ACLU plan for restoring U.S. civil rights

Day one steps are closing Guantanamo Bay, ceasing and prohibiting torture, ceasing and prohibiting extraordinary rendition; steps for the first 100 days include ending warrantless spying, watch lists, the Ashcroft doctrine on FOIA requests, monitoring of activists, the Real ID Act, the abortion gag rule, the death penalty, and faith-based initiatives. At least one of Obama’s transition teams is, at the very least, reviewing Bush’s executive orders for constitutionality, which covers some elements of the above. Most, however, have been implemented by act of Congress, which will require Congressional action to repeal. ...

November 9, 2008 · 2 min

EFF sues the NSA, Bush, Cheney, Addington, etc.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation has filed Jewel v. NSA to try another tactic in stopping unconstitutional warrantless wiretapping of U.S. residents. Their previous lawsuit against AT&T, Hepting v. AT&T, is still in federal court as the EFF argues with the government over whether the telecom immunity law passed by our spineless Congress is itself constitutional or applicable to the case. Jewel v. NSA names as defendants the National Security Agency, President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, Cheney’s chief of staff David Addington, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, and “other individuals who ordered or participated in warrantless domestic surveillance.”

September 20, 2008 · 1 min

Expert tells China visitors to encrypt data as U.S. announces policy of laptop seizure

I saw two articles this morning which I think invite comparison. First, Phil Dunkelberger, CEO of PGP Corporation, says people visiting China should take laptops with no data, or encrypt what data they have: Travelers carrying smart cell phones, blackberries or laptop computers could unwittingly be offering up sensitive personal or business information to officials who monitor state-controlled telecommunications carriers, Dunkelberger said. He said that without data encryption, executives could have business plans or designs pilfered, while journalists’ lists of contacts could be exposed, putting sources at risk. ...

