weaknesses of the CIA. The report’s main conclusions are (in Weiner’s words) that “the CIA was churning out reams of paper containing few if any facts on the communist threat,” “the agency had no spies among the Soviets and their satellites,” and “Roscoe Hillenkoetter was a failure as director.” (p. 37) May 27, 1949: Congress passes the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, giving the CIA power to do pretty much whatever it wanted, except for acting as a secret police force inside the United States. One clause of the act permits the CIA to admit 100 foreigners per year into the U.S., giving them “permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws.” The CIA brings Ukrainian Mikola Lebed into the U.S. under this law, despite the fact that the CIA’s files describe Lebed’s organization as “a terrorist organization.” Lebed went to prison for his murder of the Polish interior minister in 1936, escaping when Germany invaded Poland in 1939. The Justice Department considered Lebed a war criminal responsible for the slaughter of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews, but he was defended by Allen Dulles for his assistance in operations against the Soviets. December 1948: CIA officer Steve Tanner assesses a band of Ukrainians in Munich, the Supreme Council for the Liberation of the Ukraine, as a group deserving CIA backing. July 26, 1949: CIA special operations chief General Willard G. Wyman approves an operation to drop two Ukrainians from the group into their homeland. Tanner hires “a daredevil Hungarian air crew who had hijacked a Hungarian commercial airliner and flown it to Munich a few months earlier” (p. 44). The men were dropped on September 5, 1949; a CIA history declassified in 2005 says that “The Soviets quickly eliminated the agents." July 1949: The CIA took over the Munich-based group run by General Reinhard Gehlen, former leader of Hitler’s military intelligence service, the Abwehr. This group turned out to be penetrated by Soviet and East German moles at the highest levels, including Gehlen’s chief of counterintelligence. September 5, 1949: An air force crew flying out of Alaska detected traces of radioactivity in the atmosphere. September 20, 1949: While those radioactive traces were being analyzed, “the CIA confidently declared that the Soviet Union would not produce an atomic weapon for at least another four years.” (p. 48) September 23, 1949: Truman informs the world that Stalin has the atomic bomb. October 1949: Frank Wisner and the British send nine Albanian rebels from Malta into Albania. Three are killed immediately, the rest are captured by secret police. Wisner sends additional recruits via Athens with Polish pilots after training in Munich, each time all are captured or killed. It turns out that the German training camps were infiltrated by Soviet spies, and CIA counterintelligence head James Angleton was sharing information with Kim Philby at MI6, who was also working for the KGB. “Angleton gave Philby the precise coordinates for the drop zone for every agent the CIA parachuted into Albania.” (p. 46) 1950s: “hundreds of the CIA’s foreign agents were sent to their deaths in Russia, Poland, Romania, Ukraine, and the Baltic States during the 1950s.” (p. 47) 1945-1949: U.S. signals intelligence intercepts and decrypts messages between the Soviet Union and the Far East. This ends when William Wolf Weisband, a Russian translator and Soviet spy recruited in the 1930s, gives information about broken codes to the Soviets. The loss of intelligence information leads to the creation of the National Security Agency. July 25, 1950: The Korean War begins with a surprise attack from North Korea. October 1950: General Walter Bedell Smith becomes head of the CIA. October 11, 1950: Truman leaves for Wake Island. The CIA assures him that “no convincing indications of an actual Chinese Communist intention to resort to full-scale intervention in Korea .. barring a Soviet decision for global war.” CIA Tokyo station chief George Aurell, however, “reported that a Chinese Nationalist officer in Manchuria was warning that Mao had amassed 300,000 troops near the Korean border.” October 18: The CIA “reported that ’the Soviet Korean venture has ended in failure.’” October 20: “The CIA said that Chinese forces detected at the Yalu were there to protect hydroelectric power plants.” October 28: “those Chinese troops were scattered volunteers.” October 30: “after American troops had been attacked, taking heavy casualties, the CIA reaffirmed that a major Chinese intervention was unlikely.” November 1: “300,000 Chinese troops struck with an attack so brutal that it nearly pushed the Americans into the sea.” (All quotes from p. 52.) 