Cory Maye to be released from prison

As a result of the investigative reporting of Radley Balko, Cory Maye is about to be released from prison after ten years of incarceration and seven years after being sentenced to death on the basis of a terrible defense and kooky testimony from a now discredited and removed medical examiner. Maye shot and killed a police officer during a no-knock drug raid against a duplex property in which Maye resided, on the basis of a report of unusual traffic at the other unit of the duplex by an unreliable informant. Maye was defending his daughter from an unknown intruder kicking his door in. Through the efforts of Balko and a legal team from Covington & Burling, Maye was removed from death row in 2006.

July 3, 2011 · 1 min

Salt therapy: Where's the evidence?

Today there was a Groupon offer for salt therapy from the “Salt Chalet Arizona." Sufferers of respiratory illnesses are offered the chance to sit in a room containing salt for claimed relief of symptoms. I posted the following at the Salt Chalet Arizona’s blog, which is awaiting moderation: “Although there have been few clinical studies” — are there any that provide any empirical support for the claims made on this site? It seems to me that solid empirical support for safety and efficacy are absolutely essential requirements for any medical claim. What is the mechanism of relief, is that relief more than would be expected from a placebo effect, does it last, and are there any harmful short or long term consequences?To its credit, the blog's repost of a newspaper article about a similar service offered via a Pakistani salt mine includes the following skeptical passage: But Shahid Abbas, a doctor who runs the private Allergy and Asthma Centre in Islamabad, said that although an asthma or allergy sufferer may get temporary relief, there is no quick-fix cure. “There is no scientific proof that a person can permanently get rid of asthma by breathing in a salt mine or in a particular environment,” he said. Alex (2011-04-30): Even without reading the article, I knew that the answer to the the question in the title was 'nowhere' ...

April 29, 2011 · 3 min

James Dobson's dog-beating story

In James Dobson’s 1978 book, The Strong-Willed Child, he writes about using a belt to beat his dachshund into submission: Please don't misunderstand me. Siggie is a member of our family and we love him dearly. And despite his anarchistic nature, I have finally taught him to obey a few simple commands. However, we had some classic battles before he reluctantly yielded to my authority. The greatest confrontation occurred a few years ago when I had been in Miami for a three-day conference. I returned to observe that Siggie had become boss of the house while I was gone. But I didn't realize until later that evening just how strongly he felt about his new position as Captain. At eleven o'clock that night, I told Siggie to go get into his bed, which is a permanent enclosure in the family room. For six years I had given him that order at the end of each day, and for six years Siggie had obeyed. On this occasion, however, he refused to budge. You see, he was in the bathroom, seated comfortably on the furry lid of the toilet seat. That is his favorite spot in the house, because it allows him to bask in the warmth of a nearby electric heater... When I told Sigmund to leave his warm seat and go to bed, he flattened his ears and slowly turned his head toward me. He deliberately braced himself by placing one paw on the edge of the furry lid, then hunched his shoulders, raised his lips to reveal the molars on both sides, and uttered his most threatening growl. That was Siggie's way of saying. "Get lost!" I had seen this defiant mood before, and knew there was only one way to deal with it. The ONLY way to make Siggie obey is to threaten him with destruction. Nothing else works. I turned and went to my closet and got a small belt to help me "reason" with Mr. Freud. What developed next is impossible to describe. That tiny dog and I had the most vicious fight ever staged between man and beast. I fought him up one wall and down the other, with both of us scratching and clawing and growling and swinging the belt. I am embarrassed by the memory of the entire scene. Inch by inch I moved him toward the family room and his bed. As a final desperate maneuver, Siggie backed into the corner for one last snarling stand. I eventually got him to bed, only because I outweighed him 200 to 12! Dobson's book is a promotion of corporal punishment in child rearing. This story is complementary to Jerry Falwell's cat-killing story, written at a time when Christian fundamentalists didn't seem overly concerned about abuse of animals--the 1970s.  It's also complementary to the story of Mike Huckabee's son killing a dog, and Mormon Mitt Romney's dog abuse story. Thankfully, most of us today recognize that abusing animals is a sign of psychopathy. UPDATED: To lengthen quote and correct source book title, as per Snopes.  The original 1978 hardcover version of the book is available for $0.01 on Amazon.com Marketplace. Historical Comments Bartimaeus (2010-09-28): They probably thought Sigmund's behavior was "cute" up to the point that he started biting them. Sad that he did not realize he was creating a monster and then resorted to physical violence as his first and only option. Even more disturbing that he uses it as an example for raising children. Here is an interesting post by someone who actually understands dogs better than most, just for a little contrast; http://cynography.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2010-09-16T18%3A49%3A00-04%3A00&max-results=7 ...