August 1, 2008 · 3 min

Netroots and telecom

There’s a telecom panel at the Netroots Nation conference today on the subject of “Big Telecom: An Emerging Threat to Our Democracy?” The implied answer is yes, and it appears that every participant on the panel will be making that case. Here’s the description of the panel: Massive telecom companies control virtually all of our voice and internet communications these days—and new evidence shows a near-total lack of commitment to our democracy. AT&T has proposed filtering all content traveling on its network. Verizon tried initially to block NARAL’s pro-choice text messages. Most telecom companies are fighting net neutrality. Can democracy survive an assault by those who control the tubes?The panel members don’t include anyone with any experience managing or operating an actual telecom network, but instead includes two people who have repeatedly demonstrated not only an ignorance of telecom law, technology, and policy, but who have misrepresented facts and failed to engage with the arguments of their critics, Matt Stoller and Timothy Karr (see posts on this blog in the “net neutrality” category). The closest person to a representative of a telecom is Michael Kieschnick of Working Assets, a company that is a reseller of long distance and wireless service on Sprint’s network. I agree with many of their positions–I don’t think ISPs should be allowed to block websites on the basis of disagreement with content. I think ISPs should be transparent about their network management processes and filtering. Where I disagree with them is that they advocate that the FCC step in to regulate the Internet in a way that it has never had authority to do so before, and demand that network operators not be allowed to implement classes of service with different rates of charges, or even usage caps. Art Brodsky expresses the point which has also been made by Robb Topolsky of Public Knowledge, Timothy Karr of Free Press, and Matt Stoller: In the name of “network management,” some companies want to throttle down the use of legal applications, like BitTorrent which may, coincidentally, provide competition in entertainment programming. They want to impose usage caps across the board on all customers which would stifle innovation and curb the use of video (there’s that anti-competitive meme again) without actually solving the problem of the so-called “bandwidth hogs.” The way caps are being discussed now, they would only lead to higher prices and less usage for an industry that already charges more for less than most broadband providers around the world. Parts of our broadband industry may be the only sector in the world that wants to cut down the amount of its product it wants customers to use.Brodsky’s last sentence is clearly false–broadband is like a fixed-price all-you-can-eat buffet. All businesses want to maximize their profits by maximizing revenue and minimizing costs. When bandwidth is sold at a fixed cost in unlimited amounts, where a small number of users are consuming the majority of the service, it’s in the business’s interest to restrict those users or charge them more for what they consume in order to satisfy the rest in a cost-effective manner. The options are few–you can either restrict the “bandwidth hogs” in some way, charge them more so that they pay for what they use, or raise the price for everyone. These guys seem to advocate the latter approach, while I’m in favor of allowing all the options to be used in a competitive market. Where I disagree with Comcast’s approach in issuing RST packets to block BitTorrent traffic is not that they did it, but that they were not transparent about what they were doing (and apparently didn’t quite get it quite right–it should not have completely broken BitTorrent, but only slowed it down). Brodsky’s suggestion that Comcast has an interest in blocking BitTorrent because it provides competition in the entertainment space is absurd–they have an interest in blocking it because it’s a very popular application which itself exploits Internet protocols in a way not anticipated by the designers in order to consume more bandwidth, getting around the congestion controls in TCP/IP by using multiple TCP streams. If BitTorrent traffic wasn’t filling up the majority of Comcast’s bandwidth, they’d have no interest in it, except when the MPAA and RIAA issue them subpoenas about their users infringing copyrights. If the government prohibits the use of differential classes of service (which is already heavily used by private companies to give priority to applications within their enterprise which have requirements for low latency and jitter, such as real-time streaming audio and video, including Voice over IP) and requires that congestion be dealt with by building out infrastructure sufficiently that there will never be congestion no matter how many users max out their connectivity with BitTorrent, that will reduce competition by culling smaller companies out of the picture and making market entry more difficult. In any environment where a provider’s upstream capacity is less than the sum of the capacity to every customer (and that’s everywhere, today, and always has been), all-you-can-eat bandwidth is like a commons. The more that is available, the more the heavy users will consume, to the detriment of each other and the light users. Without setting caps and having tiered pricing or implementing technology that prioritizes packets and drops from the heavy users and from less-realtime-sensitive applications first (like BitTorrent), there are no incentives against consuming everything that is available. I also think it’s a huge mistake to have the FCC start regulating the Internet. FCC chairman Kevin Martin would no doubt love to place indecency standards and filtering requirements on Internet content. Once you open the door to FCC regulation of the Internet, that becomes more likely. And the FCC has been completely ineffectual at dealing with existing abuses like fraudulent telemarketing, illegal prerecord calls to residences and cell phones, caller ID spoofing, etc., already covered by statute and regulation. I’d rather see clear statutes that include private rights of action than entrust control of the Internet to the FCC. The FCC is a slow-moving bureaucracy, and AT&T and Verizon have the deepest pockets, the most lawyers, and the most personnel who have shuffled back and forth between government (including the NSA) and industry. That gives AT&T and Verizon the tactical advantage, and leads to less competition rather than more. Which brings me to the warrantless wiretapping and telecom immunity issues, which Cindy Cohn of the EFF no doubt addressed on the Netroots Nation panel. I suspect I have little if any disagreement with her. I’ve long been a supporter of the EFF, as are many people involved in the management of ISPs. I strongly oppose telecom immunity for warrantless wiretapping, a complete abdication of Congress’ responsibility to support the U.S. Constitution. But this shows the power of AT&T and Verizon. Not only did they get what they wanted, but the very infrastructure which was built to do this massive interception of traffic for the NSA and for law enforcement interception under the CALEA laws was built for them with assistance from government funds. All telecoms have to be compliant with CALEA (now including VoIP and broadband Internet providers), but the big incumbents who were most capable of affording it on their own got it at the lowest costs, while their competition was required to build it out at their own expense even if it never gets used. But there are legitimate uses for deep packet inspection, for understanding the nature of the traffic on a network for management purposes, including tracking down security and abuse issues. Since it is in the hands of the end user to use encryption to protect sensitive content, I think use of DPI by network providers is reasonable for the purposes of providing better service in the same way that it’s reasonable for a voice provider to intercept traffic for quality measurement purposes. It’s also reasonable for interception to occur for “lawful intercept,” but it should always require a court order (i.e., both executive and judicial branch approval) on reasonable grounds. The difficulty of obtaining wiretaps depicted in the television program “The Wire” is how it should be. I’ve written a lot on these issues, much which can be found in this blog’s Network Neutrality Index. If any reader of this blog happens to have attended the Netroots Nation telecom panel or comes across a description of its content, please point me to it, as I’d like to see what was said. I don’t have high hopes for the accuracy or reasonability of statements from Stoller and Karr, but I could be surprised, and the other panelists probably had interesting and important things to say. (See my Blogger profile for the disclosure of my employment by Global Crossing, which is currently listed by Renesys as the #3 network provider on the Internet in terms of number of customers, ahead of AT&T and Verizon, behind Sprint and Level 3.) UPDATE: The “Big Telecom” panel was live-blogged (dead, unarchived link: http://openleft.com/showDiary.do;jsessionid=C865142FFB85E14AAD27045B9A342B15?diaryId=7032"). Stoller’s anecdote about the Bill of Rights on metal is referring to Dean Cameron’s “security edition” of the Bill of Rights, which was also promoted by Penn Jillette. ...

