Bad spammer neighborhoods

I’ve been collecting data about IPs that have been attempting to spam my mail server for the past few months, and today I decided to take a look at what neighborhoods of /24 networks are the most heavily populated with spamming IPs. Here’s the list of the top ten “worst neighborhoods” trying to send me spam, mostly with dictionary attacks against my domain. These are all blocked by the CBL, so none of this spam actually gets through, but it ties up my bandwidth. I’ve put an asterisk (*) next to the ranges that are probably actually smaller than /24s based on the distribution of IPs. Does anybody have a tool that already exists to identify likely bad ranges to block based on the distribution of known bad IPs? All I did here was count IPs within a /24, but it would be nicer to identify the likely ranges of badness at both a more fine-grained and broader level. Note that these bad neighborhoods may be neighborhoods of poorly secured machines, or they may be neighborhoods of malicious machines. Either way, the providers are not doing a good job of cracking down on malicious activity from their networks. 1. 64.32.26.0/24 (25 IPs) 45 46 51 52 54 66 68 73 81 90 100 102 104 111 113 126 155 157 163 168 194 199 204 236 242 AS 46844 | 64.32.26.0 | ST-BGP - SHARKTECH INTERNET SERVICES Upstream provider: AS 7922 | 64.32.26.0 | COMCAST-7922 - Comcast Cable Communications, Inc. *2. 89.232.105.0/24 (24 IPs) 21 24 29 32 48 57 59 63 64 68 76 89 93 94 97 101 103 107 114 117 126 129 137 139 AS 28840 | 89.232.105.0 | TATTELECOM-AS Tattelecom.ru/Tattelecom Autonomous System Upstream provider: AS 6854 | 89.232.105.0 | SYNTERRA-AS SYNTERRA Joint Stock Company 64.32.26.0 3. 208.84.243.0/24 (20 IPs) 13 30 63 68 78 92 99 123 148 150 175 176 179 185 196 199 216 219 226 250 AS 40260 | 208.84.243.0 | TERRA-NETWORKS-MIAMI - Terra Networks Operations Inc. Upstream provider: AS 22364 | 208.84.243.0 | AS-22364 - Telefonica USA, Inc. *4. 83.149.3.0/24 (17 IPs) 5 6 12 14 16 18 21 22 25 28 30 40 42 47 48 51 63 AS 31213 | 83.149.3.0 | MF-NWGSM-AS OJSC MegaFon Network Upstream providers: AS 12389 | 83.149.3.0 | ROSTELECOM-AS JSC Rostelecom AS 20485 | 83.149.3.0 | TRANSTELECOM JSC Company TransTeleCom *5. 76.164.227.0/24 (16 IPs) 138 155 159 174 182 186 194 199 202 206 210 218 222 230 238 246 AS 36114 | 76.164.227.0 | RDTECH-ASN - R & D Technologies, LLC Upstream providers: AS 6473 | 76.164.227.0 | WCIXN4 - WCIX.Net, Inc. AS 35937 | 76.164.227.0 | MARQUISNET - MarquisNet LLC 6. 76.164.232.0/24 (15 IPs) 13 21 24 33 36 38 40 43 48 57 198 206 218 232 234 AS 36114 | 76.164.232.0 | RDTECH-ASN - R & D Technologies, LLC Upstream providers: AS 6473 | 76.164.227.0 | WCIXN4 - WCIX.Net, Inc. AS 35937 | 76.164.227.0 | MARQUISNET - MarquisNet LLC 7. 77.120.128.0/24 (15 IPs) 20 37 50 85 93 104 107 112 159 162 187 232 239 248 252 AS 43011 | 77.120.128.0 | DATASVIT-AS ISP Datasvit AS Number Upstream provider: AS 25229 | 77.120.128.0 | VOLIA-AS Volia Autonomous System *8. 78.138.170.0/24 (12 IPs) 66 68 77 78 160 166 178 189 190 193 202 211 AS 28840 | 78.138.170.0 | TATTELECOM-AS Tattelecom.ru/Tattelecom Autonomous System Upstream provider: AS 6854 | 89.232.105.0 | SYNTERRA-AS SYNTERRA Joint Stock Company 64.32.26.0 9. 77.232.143.0/24 (12 IPs) 33 37 40 63 69 104 175 182 190 215 218 251 AS 42145 | 77.232.143.0 | BSTV-AS OOO Bryansk Svyaz-TV Upstream provider: AS 20485 | 77.232.143.0 | TRANSTELECOM JSC Company TransTeleCom *10. 95.154.113.0/24 (12 IPs) 140 178 181 185 193 195 197 206 218 246 248 254 AS 44724 | 95.154.113.0 | OCTOPUSNET-AS Octopusnet LTD Upstream provider: AS 34470 | 95.154.113.0 | PTKOM-AS PortTelekom Autonomous system