September 13, 2010 · 4 min

Discredited doctor comes to Phoenix

British former surgeon Andrew Wakefield, whose discredited and abusive research was responsible for the resurgence of measles outbreaks in the UK and the U.S., is not just coming to Phoenix this Saturday, he is being celebrated by the Autism Society of Greater Phoenix at the Ritz Carlton Hotel. Wakefield’s 1998 paper in The Lancet reported symptoms of inflammatory bowel disease in twelve children with autism, and speculated that the cause was the MMR (measles, mumps, rubella) vaccine. What it didn’t report was that Wakefield had a financial interest in his own alternative vaccine, that he had been paid by attorneys who were trying to prove that MMR vaccines were harmful, that his test subjects were recruited by those attorneys from among their plaintiffs, or that Wakefield engaged in unnecessary colonoscopies, colon biopsies, and spinal taps on children in his study. Ten of Wakefield’s 12 co-authors published a retraction of his interpretation of the paper, and the original paper was withdrawn by the journal this year. Wakefield’s name has been struck from the register of British medical doctors as a result of his unethical behavior. The publication of his paper was responsible for a significant drop in UK vaccination rates due to fear of a link to autism, which was accompanied by a rise in measles outbreaks (but no drop in autism diagnosis rates). It is a pity that the Autism Society of Greater Phoenix is promoting an unethical, discredited quack. ...

June 24, 2010 · 2 min

Politics and science in risk assessment

There’s a widespread recognition that public policy should be informed by both scientifically verifiable factual information and by social values. It’s commonly assumed that science should provide the facts for policy-makers, and the policy-makers should then use those facts and social and political values of the citizens they represent to make policy. This division between fact and value is institutionalized in processes such as a division between risk assessment performed by scientists concerned solely with the facts and subsequent risk management that also involves values, performed in the sphere of politics. This neat division, however, doesn’t actually work that well in practice. “Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously,” a 2007 “Report by the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, Directorate-General for Research” of the European Commission, spends much of its third chapter criticizing this division and the idea that risk assessment can be performed in a value-free way. Some of the Report’s objections are similar to those made by Heather Douglas in her book Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal, and her analysis of a topography of values is complementary to the Report. The selection of what counts as input into the risk assessment process, for example, is a value-laden decision that is analogous to Douglas’ discussion of problem selection. Health and safety concerns are commonly paramount, but other potential risks–to environment, to economy, to social institutions–may be minimized, dismissed, or ignored. Selection of methods of measurement also can implicitly involve values, as also is observed by Douglas. The Report notes, “health can be measured alternatively as frequency or mode of death or injury, disease morbidity, or quality of life,” and questions arise as to how to aggregate and weight different populations, compare humans to nonhumans, and future generations to present generations. In practice, scientists tend to recognize questions of these sorts, as well as that they are value-laden. This can lead to the process being bogged down by scientists wanting policy-makers to answer value questions before they perform their risk assessment, while policy-makers insist that they just want the scientific facts of the matter before making any value-based decisions. Because science is a powerful justification for policy, it’s in the interest of the policy-maker to push as much as possible to the science side of the equation. We see this occur in Congress, which tends to pass broad-brush statutes which “do something” about a problem but push all the details to regulatory agencies, so that Congress can take credit for action but blame the regulatory agencies if it doesn’t work as expected. We see it in judicial decisions, where the courts tend to be extremely deferential to science. And we see it within regulatory agencies themselves, as when EPA Administrator Carol Browner went from saying first that “The question is not one of science, the question is one of judgment” (Dec. 1996, upon initially proposing ozone standards) to “I think it is not a question of judgment, I think it is a question of science” (March 1997, about those same standards). The former position is subject to challenge in ways that the latter is not. In reality, any thorough system of risk management needs to be iterative and involve both scientific judgments about facts and political decisions that take into account values, taking care not to use values in a way to achieve predetermined conclusions, but to recognize what sets of interests and concerns are of significance. This doesn’t preclude the standardization of methods of quantification and assessment, it just means that they need to be able to evolve in response to feedback, as well as to begin from a state where values are explicitly used in identifying what facts need to be assessed. [A slightly different version of the above was written as a comment for my Human and Social Dimensions of Science and Technology core seminar. Thanks to Tim K. for his comments.] ...