1950-1960s: Classified CIA histories of the Korean War “say the agency’s paramilitary operations were ’not only ineffective but probably morally reprehensible in the number of lives lost.’” (p. 54) “Bedell Smith repeatedly warned Wisner to watch out for false intelligence fabricated by the enemy. But some of Wisner’s officers were fabricators themselves–including the station chief [Albert R. Haney] and the chief of operations [Hans Tofte] he sent to Korea.” (pp. 55-56) Haney’s 1952 replacement, John Limond Hart, found that “nearly every Korean agent he had inherited had either invented his reports or worked in secret for the communists. Every dispatch the station had sent to CIA headquarters from the front for the past eighteen months was a calculated deception.” (p. 57) Similar operations in Taiwan to recruit spies and drop them into mainland China failed. Over $100 million is spent on weapons for a “third force” of 200,000 guerillas between April 1951 to the end of 1952, but the agency was unable to recruit them. January 4, 1951: Allen Dulles appointed CIA deputy director of plans (a cover for his actual position, chief of covert operations) despite not getting along with Bedell Smith. Shortly thereafter, deputy director Bill Jackson resigns, and Dulles is appointed to deputy director and Frank Wisner to chief of covert operations. Early 1951: 1,500 followers of Chinese Nationalist General Li Mi were stranded in northern Burma; the CIA supplied guns, gold, and additional Chinese Nationalist soldiers. Those who crossed into China were killed; Li Mi’s radioman in Bangkok was a Chinese communist agent. July 1952: A four-man Chinese guerilla team is dropped into Manchuria and radios for help four months later, which turns out to be a trap that leads to the death or capture of the rescuers–with two young CIA agents spending the next 19-20 years in Chinese prisons. “Beijing later broadcast a scorecard for Manchuria: the CIA had dropped 212 foreign agents in; 101 were killed and 111 captured.” (p. 60) The CIA supplies more guns and ammunition, but Li Mi’s men choose not to fight, but instead to settle into the Golden Triangle, harvest opium poppies, and marry local women. Li Mi becomes a heroin kingpin. [Note added 23 November 2014: The CIA film “Extraordinary Fidelity” tells the story of John T. Downey and Richard G. Fecteau, the two young CIA agents imprisoned in China mentioned here.] July 1953: After the armistice, the CIA nearly kills South Korean President Syngman Rhee when a yacht he is on sails past Yong-do, an island where the agency trained Korean commandos. The CIA’s paramilitary group is given 72 hours to leave the country. 1950s: Wisner’s men are active in Europe, spending Marshall Plan money to prepare for a future war against the Soviets, including “dropping gold ingots into lakes and burying caches of weapons for the coming battle” (p. 64). 1948-1950s: Secret prisons set up to interrogate suspected double agents–in Germany, in Japan, and in the Panama Canal Zone (the largest such prison). May 15, 1952: Dulles and Wisner receive a report on Project Artichoke, a “four-year effort to test heroin, amphetamines, sleeping pills, the newly discovered LSD, and other ‘special techniques in CIA interrogations.’” (p. 65) Dulles approves Ultra, under which “seven prisoners at a federal penitentiary in Kentucky were kept high on LSD for seventy-seven consecutive days” and Army civilian employee Frank Olsen is dosed and leaps to his death out the window of a New York hotel. Project Artichoke continues until 1956, but most records of these activities were destroyed. 1952: The “Young Germans” (many of which were aging Hitler Youth) are supported by the CIA. The “Free Jurists’ Committee,” an underground group in East Germany, was taken over by Frank Wisner, whose men selected one of Gehlen’s officers to train them as a fighting force. “After Soviet soldiers kidnapped and tortured one of their leaders on the eve of the international conference, every one of the CIA’s Free Jurists was arrested.” (p. 67) 1952: Wisner supported a Polish liberation group, the Freedom and Independent Movement (known as WIN). They had contacts with “WIN outside,” emigres in Germany and London, and believed they were supporting thousands of sympathizers of “WIN inside” in Poland. They dropped $5 million in gold and weapons for “WIN inside,” but the Polish secret police and the Soviets had wiped out WIN in 1947 and it was all a trap. (p. 67) October 27, 1952: Gen. Bedell Smith convened a “Murder Board” to kill off the worst of the CIA’s covert operations, but his efforts came to naught when Eisenhower appointed Allen Dulles as head of the CIA. November 26, 1952: “British spy Monty Woodhouse flew to Washington to meet with Walter Bedell Smith and Frank Wisner” about how to get rid of Mossadeq in Iran (p. 83).