July 25, 2009 · 4 min

Bad military botnet proposal still being pushed

I just came across an April 2009 BBC story which shows that USAF Col. Williamson is still promoting his idea of building a U.S. military botnet to engage in offensive denial of service attacks against foreign targets on the Internet. But I haven’t seen him respond to any of the criticisms of his bad idea, including in the online forum of the journal where he published it. I think a more effective idea would be to adjust the computer crime statutes to provide immunity to prosecution (or at the very least an affirmative defense to criminal charges) for private responses to attacks that meet certain criteria, so that ISPs, security researchers, and competent individuals could engage in offensive actions against compromised machines to disable malicious software or take them off the network. Perhaps some kind of licensing or bonding would do the trick, and ISPs could put an exception into their acceptable use policies for entities that met the criteria. That’s also my partial response to this more recent BBC story about “what rules apply in cyber-wars” which led me to find the Williamson article.

June 27, 2009 · 1 min

Tracking cyberspies through the web wilderness

Yesterday’s New York Times has an interesting article about how security researchers at the University of Toronto have helped uncover online spy activity, apparently conducted by the Chinese government, against the Dalai Lama’s office in India. One odd comment in the article: “And why among the more than 1,200 compromised government computers representing 103 countries, were there no United States government systems?" I find this particularly odd in that I’ve seen compromised U.S. government systems plenty of times in my information security career, including spam issued from military computers. I don’t find it plausible that the U.S. government has recently improved the security of all of its computers and networks so that there are no more compromised systems. In the context of the article, it’s discussing more specifically compromises due to the particular spy ring being monitored. The preceding sentences point out that they weren’t able to determine with certainty who was running it, and the immediately preceding sentence asks, “Why was the powerful eavesdropping system not password-protected, a weakness that made it easy for Mr. Villeneuve to determine how the system worked?" The question should actually have asked why it wasn’t encrypted, rather than “password-protected,” but the possibilities suggested to me here are that (a) this particular activity is being run by amateurs or (b) this particular activity was intentionally detectible as either (i) a distraction from other, more hidden activity or (ii) to put the blame on China by somebody other than China. ...

May 12, 2009 · 2 min

The Cybersecurity Act of 2009

There’s FUD spreading about Sec. 14 of the Cybersecurity Act of 2009, maintaining that it amounts to an effective repeal of the 4th Amendment for the Internet. That’s not so–the scope is restricted to “threat and vulnerability information” regarding the Internet, which I interpret to mean network service provider knowledge about compromised systems, botnets, etc., much of which is no doubt already being voluntarily shared with the government as is permissible under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, when, in the course of a provider’s normal service monitoring, it becomes aware of possible criminal activity. I expect I’ll have more to say after I have a chance to read through the whole bill (PDF).

April 5, 2009 · 1 min

Military botnets article

I’m quoted in Peter Buxbaum’s “Battling Botnets” article in the August 20, 2008 Military Information Technology. It didn’t really fully capture the points I made in the interview, and I don’t remember saying the statement at the end about using botnets as an offensive measure as “a nuclear option.” I said that nullrouting is a much better method of denial of service for network service providers than flooding attacks, and made a point similar to Schneier’s about military attacks on the infrastructure of another nation that the U.S. is at war with–it would be more useful to obtain access to their systems, monitor, and disrupt than to just shut off access completely, but those points weren’t reflected in the article. I’ve written more about military use of botnets at this blog.