May 2, 2010 · 6 min

Many Species of Animal Law

Today I went to hear Bruce Wagman speak on the subject of “Many Species of Animal Law” at ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. Wagman, an attorney with Schiff Hardin who is also an outside litigator for the Animal Legal Defense Fund, has litigated cases involving animals for 18 years, written a case book on animal law, and teaches animal law courses at several law schools as an adjunct faculty member. He was introduced by ASU Law School Dean Paul Berman and Arizona Court of Appeals Judge Pat Norris. Wagman began by defining “animal law” as any law where the status of an animal matters–psychological, biological, welfare, etc. status of the animal, as opposed to its value as property. He suggested that animal law attorneys “may be the only lawyers on earth whose clients are all innocent." He divided his talk up into multiple “species” of animal law. Species 1: Companion Animal Issues He said this makes up the majority of his cases, and includes injuries by or to animals, including veterinary malpractice. The challenge is to get courts to recognize that animals are not merely property, since historically companion animals have been viewed as property with low or even zero market value. In cases where an animal is injured or killed, the market value doesn’t recognize the interests of the animal or other kinds of value that companion animals give. Under the American Law Institute’s Restatements of the Law, however, there is a notion of “special property” (or “peculiar property” in California’s statutes) which allows quantification of other kinds of worth to an animal owner, for instance if the animal is a therapy dog. There are no emotional stress damages available. Other sorts of companion animal cases include custody disputes, which often occur as a result of one partner just trying to inflict distress on another rather than having actual interest in the animal. Wagman said that courts are beginning to take a better look at the interests of the animal in such cases, and be willing to appoint a guardian ad litem, as occurred in the Michael Vick case and in another case in Tennessee where there was a dispute over custody of a dog between a dead man’s girlfriend and parents. There are dangerous dog issues, where an attorney may be fighting against the classification of a dog as a dangerous or vicious animal, or against its euthanasia–what he called “capital cases” for animals. In three counties surrounding San Francisco, what happens in the case of a dog biting another dog that requires stitches varies dramatically. In one county, the dog gets a period of probation. In another, the dog gets labeled as a dangerous or vicious dog, which requires the owner to meet various conditions of housing the dog, having a certain height of fence, carry additional insurance, and so forth. And in Santa Clara County, the dog gets euthanized. He pointed out that that county’s statute has an exemption for “mitigating circumstances” which he’s successfully used to prevent dogs from being euthanized. Finally, there are wills and trusts–he said he doesn’t do that sort of work, but that 48 states now have mechanisms for having trusts for animals. He said he considers companion animals to be a sort of “gateway animal” for getting recognition of animals in the law, and noted that we tend to be “speciesists” who would feel very different about snakes vs. Labrador Retrievers. [IMO, this is rational to the extent that animals differ in cognitive capacities, and I note that at no point did he discuss litigating on behalf of cockroaches against pest control companies.] Species 2: Farm animal issues–legislation and litigation. His second species of animal law was about animals killed for food–about 10 billion per year in the United States. He said the goal here is not to stop the killing, but just to improve the living conditions of animals before they’re killed for food. This is problematic, however, because the animal cruelty statutes are criminal rather than civil (with an exception in North Carolina that will be discussed with regard to Species 3 of animal law), and that the criminal law for animal cruelty excludes farm animals in 35 states. He discussed a few of the more abusive methods of animal treatment in factory farming–calf crates, in which calves are placed for about the first 60 days of life, gestation crates for pigs (outlawed in Arizona since 2006, as well as illegal in Florida, Oregon, Colorado, and California), and battery cages for chickens. He also discussed downer animals–animals which are either so seriously injured or ill that they are unable to move, which the meat industry wants to drag in that condition to slaughter. Wagman raised the concern that such animals, if sick, could potentially spread illness