July 19, 2008 · 36 min

Another liar as Attorney General

Ed Brayton at Dispatches from the Culture Wars reports on some recent statements by Attorney General Michael Mukasey during a speech about political corruption, in which he lied about FISA’s impact on wiretapping, falsely claiming that FISA law had to be violated because it would require the methods of wiretapping being used to be discussed in open court. The mainstream media seems to be mostly giving him a pass on his falsehoods. UPDATE (April 5, 2008): Glenn Greenwald uncovers more evidence that Mukasey is a liar, fabricating pre-9/11 events that didn’t happen.

April 2, 2008 · 1 min

NSA's data mining and eavesdropping described

The March 10 Wall Street Journal contains a fairly detailed description of the data mining operation being run by the NSA. The program described is more data mining than eavesdropping, though it does involve the collection of transactional data like call detail records for telephone calls, and intercepted Internet data like web search terms and email senders and recipients. Also included is financial transaction data and airline data. I think most of this had already been pieced together, but this is a fairly comprehensive summary in one place. The WSJ story reports that leads generated from the data mining effort are then fed into the Terrorist Surveillance Program, which does warrantless eavesdropping. (An earlier version of this post incorrectly referred to the whole operation as the Terrorist Surveillance Program.) ...

March 12, 2008 · 2 min

More InfraGard FUD and misinformation

Gary D. Barnett, president of a financial services firm in Montana, has written an article about InfraGard for The Future of Freedom Foundation, apparently inspired by the Progressive article. Thankfully, he avoids the bogus “shoot to kill” claims, but he introduces some erroneous statements of his own. It’s apparent that he didn’t bother speaking to anyone in InfraGard or doing much research before writing his article, which is another attempt to spread fear, uncertainty, and doubt about the program. Barnett first goes wrong when he writes: ...

February 23, 2008 · 12 min

Spies who love you

Mark Fiore helps teach kids about the importance of warrantless wiretapping. (Hat tip to Bob Hagen.)

February 16, 2008 · 1 min

FBI Wiretaps Dropped Due to Unpaid Bills

Today’s Washington Post reports: The FBI, which has had trouble keeping track of its guns and laptops, also has a chronic problem paying its phone bills on time, according to audit results released today. Telephone companies have repeatedly cut off FBI access to wiretaps of alleged terrorists and criminal suspects because of the bureau’s failure to pay its bills, the audit found. The report by Justice Department Inspector General Glenn A. Fine also found that more than half of the nearly 1,000 telecommunications bills reviewed by investigators were not paid on time, including one invoice for $66,000 at one unidentified field office. ...

January 11, 2008 · 2 min

Chinese intelligence was translating for the NSA

The Washington Times reported on December 21 that several years ago, Chinese intelligence successfully subverted the National Security Agency in Hawaii. First, by creating a company based in Hawaii to do Chinese translations which successfully obtained government contracts with the NSA to translate intercepted Chinese communications. The intercepted communications included sufficient information to identify the sources, giving the Chinese the ability to control what information was obtained by the NSA either by preventing significant information from being carried over by the compromised channel or by introducing disinformation. This shows one of the problems that faces a world superpower whose own language is commonly used and which does little or nothing to encourage its citizens to learn other languages. Understanding communications in other languages require the assistance of translators who may be working for the enemy, and the enemy can almost get away with speaking freely anywhere while being overheard, since the likelihood of comprehension is so small. The more communications you need translated, the more translators you need, and the greater the likelihood of compromise. UPDATE (January 2, 2008): Noah Schachtman at Wired and Jeffrey Carr at IntelFusion cast some doubt on this story. ...

December 26, 2007 · 3 min
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