August 29, 2008 · 1 min

Bad military botnet proposal

An article by Col. Charles W. Williamson III titled “Carpet bombing in cyberspace: Why America needs a military botnet” has been published by the Armed Forces Journal. Col. Williamson, seeing that miscreants are using compromised machines all over the Internet to create botnets used for malicious purposes, has decided that the military needs to create its own, legitimate botnet. He proposes that this would be used in order to respond to online attacks from foreign countries by attacking the attackers, including both government and civilian attacking machines as necessary. He specifically proposes not using compromised machines (which would be illegal), but using machines on the af.mil (U.S. Air Force) network, including all hosts on the NIPRNet (Nonsecret IP Network). The proposal doesn’t really make any sense to me. First of all, attacks from hostile compromised machines on the Internet occur on a daily basis and are already handled by network service providers. These attacks are never likely to be initiated specifically from an individual attacking country’s systems, but rather from compromised systems all over the world–sometimes including compromised systems belonging to the U.S. military. Second, the best way to respond to attacking systems is not by launching hostile traffic back at them, but by filtering them or nullrouting them. Again, network service providers already do this today, and cooperate with each other in addressing major attacks. Thirdly, if the U.S. military sets up a botnet and uses it to launch denial of service attacks, it will be in violation of its own contracts with its network service providers–I don’t know of any network service provider that offers a military exception to its terms of service regarding denial of service attacks. Fourth, if all of the U.S. military bots are on its own network, their aggregate bandwidth still can’t exceed the bandwidth of its connections to other networks. Fifth, if there are attacks coming from another country that the U.S. is at war with, the recent subsea cable outages in the Middle East suggest that there are other effective mechanisms for disabling their ability to engage in Internet attacks. Finally, it’s not clear to me what benefit would be obtained from the military setting up its own botnet on its own network using its own IPs. Botnets offer two main benefits–(1) offering a distributed platform for computing and traffic generation and (2) creating a buffer of separation between the agent performing an action and the action itself. The second benefit occurs because the miscreant doesn’t own the machines that make up the botnet, lots of other people do. A botnet composed entirely of hosts on the military’s network is relatively easy to identify, filter, and block–the second benefit doesn’t exist. The first benefit is also mostly lost if you use your own network and hosts. The point of a distributed denial of service attack is to use up the other guy’s bandwidth, but not your own. That’s very easy to do if you’re not using your own resources, which is why distributed denial of service attacks use compromised systems and, sometimes, methods to amplify attacks using other people’s servers that send out responses that are larger than the requests that prompt them. But if you’re using your own resources on your own networks, you’re limited to the bandwidth you have at your network interconnection points, and multiplying hosts inside that perimeter gains you nothing except a guarantee that you can saturate your own internetwork connectivity and cut yourself off from the outside unless your target has less bandwidth than you do. It’s ironic that Williamson complains about a “fortress mentality,” while making a proposal to create a gigantic bot army inside the military’s own perimeter. A million-man army doesn’t help you if they’re inside a fortress with exits that restrict its ability to be deployed, except when you can win the battle with the number of men who can leave the exits at any one time. I’ve also posted a comment on the Armed Forces Journal article at the AFJ’s forum where I make a few additional points. I also agree with many of the other critical remarks that have been made in the thread there. “Crass Spektakel”’s point that “Whoever controls BGP and the backbone routers controls the internet” and that most of the control of BGP routing and the routing registries resides in the U.S. is a good one. A similar point could be made about DNS. Other posts on this subject: Kevin Poulsen at the Wired blog Jon Stokes at Ars Technica UPDATE (May 14, 2008): I may take some heat for even suggesting this, but an idea which actually takes advantage of both of the characteristic benefits of botnets I listed above and would be far, far more effective than Williamson’s proposal would be if the military produced bot software along the lines of SETI@Home and Folding@Home, which anyone could volunteer to download and run on their home or corporate machines (or better still, made available to run on XBoxes and Play Station 3s), for use by the military when needed. Some of the abuse worries could be defeated if the activation and deactivation of the software was fully under the control of the end user, and the military obtained appropriate permission from upstream ISPs for activities which would otherwise constitute AUP violations by end users. I hasten to add that this is still a terrible idea–putting such software out in public makes it a certainty that it would be reverse-engineered, and the probability of it being compromised by third parties for their own abuses would correspondingly increase. UPDATE: Looks like Paul Raven beat me to the “Milnet@Home” idea, as he dubs it. A commenter at Bruce Schneier’s blog also came up with the same idea. F-Secure’s blog also offers some good criticisms of Williamson’s proposal. ...