to humans, and listed a bunch of diseases that could potentially so spread, with BSE (mad cow) at the top of the list along with avian flu. Of these, only BSE has been documented to spread to humans, and the industry position is that there should be no restrictions on downer pigs unless and until a human actually gets sick. The state of California passed a law that said that all downer animals must be euthanized on the spot; the meat industry sued and overturned the statute in federal district court, but the 9th Circuit just reversed it last week (National Meat Association v. Brown). Species 3: Animal hoarding–private ownership, breeders, and the sanctuary that is not Wagman said that there have been 250,000 documented cases of animal hoarding, and that they are difficult cases to work with in multiple ways. He said he believes such cases involve mental illness, but while the APA has a diagnosis for “hoarding” behavior, it excludes animal hoarding which is considered to be different. How many animals constitutes hoarding? He said he likes to say “more than eight,” because he has eight animals at home. Hoarders characteristics include possessing more animals than they can care for, having a sense of being persecuted, and living in deplorable conditions. He discussed two cases that he litigated, ALDF v. Barbara & Robert Woodley, and ALDF v. Janie Conyers, which involved over 500 animals between them. The former case, in North Carolina, was able to use North Carolina statute 19a, which allows a civil cause of action for animal cruelty. Wagman had some horrifying photos from the Woodley case. They had hundreds of dogs in their home living in their own feces, where ammonia levels were 20 times the USDA maximum allowed in a pig facility. These ammonia levels caused blindness in the dogs, as well as chemical burns to bare skin that contacted the floor, such as dogs’ scrotums. Multiple dogs were kept in wooden boxes with lids on them, and never let out. Mrs. Woodley’s favorite dog, Buddy, not only had his eyes burned to blindness from ammonia, but the bone in the dog’s jaw deteriorated from malnutrition. Local officials had known of Woodley’s problem for 20 years, but considered themselves powerless to do anything about it, since the scale of the problem was so large–the local shelter had only eight kennels, while the Woodleys had about 450 animals. The ALDF had to coordinate a massive effort to manage the rescue of the animals through their case. Conyers was an AKC poodle breeder who had 106 poodles living in their own feces. Wagman said that animal psychological suffering is difficult to show, but it can be done; demonstrating physiological suffering is easier, with objective criteria like the ammonia levels and physical injuries to animals. There is no law against hoarding (except in Hawaii), just the criminal abuse statutes (and civil in NC). In the hoarding cases the abuse is typically neglect rather than active abuse. Species 4: Exotic animal ownership Wagman has handled about 10 chimpanzee cases. One was a case involving a couple in West Covina, California who had a chimp named Moe for 35 years that bit two people. He argued for a guardian ad litem to determine what was in the best interests of the chimp, and arranged to get Jane Goodall and Roger Fouts for that role. The court looked upon it favorably, but the couple came to an out-of-court settlement. He also briefly discussed the Stamford, Connecticut case of Travis, the 200-pound chimpanzee who attacked a woman that was in the news last year. He argued that there should be a legislative fix to ban exotic animal ownership completely–they’re wild animals. [A complete ban seems to me too much–there should be exceptions for research, conservation, breeding programs for endangered species, and so forth. And shouldn’t it be possible to domesticate other wild animals?] Connecticut has taken the step of banning chimp ownership. Species 5: Shelter practices - euthanasia, veterinary care, adequate food, water, and sanitation, and hold periods Animal shelters have an overwhelming job, said Wagman. The County of Los Angeles, which he sued, operates seven shelters which handle tens of thousands of animals per year. California law says that all animals must get veterinary care and be held for five days, and allowing animal suffering without treatment is not permissible. The shelters’ own records showed that they weren’t meeting that standard for thousands of animals, but they’re now working to meet them and having their activity monitored for compliance. A similar set of cases occurred in Kentucky, when the state transferred all shelter responsibility to the counties. Although the standards of care were minimal, they weren’t meeting it, and there were nutrition, veterinary care, and euthanasia issues. Upon getting