May 13, 2008 · 5 min

Canada busts 17 in botnet ring

This morning Canada arrested 17 people of ages ranging from 17 to 26 years old for running botnets containing “up to one million computers” in 100 countries. They face charges that could result in up to 10 years in prison. This barely scratches the surface of online criminal activity. Niels Provos of Google did a study (PDF) that found that of 4.5 million websites scanned between March of 2006 and February of 2007, 450,000 of them attempt to load malware on visiting machines. Sophos’ similar survey in July of last year that found that 29% of websites host malware, 28% host porn or gambling content, and 19% are spam-related. Drive-by malware installations (where merely visiting a website causes malware to be loaded onto your machine) are definitely the method of choice for creating botnets today. I recommend using Firefox with the NoScript plugin and the MyWOT plugin to help prevent getting infected by such sites. Tomorrow, I’ll be attending a New Mexico InfraGard conference at which I hope to learn more about recent malware trends (and get my copy of Catch Me If You Can and/or The Art of the Steal autographed by their author). This is another one open to the general public, so I expect no talk about “shoot to kill” powers except in jest. UPDATE (February 22, 2008): I’m quoted in Brian Jackson’s article on the Quebec botnet hacker bust on itbusiness.ca. I’m not entirely happy with the quotes attributed to me–I didn’t say “tens of millions,” though I said there have been botnets with more than a million hosts, and there are multiple millions of compromised hosts out there. If tens of millions is not accurate today, it will be in the future. The other quotation about IRC got a little bit garbled, but is not far off–I made the point that the bots of today have evolved from a combination of IRC bots of the past combined with denial of service attack tools, remote access trojans, and other malware, and many of them still use IRC as their mode of communication.

February 21, 2008 · 2 min

Tinfoil hat brigade generates fear about Infragard

An article in The Progressive by Matthew Rothschild worries that the FBI’s InfraGard program is deputizing businesses, training them for martial law, and giving them a free pass to “shoot to kill.” Rothschild writes: The members of this rapidly growing group, called InfraGard, receive secret warnings of terrorist threats before the public does—and, at least on one occasion, before elected officials. In return, they provide information to the government, which alarms the ACLU. But there may be more to it than that. One business executive, who showed me his InfraGard card, told me they have permission to “shoot to kill” in the event of martial law.Nonsense. I’ve been a member of the Phoenix InfraGard Members Alliance for years. It’s a 501(c)(3) organization sponsored by the FBI whose members have been subjected to some rudimentary screening (comparable to what a non-cleared employee of the federal government would get). Most InfraGard meetings are open to the general public (contrary to Rothschild’s statement that “InfraGard is not readily accessible to the general public”), but the organization facilitates communications between members about sensitive subjects like vulnerabilities in privately owned infrastructure and the changing landscape of threats. The FBI provides some reports of threat information to InfraGard members through a secure website, which is unclassified but potentially sensitive information. InfraGard members get no special “shoot to kill” or law enforcement powers of any kind–and membership in the organization is open to anyone who can pass the screening. As Rothschild notes in the first sentence of his article, there are over 23,000 members–that is a pretty large size for a conspiracy plot. At one point in the article, Rothschild quotes InfraGard National Members Alliance chairman Phyllis Schneck referring to a “special telecommunications card that will enable your call to go through when others will not.” This is referring to a GETS card, for the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service, which provides priority service for call completion in times of emergency or disaster to personnel who are working to support critical infrastructure. There is a similar service for wireless priority (Wireless Priority Service), and yet another for critical businesses and organizations (like hospitals) which need to have their telecommunications service re-established first after a loss of service due to disaster (Telecommunications Service Priority). These programs are government programs that are independent of InfraGard, though InfraGard has helped members who represent pieces of critical infrastructure obtain GETS cards. The ACLU’s concern about InfraGard being used as a tip line to turn businesses into spies is a more plausible but still, in my opinion, unfounded concern. Businesses are not under any pressure to provide information to InfraGard, other than normal reporting of criminal events to law enforcement. The only time I’ve been specifically asked to give information to InfraGard is when I’ve been asked to speak at a regular meeting, which I’ve done a few times in talks that have been open to the public about malware threats and botnets. Check out the comments in The Progressive for some outright hysteria about fascism and martial law. I saw similar absurdity regarding the Department of Homeland Security’s TOPOFF 4 exercise, which was a sensible emergency planning exercise. Some people apparently are unable to distinguish common-sense information sharing and planning in order to defend against genuine threats from the institution of a fascist dictatorship and martial law. Now, I think there are plausible criticisms to be made of the federal government’s use of non-governmental organizations–when they’re used to sidestep laws and regulations like the Freedom of Information Act, to give lots of government grant money to organizations run by former government employees, to legally mandate funding of and reporting to private organizations and so forth. The FBI has created quite a few such organizations to do things like collect information about missing and exploited children, online crime, and so forth, typically staffed by former agents. But personally, I’ve not witnessed anything in InfraGard that has led me to have any concerns that it’s being used to enlist private businesses into questionable activities–rather, it’s been entirely devoted to sharing information that private businesses can use to shore up their own security and for law enforcement to prosecute criminals. UPDATE (February 9, 2008): The irony is that Matthew Rothschild previously wrote, regarding 9/11 truthers: We have enough proof that the Bush administration is a bunch of lying evildoers. We don’t need to make it up.He’s right about that, but he’s now helped spread nonsense about InfraGard and seriously damaged his own credibility. I find it interesting that people are so willing to conclude that InfraGard is a paramilitary organization, when it’s actually an educational and information sharing organization that has no enforcement or even emergency, disaster, or incident response function (though certainly some of its members have emergency, disaster, and incident response functions for the organizations they work for). UPDATE (February 10, 2008): I suspect tomorrow Christine Moerke of Alliant Energy will be getting calls from reporters asking what specifically she confirmed. I hope they ask for details about the conference in question, whether it was run by InfraGard or DHS, what the subject matter was, and who said what. If there’s actually an InfraGard chapter endorsing the idea that InfraGard members form armed citizen patrols authorized to use deadly force in time of martial law, that’s a chapter that needs to have its leadership removed. My suspicion, though, is that some statements about protection of infrastructure by their own security forces in times of disaster or emergency have been misconstrued. Alliant Energy operates nuclear plants, nuclear plants do have armed guards, and in Arizona, ARS 13-4903 describes the circumstances under which nuclear plant security officers are authorized to use deadly force. Those people, however, are thoroughly trained and regularly tested regarding the use of force and the use of deadly force in particular, which is not the case for InfraGard members. UPDATE (February 11, 2008): Somehow, above, I neglected to make the most obvious point–that the FBI doesn’t have the authority to grant immunity to prosecution for killing. If anyone from the FBI made that statement to InfraGard members, they were saying something that they have no authority to deliver on. UPDATE (February 12, 2008): I’ve struck out part of the above about the ACLU’s concern about spying being unfounded, as I think that’s too strong of a denial. There is a potential slippery slope here. The 9/11 Commission Report pointed to various communication problems that led to the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks. These problems included failure to share information (mainly from the CIA to the FBI and INS), failure to communicate information within the FBI (like Phoenix Special Agent Ken Williams’ memo about suspicious Middle Easterners in flight schools), and