notice, they quickly took action to remedy. In Georgia, by contrast, there is a statute that prohibits the use of gas chambers for euthanization at shelters, but the Commissioner of Agriculture sent out letters to the shelters asking that they purchase gas chambers for euthanization. Gas chambers apparently have very ugly results in some cases, such as with unhealthy dogs. A lawsuit against the state of Georgia for its failure to comply with its own statute resulted an an injunction, which they then immediately violated by sending out more letters asking for gas chamber purchases. After obtaining a contempt ruling from the court, they finally got compliance. Species 6: Entertainment Wagman called this category both the most obvious and the most hidden. The use of animals in entertainment is obvious, but what is not obvious is what goes on behind the scenes, the knowledge of which drains the fun out of the entertainment. Circuses, zoos, film and TV ads, animal fighting, public appearances, racing and rodeos, and hunting and fishing are all cases of animals used for entertainment. Wagman first discussed elephants in circuses, commenting on a recent Ringling Brothers case which was tossed out on an issue of standing. The case involved the use of bullhooks for elephant training, which injures the animals. The defense didn’t deny use of bullhooks, but claimed that they only use them as “guides." Elephant treatment in zoos is also problematic, since standing around on hard surfaces causes painful arthritis. In the wild, elephants are awake 21 hours a day and may move 35 miles per day. Wagman discussed dog fighting, and said that the Michael Vick case was a wakeup call for America to the reality of dog fighting, which exists in every state and most major cities. He argued that the use of great apes in film and television should be banned, because of how the training process works. He said that while trainers claim to use only positive reinforcement training, an undercover person who volunteered for a year and a half with trainer Sid Yost found otherwise. A young chimpanzee is immediately treated to beating and punching to get them to comply. Their performance lifetime is about 3-5 years, after which they become to strong to conrol, and end up in private homes, in research, or in zoos, often all alone in barren cases. Wagman pointed out that the common use of a “smiling” chimpanzee is actually a fear grimace. He does lots of work for sanctuaries, of which there are nine in the U.S. for chimpanzees (including chimpsanctuarynw.org). Regarding hunting, he distinguished traditional hunting from canned hunting and Internet hunting. Hunting is protected in most states, including in many state constitutions. Canned hunting ranches, where animals are fed by hand by humans before they are flushed out into open areas to be shot, are not considered to be hunting by most traditional hunters. [But is considered hunting by our former Vice President, Dick Cheney.] Internet hunting, where a rifle can be fired at live animals over the Internet, has been banned in 30 states. He mentioned mountain lion hunting in the Black Hills of South Dakota, where mountain lions have become fairly scarce. A lawsuit was filed to try to stop the hunting on grounds of near-extinction of the animals, but the injunction was denied on the grounds that there were unlikely to be any mountain lions even found and killed. Two mountain lions were killed shortly thereafter in fairly quick succession, and even though there was a law that prohibited killing female mountain lions with cubs, the second one killed had a cub, and there was no prosecution. Some Adidas shoes are made with kangaroo skin, and the state of California has banned the importation of kangaroo skin, which Adidas ignored. Adidas was sued as a result, and they lost at the California Supreme Court–but they responded by persuading the legislature to repeal the ban rather than changing their practices. Species 7: Species and breed-specific legislation and ADA breedism case. A variety of dog breeds have been considered at various times and places to be “bad dogs” that create a special danger. After WWII, it was German Shepherds and Dobermans. All cases to stop such breed-specific legislation have failed, because the “rational relation” standard is met by only a single case of harm. A case in progress right now in Concord, California involves Theresa Huerta, a woman suing under the Americans with Disabilities Act to keep her pit bull therapy dog from being euthanized. Wagman concluded by saying that his overall objective is to keep the public and the courts focused on the real issue, which is ending blatant cases of animal abuse. Animal law is a growing field, and there’s an annual animal law conference in Portland that’s now in its fifth year. ...