failure to have enough resources to translate NSA intercepts (some specific chatter about the attacks was translated after the attacks had already occurred). As a result, the CIA has been working closely with the FBI on counterterrorism and counterintelligence at least since 2001. (Also see Dana Priest, “CIA Is Expanding Domestic Operations,” The Washington Post, October 23, 2002, p. A02, which is no longer available on the Post’s site but can be found elsewhere on the web, on sites whose other content is so nutty I refuse to link, as well as this January 2006 statement from FBI Director Robert Mueller on the InfraGard website, which includes the statement that “Today, the FBI and CIA are not only sharing information on a regular basis, we are exchanging employees and working together on cases every day.”) The slippery slope is this–the CIA is an organization which recruits and develops in its officers a sense of flexible ethics which has frequently resulted in incredible abuses, and which arguably has done more harm than good to U.S. interests. (My opinion on the CIA may be found in my posts on this blog labeled “CIA”; I highly recommend Tim Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.) Some of that ethical flexibility may well rub off on FBI agents who work closely with CIA case officers. (The FBI itself has also had a history of serious abuses, an objective account of which may be found in Ronald Kessler’s book The Bureau: The Secret History of the FBI.) And then, that same ethical flexibility may rub off on InfraGard members as a result of their relationships with the FBI (and potentially relationships with the CIA, as well). The intelligence community seems to have a hunger for more and more information from more and more sources, but it is already awash in a sea of information that it has trouble processing today. (It doesn’t help that the Army fires direly needed Arabic translators because they are gay.) The need is to accurately assess the information that it has, and ensure that bits and pieces aren’t cherry-picked to produce desired conclusions, as well as ensure that information isn’t sought or assembled to serve personal and political ends of particular interests rather than combatting genuine threats to the country and its citizens. My recommendation is that all InfraGard members read Kessler’s The Bureau, Weiner’s Legacy of Ashes, and view the film that won the 2007 Academy Award for best foreign film, “The Lives of Others,” to help innoculate them against such a slippery slope. UPDATE: Amy Goodman interviewed Matt Rothschild for “Democracy Now!” on Wisconsin Public Television, in which it is pretty clear to me that Rothschild is exaggerating something he doesn’t understand–what he cites as evidence doesn’t support what he claims. Here’s a key excerpt, see the link for the full transcript: MR: […] And one other member of InfraGard [Christine Moerke of Alliant Energy] confirmed to me that she had actually been at meetings and participated in meetings where the discussion of lethal force came up, as far as what businesspeople are entitled to do in times of an emergency to protect their little aspect of the infrastructure. AG: But just to clarify, Matt Rothschild, who exactly is empowered to shoot to kill if martial law were declared? The business leaders themselves? MR: The business leaders themselves were told, at least in this one meeting, that if there is martial law declared or if there’s a time of an emergency, that members of InfraGard would have permission to protect—you know, whether it’s the local utility or, you know, their computers or the financial sector, whatever aspect. Whatever aspect of the infrastructure they’re involved with, they’d have permission to shoot to kill, to use lethal force to protect their aspect of the infrastructure, and they wouldn’t be able to be prosecuted, they were told. […] You know, this is a secretive organization. They’re not supposed to talk to the press. You need to get vetted by the FBI before you can join it. They get almost daily information that the public doesn’t get. And then they have these extraordinary, really astonishing powers being vested in them by FBI and Homeland Security, shoot-to-kill powers. I mean, this is scary stuff. MR: The business leaders themselves were told, at least in this one meeting, that if there is martial law declared or if there’s a time of an emergency, that members of InfraGard would have permission to protect—you know, whether it’s the local utility or, you know, their computers or the financial sector, whatever aspect. Whatever aspect of the infrastructure they’re involved with, they’d have permission to shoot to kill, to use lethal force to protect their aspect of the infrastructure, and they wouldn’t be able to be prosecuted, they were told.It looks to me like the following transformation has occurred: 1. At a DHS conference on emergency response, somebody asks if owners of critical pieces of infrastructure should be expected to use deadly force if necessary to protect it (e.g., a nuclear power plant). 2. Somebody at DHS answers yes. They may even add that in some cases the law provides specific justification for use of deadly force (as in the Arizona statute I cite above). 3. Matt turns that into a general right to “shoot-to-kill” in times of martial law by any InfraGard member. 4. The blogosphere turns that into roving citizen patrols unleashed on the nation as the Bush hit squad after declaration of martial law. I don’t see his key source–Christine Moerke–confirming anything beyond #1 and #2. Note other exaggerations and contradictions–Rothschild claims that InfraGard is highly secretive and selective, yet has quickly grown to over 23,000 members and has multiple public websites. He fails to note that most InfraGard meetings are open to the general public, or that it has been discussed in many articles in the national press over the last decade. Rothschild speaks of “business leaders,” which the blogosphere has turned into “CEOs,” yet I suspect the most common “business leader” represented in InfraGard is an IT or physical security manager. UPDATE (February 15, 2008): The FBI has issued an official response to Rothschild’s Progressive article (PDF), which says, in part: In short, the article’s claims are patently false. For the record, the FBI has not deputized InfraGard, its members, businesses, or anything else in the program. The title, however catchy, is a complete fabrication. Moreover, InfraGard members have no extraordinary powers and have no greater right to “shoot to kill” than other civilians. The FBI encourages InfraGard members – and all Americans – to report crime and suspected terrorist activity to the appropriate authorities.The FBI response also states that Rothschild has “refused even to identify when or where the claimed ‘small meeting’ occurred in which issues of martial law were discussed,” and promises to follow up with further clarifying details if they get that information. UPDATE (February 25, 2008): Here’s another blogger with a rational response to The Progressive article. UPDATE (March 2, 2008): Matthew Rothschild has responded to the FBI’s response on Alex Jones’ Info Wars blog, and he stands behind every word of his original article. He doesn’t display any knowledge of or response to any of the criticisms I’ve offered. ...