April 8, 2010 · 14 min

Rom Houben not communicating; blogger suppresses the evidence

It has now been demonstrated, as no surprise to skeptics, that Rom Houben was not communicating via facilitated communication, a discredited method by which facilitators have typed for autistic children. A proper test was conducted by Dr. Steven Laureys with the help of the Belgian Skeptics, and it was found that the communications were coming from the facilitator, not from Houben. A blogger who was a vociferous critic of James Randi and Arthur Caplan for pointing out that facilitated communication is a bogus technique and who had attempted to use Houben’s case to argue that Terri Schiavo also may have been conscious is not only unwilling to admit he was wrong, but is deleting comments that point to the results of this new test. I had posted a comment along the lines of “Dr. Laureys performed additional tests with Houben and the facilitator and found that, in fact, the communications were coming from the facilitator, not Houben” with a link to the Neurologica blog; this blogger called that “spam” (on the basis of my posting a similar comment on another blog, perhaps) and “highly misleading” (on the basis of nothing). As I’ve said all along, this doesn’t mean that Houben isn’t “locked in” and conscious, but facilitated communication provides no evidence that he is. (Previously, previously.) ...

February 20, 2010 · 2 min

Vocab Malone on abortion and personhood, part 5

Vocab has put up the fifth and final part of his essay on abortion and personhood up at his blog, devoted to Thomson’s violinist argument. I don’t really have much to say about it–we didn’t coordinate our posts in advance, and I’ve already discussed Thomson’s argument myself in my response to part 4. I disagree with Vocab’s claim that Thomson’s argument proves too much and would allow infanticide–her argument only addresses a physically dependent fetus. And, as I already pointed out in my prior response, the argument doesn’t prove as much as it purports to. The violinist case isn’t exactly analogous to pregnancy and abortion in a number of ways, and Vocab is right to point out the differences. I agree that if a pregnancy is allowed to go to term (as well as to some earlier point at which there is plausible evidence for personhood on my standard), then that entails at least tacit consent and a moral duty of care. I would still argue, however, that abortion would be legitimate beyond that point for medically justifiable reasons (e.g., endangered health and life of the mother). This position–like the current position of the courts, which I think is approximately correct despite being based on viability–points out that there are more than two polar opposite positions in this debate. In Vocab’s final part, he talks a bit about the work that he and his wife do in caring for foster children. I commend him for that work, which is all-too-rare among opponents of abortion. Thanks, Vocab, for the debate–and I still would like to hear a response from you in the comments on some of the issues that have been left hanging (e.g., in the comments on part 3). UPDATE: It would probably be better to end this discussion with a summary that I already made in the comments on part 3: We don’t disagree that there is continuity of organism (just as there is continuity of a population of organisms over time)–all life on this planet is connected in that way. But just as we don’t count every species as human, even in our own genetic lineage, we don’t count every life stage of individual human organisms as persons. There’s a sense in which “I” was once a zygote that had my same DNA, but at that stage there was no “me” there yet–there was nothing that it was like to be a zygote, to use Thomas Nagel’s expression. In that same sense that “I” was a zygote, “I” will be a dead body in the future, even though there will at that point be nothing that it is like to be me, and the person that I am will be gone from the world though my body will briefly remain. I think we understand each other’s positions. You think that being a human organism is the same thing as to be a person, while I think personhood is a feature that comes into existence and persists for a subset of the life of an organism, that requires capacities of sentience or self-awareness. But I think I can give reasons to support why my view makes moral, legal, and practical sense, and why human cultures and practices are more consistent with my view than yours. I don’t think you can give such reasons, other than the brute assertion that human organisms are persons from start to finish. Your view has no need of the notion of person, yet it seems to me that there are all sorts of practical, moral, and legal reasons why we do need and use such a notion. ...

December 19, 2009 · 21 min

Vocab Malone on abortion and personhood, part 4

Vocab Malone has posted the fourth part of his essay on abortion and personhood, addressing the arguments from viability and wantedness. These are two more arguments that I don’t place a whole lot of stock in, though perhaps some commenters will want to say more about. The viability criterion is significant in that it’s the basis of current federal case law on abortion since Roe v. Wade, but Vocab correctly notes that viability changes with the availability of technology, and that doesn’t seem like a feature that should be relevant to whether one is a person. On the other hand, it is relevant to the notion of dependence–pre-viability is a time where, if you do grant that a fetus is a person, it’s a person that is dependent for its existence upon another person. This raises questions of when it is morally permissible for a person upon whom another is dependent for their life to sever that dependence. Judith Jarvis Thomson’s argument on abortion, which I referred to earlier in my response to part 1 of Vocab’s essay, presents the following scenario: ...

December 18, 2009 · 13 min

Vocab Malone on abortion and personhood, part 3

Vocab Malone has posted the third part of his argument against abortion at his blog, focusing on what he calls “the argument from size.” As I don’t think there’s any plausibility to this argument, I won’t spend any time with it, but there are still a few things in his post that I think demand response. The first is the assertion Vocab quotes from “prolific pro-life trainer and speaker Scott Klusendorf” that he always encounters this argument when he speaks at Christian schools. I find this assertion very difficult to believe–I don’t think I’ve ever encountered this argument anywhere, and I suspect that Klusendorf is either intentionally or unintentionally misconstruing some other argument as this argument. (Would he consider Randy Newman’s song, “Short People,” to be an instance of the argument, given its lyric, “short people got no reason to live”?) The instance of the argument Vocab suggests is nothing of the sort, though at least he admits that it is an argument about another subject. Here’s the quote as Vocab presents it: From the other end of things, a recent New York Times article featured a similar argument (although his piece was on a broader topic than abortion): Look at your loved ones. Do you see a hunk of cells or do you see something else? … We do not see cells, simple or complex – we see people, human life. That thing in a petri dish is something else. [2]The quote is from a New York Times editorial by neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga about the difference between reproductive and therapeutic cloning. Here’s the quotation in context; it’s the ending of the piece: ...

December 16, 2009 · 16 min
Mastodon Verification