February 8, 2008 · 22 min

Notorious major spammer indicted

Alan Ralsky, at one time believed to be the top spammer in the world, has finally been indicted today by a federal grand jury. His home was raided back in 2005, and he’s now been charged along with ten other people in “a wide ranging international fraud scheme involving the illegal use of bulk commercial e-mailing.” Those indicted include James E. Bragg, 39, of Queen Creek, Arizona. The indictment alleges that Ralsky’s spam gang “tried to send spam” through botnets and engaged in a “pump and dump” stock scam for Chinese companies. The Detroit Free Press’s coverage reports: “Prosecutors described Ralsky, 52, of West Bloomfield, as one of the most prolific spammers in the nation. Until 2005, when federal agents raided his home and seized his computers, his operation sent tens of millions of unsolicited email messages daily to Internet subscribers, hawking everything from sexual enhancement drugs, weight loss products and worthless stock, the government said. In the summer of 2005 alone, prosecutors said, his operation generated $3 million." The DOJ press release is here. ...

January 4, 2008 · 2 min

Spammers and criminals for Ron Paul

From metafilter: When Ron Paul email spam started hitting inboxes in late October, UAB Computer Forensics Director Gary Warner published findings on the spam’s textual patterns and the illicit botnet used to spread it – findings which were picked up by media outlets and tech websites like Salon, Ars Technica, and Wired Magazine’s “Threat Level” blog, the latter in a set of followup posts by writer Sarah Stirland: 1, 2, 3. The Ron Paul fan response was swift and decisive: clearly the botnet was the work of anti-Ron Paul hackers trying to discredit his campaign, and Rudy Giuliani had paid Stirland (and not UAB Computer Forensics) to do a smear piece – as claimed by a YouTube video pointing to posts on RudyGiulianiForum.com. Thus proving, once again, that the Ron Paul campaign’s greatest liability is not so much his far-right conspiracy-driven antifederal libertarianism, but rather the spittle-flecked anger of his own noisiest supporters.There are definitely a lot of nuts among Ron Paul’s supporters. Meanwhile, he raised $3.8 million yesterday (apparently a number revised downward from $4.3 million) in the largest one-day online political fundraiser ever. Intrade currently shows Paul as the third most likely GOP nominee, after Giuliani and Romney. A few other Ron Paul-related blog posts that I realize I’ve neglected to mention here, from Dispatches from the Culture Wars: “Is Ron Paul a Dominionist?" Argues that Paul appears to have much in common with some theocrats. “Sandefur on Ron Paul” Doubts that Paul is a dominionist, but suggests he might be a Thomas DiLorenzo-style neo-confederate who thinks we don’t even need a federal government (in which case he wouldn’t really be the supporter of the Constitution that he seems to be) and that the U.S. Civil War wasn’t about slavery (which is pernicious nonsense). I also just came across this story, which says that Paul would like to see the U.S. Constitution amended to remove the subject of abortion from the purview of the courts, which is yet more anti-constitutional insanity. ...

November 6, 2007 · 17 min
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